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Since the second world war, there have been enormous changes in Britain’s 
production and employment patterns. Two possible explanations for this phenomenon 
are technical progress and demand shifts. We set out an industry model with 
imperfect competition to assess their roles.
In many ways, the effects of technical progress and demand shifts are intertwined. 
Technical changes which lead to new products or higher quality of output will obviously 
increase demand and employment. On the other hand, technical progress in the form 
of productivity gains have an ambiguous effect in employment terms. This is one of 
the questions we address.
In our model, we demonstrate that the impact of productivity gains on employment 
depend chiefly on the demand elasticity and the extent to which higher productive 
efficiency is passed on in lower prices. This implies that an understanding of "insider" 
power in wage setting is essential for evaluating these effects. In the long run, 
however, competition ensures that these "insider" effects are washed out and the long 
term effect of technical change depends chiefly on the demand elasticity. Under 
plausible assumptions and empirical estimates, we find these effects to be positive.
On the role of demand shifts, we note that these influences depend on the demand 
elasticity and the slope of the industry supply curve. Empirical estimates are obtained 
for these factors. Ultimately, the overall effects depend on the size of the demand 
shifts themselves which we suspect to be substantial. We distinguish between secular 
changes in demand and its cyclical counterpart. Cyclical demand could have been 
adversely affected by persistently large deviations from purchasing power parity and 
the differential pace of product improvement and development relative to competing
countries. Secular demand could have fallen due to a lower world income elasticity 
of demand for British industrial products.
Given the huge rise of unemployment in the last two decades, we assess its impact 
on the health of workers. After controlling for age, sex, duration of unemployment, 
regional characteristics, macro-economic and secular factors, we find that 
unemployment shocks have significant impacts on mortality rates. The pattern of such 
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8CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION.
In the period since the second world war, there have been enormous changes in 
Britain’s production and employment patterns. Back in 1960, manufacturing used to 
employ 37% of the labour force accounting for 37% of British Gross Domestic Product. 
In 1991, this has fallen to 22% representing 23% of GDP.1 This drop was particularly 
severe in the past decade. With the fall in industrial employment, there was also an 
alarming rise in unemployment, to a level which is sometimes comparable to that in 
the great depression. In this thesis, we attempt to shed some light on the causes of 
the employment changes in British industry and to study the health consequences of 
the rise in unemployment.
There are, of course, natural reasons why the share of industry output and 
employment might fall over time. For a start, the world is now much richer. Higher 
savings have led to a vast pool of financial resources that needs managing. Thus the 
financial sector has grown in importance and has absorbed manpower and resources 
from manufacturing. Better off individuals go on more holidays and entertain 
themselves with artistic and leisure activities creating a large leisure industry. The 
development and expansion of the service sector has led to it gradually overtaking the 
industry sector partly mirroring the way that manufacturing overtook the agricultural 
sector in the industrial revolution.
Internationally, some less developed countries have become richer in their capital 
stock, thus giving them a comparative advantage that hitherto did not exist. Moreover, 
as these LDC’s mature, some have become so efficient in manufacturing that they
Various issues of Department of Employment Gazette and National Accounts. 
Due to changes in definition, these comparisons are not exact.
have replaced part of the manufacturing capacity of the developed world. And, as the 
world economy develops, the income elasticities of demand for manufacturing goods 
fall since more people will be able to spend their extra income on holidays and such 
like.
Insofar as the substitution away from manufacturing industries is a natural 
consequence of global development, the decline in industrial employment and output 
need not pose any economic problems, much less imply a decline of the national 
economy. However, there are some phenomena which cause concern. First, there 
is the emergence of persistently high levels of unemployment suggesting that 
industries have been shedding jobs faster than the service sector was capable of 
absorbing them. Second, comparisons of British industrial employment and output with 
those in other industrialised countries reveal that the decline in Britain was much more 
severe. The growth of German and Japanese industries has, of course, been 
legendary. But even U.S. or French industrial performance compares very favourably 
to the British. Between 1960 and 1990, industrial production almost trebled in France, 
and U.S. industrial output grew by 150%. By contrast, British industry only managed 
a 50% growth. Over the same period, manufacturing employment in Britain fell by 
40%, much more than that in France (down 16%), or the U.S. (virtually unchanged).2 
Thus, there is a significant part of the change in British manufacturing employment that 
requires further investigation.
There exist a number of conjectures about the causes of industrial decline in Britain. 
Kaldor (1966) postulates that the growth rate of labour productivity is determined by 
the growth rate of manufacturing output, and that the comparatively poor performance 
of British industries is to be explained by inability to recruit sufficient labour to
2United Nations Monthly Digest of Statistics.
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manufacturing.3 However, Rowthom (1975) demonstrates empirically that labour 
productivity gains and the growth of the manufacturing employment are mutually 
independent. Bacon and Eltis (1976) suggest that the growth of the public sector had 
wrested labour and resources from manufacturing, creating structural imbalance and 
reducing industrial growth. Here too, Gomulka (1979) works out that, even if we 
accepted all their arguments, these would only explain 10% of the relative decline of 
British industrial output (relative to Germany or Japan) from 1961-74.
The weakness of these theories is that they are set in an environment of full 
employment, and their persuasiveness is seriously undermined by high levels of 
unemployment. It appears that the modelling of industrial performance must allow for, 
and hopefully explain, the presence of unemployment. In this regard, Layard and 
Nickell (1985,1986) provide a neoclassical model which explains the changes in British 
employment and unemployment. The possible causes they examined include wage 
push variables such as benefits and unions, import prices, cyclical demand factors, 
and technical progress.
We adopt this approach and extend it into the present analysis. In particular, we are 
concerned about the drastic decline of manufacturing employment relative to the 
domestic economy, and also relative to international competitors. Were there factors 
specific to British industries which caused them to decline, or have British industries 
been less able to adapt to general economic, technological or price developments? 
And how do we measure the effects of these factors?
Our framework is one where industries compete in an imperfectly competitive market 
with other domestic industries as well as foreign producers. The main causes we 
would like to explore are technical progress and shifts in the demand function. In
3Kaldor (1975) later recanted this latter view, and thought that the lack of 
international competitiveness was probably more important.
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order to give us a frame of reference, let us begin with a consideration of a set of 
possible explanations.
There are those who believe that raw material or import prices are important causes 
for the decline in industrial employment. Material costs can influence the 
manufacturing sector in two ways. First, they enter the production process, possibly 
affecting factor allocation efficiency, and definitely making final goods more expensive 
to produce. If the production function is separable in materials, then factor utilization 
is unaffected, and material price changes impact on industry demand via differential 
material contents in different industries. Keeping in mind that we are trying to 
understand inter-country or inter-sector differences, this effect is important only if 
British industries have higher material input than their competitors. If so, then we 
would expect a drop off in demand for British industrial goods as input price rises.4
Another way material or import prices can affect industry is through their impact on 
the wage setting process, since it will exacerbate the wedge between the real product 
wage and the real consumption wage. Higher import prices will drive up the aggregate 
wage level, generating higher prices. Relative domestic prices are unchanged, but for 
the traded sector competitiveness will deteriorate causing a loss of demand (assuming 
that other countries do not suffer from the same problem). Of course, all these are 
relevant only if raw material or import prices have changed significantly. Here, the 
evidence is mixed. Commodity prices (including oil) have seen substantial rises in the 
seventies and early eighties, falling back significantly in the late 1980s.5 Real import 
prices, on the other hand, had shown no clear trend.6
4While there are plenty of casual evidence that the Japanese, for example, are 
moving into high value added activities, the extent of this development in Britain is 
unclear.
5See Figure 4 in Layard and Nickell (1991), "Unemployment", p400.
6See Layard and Nickell (1986), "The Rise in Unemployment", p128-129.
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A second set of possible explanations are wage push variables. Initially, variations 
in general wage push factors such as benefits or taxes would be expected to have a 
fairly uniform impact, changing aggregate wages but not affecting relative wages. 
However, if there are no abnormal profits, prices will have to rise to compensate, 
competitiveness will fall in the traded sector once again affecting demand. Industry 
specific wage push factors will obviously have more selective impact. Some, like union 
power, affects the sharing out of economic rents. As such, their influence is essentially 
short term, and of a duration that depends on the source of such rents and the 
competitive processes that will eliminate them. (We shall return to this point 
latter.) Empirically, the change in the general factors are well documented. For 
example, Layard and Nickell (1985) pointed out that taxes had risen steadily for the 
most part of the last three decades. Real benefits, on the other hand, are unlikely to 
offer a lot of explanatory power.
Overall then, the predominant way these factors influence industry employment is 
via their effect on industrial demand. Now this type of demand change is chiefly short 
term and cyclical. Theoretically, differences in competitiveness will be gradually 
removed by a combination of exchange rate depreciation and the elimination of 
temporary rents that are accruing to wages or profit margins. And that part of 
industrial demand that is pro-cyclical or anti-cyclical will also revert to its normal state. 
As such, they do not offer a satisfactory explanation of secular changes in 
employment.7 In practice, some types of cyclical demand can take a long time to 
recover. Exchange rates, for example, are driven mainly by financial flows rather than 
trade flows, and can deviate from purchasing power parity significantly for prolonged 
periods. Thus, producers may well have to treat them as secular changes. More
7This is especially true in the presence of adjustment costs, which will tend to make 
short term changes uneconomical.
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common types of secular demand factors are things like consumer tastes, and the 
world income elasticity of demand for British industrial goods. Here, we would expect 
producers to take full account of demand changes in planning their investment and 
labour requirements.8
Someone looking at industrial production statistics may well wonder why we need to 
worry about demand at all. Given that industrial output had increased over this period, 
albeit at an anaemic rate, and that employment had fallen, one might feel that, 
whatever happened to demand, it was technical progress which led to the contraction 
in employment. This simplistic view is incorrect because technical progress is 
intrinsically intertwined with industry demand.
Technical progress can occur in a number of ways. Most obviously, improvements 
in the methods of production mean that labour, machinery and material inputs are used 
more efficiently to produce the same product. In this sense, the impact on 
employment is ambiguous. Less manpower is now required to produce the same 
amount of output. On the other hand, reductions in the cost of production allow a 
lower price and generate more demand for this output.
Technical progress can also occur in other substantial ways. It can change the 
nature of products, for example make them more reliable. Consider the modem 
television set. It seldom goes wrong and when it does, repairing it is straightforward. 
Or consider the use of new materials. New alloys for the engine blocks in motorcars 
allow them to run at much higher temperatures. This greatly improves fuel efficiency 
and lowers running costs. Thus when we buy a television set or a motor car, we 
purchase a product that is intrinsically superior to items made a decade or so ago.
Technical progress can also change and increase the mix of goods available.
8ln this respect, note that Thirwall(1978) presents evidence that British industries 
have lower world income elasticities of demand when compared to other industrialised 
countries.
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Through a combination of better production technique, use of new materials etc., new 
products come on the market. Look at the large arrays of computers and computer 
software. While these changes are difficult to quantify, intuitively it is easy to see that 
these developments tend to increase the demand for industry products. That is, they 
shift the demand cun/e outward. What is more, international considerations 
exacerbate the sensitivity of these effects, further emphasizing the desirability of 
technical progress. Indeed, there is a view that British industries suffer from 
disadvantages in the development of technical innovations.9
Nonetheless, new technologies tend to divide employers and employees. For 
however good new products are, they tend to be made by new workers in new working 
arrangements. Very often, this does not generate any great advantage to the existing 
workforce. Of particular interest is the role of technical innovations in production 
efficiency. There is considerable resistance to the implementation of new technologies 
because of a fear that they will cost jobs. However, as we argued before, 
technological lags can cause serious losses in demand in the long term. It is thus 
important to clarify the arguments.
The balance between lower employment due to labour efficiency and higher 
employment due to increased demand depends on two things. First, the elasticity of 
demand. Second, the extent to which higher production efficiency is passed on in the 
form of lower prices. As production techniques improve the cost of production falls, 
generating the possibility of higher profit margin and wages and, to the extent that 
these have not exhausted the technical gain, lower prices attract larger demand. Of 
course, such progress spreads out to other producers sooner or later and profit 
margins will need to come back into line. Similarly wages which may be held higher
9see Gomulka, S. (1979), "Increasing Inefficiency versus Slow Rate of 
Technological Change".
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for a time through union action, for example, will have to reckon with competitive 
forces eventually. Therefore, in the short run, rent seeking behaviour in wage and 
price setting have important implications for industrial adjustments to technology and 
demand changes. In the long run, the employment consequences of technical 
progress in production depend mainly on the demand elasticity.
Given the pivotal roles that industry demand and technical progress play in the 
determination of employment, we need to address several questions. First, how 
sensitive are employment and output to different kinds of demand shocks? And, what 
are the employment consequences of technical progress in production?
To answer these questions, we set out in chapter 2 an industry model with imperfect 
competition which determines industry wages, prices, employment and output. We 
then discuss the impact of technology and demand shocks in our model. In chapter 
3, we derive and estimate an empirical version of our model using 3-digit level industry 
data This provides parameter values on an industry by industry basis to allow us to 
assess the significance of our analytical results. Along the way of the theoretical 
developments, we look into the behaviour of rent seeking in 
wage setting which affects the short run response of industry to technological or 
demand shocks. In particular, we employ the idea of "insider" effects in wage 
determination. In chapter 4, we provide a more rigorous derivation of these "insider" 
effects in wage setting. We then proceed to estimate these "insider" effects on 2-digit 
level industry data and attempt to explain them in terms of industry characteristics, 
such as union power.
Having thus explored the causes of employment decline in British industries, in 
chapter 5 we turn our attention to the health effects of the consequent rise in 
unemployment. The particular question we address concerns the relationship between 
mortality and unemployment. Despite a long list of literature on this subject stretching
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back to the 1930s, there is no strong consensus on the existence of the mortality 
effects of unemployment. Essentially, there are two problems which trouble 
investigators. One is the association between incidence of unemployment, mortality 
and chronic poverty, confusing the issue of causation. The second relates to a debate 
concerning whether material or psychological channels are more important. In a 
comparison of different British standard regions, we try to resolve these questions by 
exploring the different aspects of unemployment and how they may or may not be 
associated with mortality. One would expect that different characteristics of 
unemployment, such as its duration or its age specificity, will have differential effects 
on the unemployed. By exploiting these differences, we may be able to explain why 
conflicting results have been found in the literature, and to help resolve the debate 
over the manner in which these effects work.
The results from the various parts of the thesis are summarised in our conclusion, 
chapter 6. After which we present a list of references.
There are several themes which run through this thesis. One is, of course, the 
investigation of employment and unemployment. Another is our methodology. We are 
able to employ pooled cross section-time series throughout most of our analysis. This 
has the advantage of controlling for time invariant characteristics of the cross section 
unit, as well as macro factors which have a uniform impact. The implication in chapter 
5, for example, is that we need not worry about modelling the secular decline in 
mortality when we seek to explain cyclical effects like unemployment. In the earlier 
chapters too, we are able to control for industry characteristics and business cycle 
effects which would make estimations of demand elasticities and such like very 
difficult. The only point when we did not used this methodology is in the main part of 
chapter 4. This is decided mainly on technical grounds. Since we were interested 
only in the identification of the "insider" effects, the data requirements are somewhat
different. Furthermore, some wage push variables are only available at the 2-digit 
level. Using this in our estimation means that we cannot used pooled time series- 
cross section method, but are however able to use a longer run of data. As an 
interesting exercise, at the end of chapter 4, we present an alternative empirical route 
comparing estimates obtained using the 2-digit data set and the 3-digit data set. 
Reassuringly, these are remarkably similar.
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CHAPTER 2. THE DETERMINATION OF WAGES, PRICES, EMPLOYMENT AND 
OUTPUT IN BRITISH INDUSTRY: A MODEL WITH IMPERFECT 
COMPETITION.
I. Introduction.
In this chapter, we provide a theoretical analysis of the impact of technical progress 
and demand shifts on British manufacturing employment. Our aim is to explain the
secular changes in employment in this sector, particularly the sharp decline since the
early 1970s.
There is a long history of research into the causes of slow industrial growth in Britain. 
This includes the papers by Kaldor (1966,1975), Bacon and Eltis (1976), and 
Eltis(1979). In the main, these arguments are based on growth theories with the 
implicit assumption of full employment. Their relevance has thus been weakened by 
the rise of unemployment. An attempt to model industrial performance must allow for 
the presence of unemployment. For this, we turn to the approach developed in Layard 
and Nickell (1986,1991), in which they set out a neoclassical model to explain the rise 
in British unemployment. The array of possible causes they examined include wage 
push variables such as benefits and unions, import prices, cyclical demand factors, 
and technical progress.
We extend this approach into the present analysis. Of particular concern to us is the 
fact that, though overall employment growth has been anaemic and aggregate 
unemployment has been rising, the fall in manufacturing employment has been 
especially severe. Furthermore, there is also a relative decline of British manufacturing 
when compared to those of other industrialised nations. Hence, there is a part in the 
movement of manufacturing employment that deserves further examination. The
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methodology and data we employ here allow us to utilise and investigate the difference 
in the inter-industry pattern of employment and output. The framework we use is a 
model of an imperfectly competitive industry in the presence of general wage setting 
behaviour. The general idea in this model is that as productivity or demand rises, both 
wages and profits rise in the short run, with the presence of "insider" forces in wage 
setting generating further complications. Over the longer term, however, competitive 
forces drive down the price of output relative to costs and eventually wages are forced 
back into line.
This analysis allows us to address a number of important issues. There are those 
who resist the implementation of new technologies on the ground that such 
technologies will reduce employment. If we observe the histories of past innovations, 
this does not appear to be the case. More significantly, delay and refusal to accept 
new technologies, either in new products or new processes, can cause a serious loss 
of competitiveness and hence, demand. It is very desirable to resolve this question 
on an industry by industry basis and also to assess their demand elasticities. There 
are also some evidence that the world income elasticities for British products are 
relatively low because British manufacturing is concentrated in the older industries, and 
that this may explain the reduction in Britain’s share of world trade.1 We attempt to 
capture this by calibrating a demand variable so that it has a trended part as well as 
a cyclical element.
In terms of a full explanation of the changes in manufacturing employment, there are 
of course other possibilities apart from technical progress and demand. Some have 
argued that import or raw material prices could be an explanation. While there is no 
clear evidence that real import prices have significantly increased,2 commodity prices
1For example, see the NEDO studies by Panic (1975).
2See Layard and Nickell (1986), pp128-9.
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have been more erratic.3 However, any rise in raw material prices would also affect 
other industrialised countries, such as Germany or Japan, and is therefore unlikely to 
explain international differences unless British industries have particularly high material 
contents. Variations in wage push variables such as benefits and taxes would also be 
expected to have a fairly uniform impact and unlikely to explain inter-sectoral 
differences. On the other hand, wage push effects which raise the general wage level 
may cause a more detrimental loss of competitiveness in a traded sector like 
manufacturing. These effects are captured as part of our demand variables. Hence, 
technology and demand shocks have pivotal roles in the determination of industry 
employment.
Following the developments in this chapter, we shall investigate empirically the 
impact of demand shifts and technical progress in the next chapter. In chapter 4, we 
return to the issue of "insider" forces in wage setting as this is of fundamental 
importance in understanding the labour market.
Our model of industry behaviour and wage determination is presented below. 
Section III contains a discussion of some long run comparative static results arising 
from the theory. In particular, we shall concentrate on the long run impact of demand 
shifts and productivity gains. Section IV presents our conclusions.
3see Layard and Nickell (1991), figure 4, p400.
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II. A Model of Industry Behaviour.
In this section we discuss the behaviour of firms in an imperfectly competitive 
industry and go on to present a rather general model of wage setting. We then put the 
pieces together and study how the industry responds to exogenous changes in the 
long run.
The Behaviour of Firms.
Suppose that each industry, /, consists of price setting firms (indexed y). In order to 
analyze their pricing and employment decisions, we must specify the demand 
conditions which they face and their technology. Starting with the latter, the firms have 
a common, constant returns, technology described by
Y'j-F iA 'N 'jIK^K ,, (D
where Y is value-added output, N is employment, K is capital and A is labour 
augmenting technical progress.
Next consider the demand curve facing the industry. First we define real aggregate
demand in the whole economy as q°<y  where y  is the potential output of the
economy when resources are fully utilised and is a measure of aggregate demand 
relative to potential output. The share of real demand falling to the fh industry depends 
on a taste factor, 6 ,^ and demand factors specific to the industry, e°1i. The output of 
industry / competes in two specific markets, first the domestic market for all goods 
(price index P) and second the world market for all goods (price index P’ in domestic
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currency). The output of industry i also competes against the foreign output of the 
same industry and the price used here is the relevant import price, P-. So the demand 
curve facing industry / can be written as
Y,d-  (P,IP,I"*' IPiIP")'*1 (P,//’,•)"*’ e“ Y <2)
or
0°'Y  <3>
where 0= 0,+ 02+ 0, and a, is defined by
o r a^ aM+^ 0Q(pmlp)+^ ° Q ( pimlp)  ^
Having set the scene, we now discuss industry pricing behaviour. We suppose that 
prices are set before demand, o„ aggregate price, P, and wages Wh are revealed. 
Once prices have been set, output is produced in order to satisfy demand and labour 
is employed to produce the output.
Concerning price setting, we suppose that the industry output price which emerges 
is systematically related to the monopoly price which would rule if there was complete 
collusion between all the firms. The details of this relationship are discussed later.
The final price is uniform across all firms in the industry and demand, and hence
output, is distributed across firms according to size as measured by the 
(predetermined) capital stock. So the output-capital ratio is the same for all firms. 
Thus if Yh Kj, Nj are industry aggregates,
Y, :K, :Nr  Y9:Kf :N9
So we can write an industry aggregate production function
Yr F(A,N,IK,) K, (5)
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In order to derive the monopoly price, we may define the cost function corresponding 
to (5) as
C -C ^ W jA ^ Y ^ K ,  (6)
and given that the industry demand elasticity is 0, the monopoly price PmJ is given by
PmJ- ^ C 2(WlIAl ,YlIKl) (7)
Note that both C and marginal cost, C# are homogenous of degree one in prices and 
that the elasticity of demand, 0, must exceed unity.
The fundamental question is the determination of the relationship between Pmi and 
the actual price which is set. In a Coumot-Nash industry, the actual price is a fixed 
proportion of the monopoly price. This follows from the fact that in such an industry, 
price is set as a fixed mark-up on marginal cost, the mark-up depending on the 
Herfindahl index of concentration. However, other theories indicate that deviations of 
industry prices from the joint monopoly level are sensitive to the cycle. Stiglitz (1984) 
provides a long list of possible theories which generate the result that industry prices 
will tend to fall further below the joint monopoly price as demand expands. Thus, for 
example, the flow of potential entrants tends to be higher in booms than in slumps so 
the limit price required for entry deterrence is higher in the latter period. This is related 
to the result that in industries with free entry and exit, only average cost pricing can 
limit the threat of entry (see Mirman, Tauman and Zang 1986, for example).
In the context of oligopolistic industries Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) provide both 
a theoretical foundation and some empirical evidence for the view that collusion is 
more difficult when demand is high. The idea here is simply that the benefits of 
deviating from collusive behaviour are more likely to outweigh the costs when demand 
is high. Again this implies that the mark-up on marginal cost moves counter-cyclically.
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This discussion implies that we must allow for the possibility that there is a cyclical 
relationship between the actual price, P„ and the monopoly price PmJ with the 
discrepancy being bigger when demand is higher.4 This would imply that we have
Pr f(o f)P ml, fe l .^ O  (8)
a® being the expected demand index.
Since prices are fixed in advance, they must be set on the basis of expected 
marginal costs and so, using (7) and (8) we have
p,- c2(w; ia „ y; ik ,) (9)
To make our model comparable with standard models of price behaviour it is
convenient to separate out trend productivity effects and demand effects and this we
do by defining trend industry output by
Yr e“'(P ,IP a)-, eT'Y  (10)
where is the average demand index.
Now expected output, y^, is equal to expected demand at price P„ that is 
(from 3)
y,*-e“ '(P /P V  e °*7
Therefore,
Ultimately, this is an empirical matter and the discussion below does not depend 
on the particular cyclical behaviour of margins.
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Y '« /y '-e (°/#‘ " ') (11)
Hence, marginal cost, C& may be expressed in terms of trend industry output as
MCr  Ci ( W f/A,, Y,IK, ■ e{°''~Tt>) (12)
Instead of using trend capital productivity, it is more instructive to use trend labour
productivity. This we do by relating trend industry output, yt > to trend employment,
Af; , through the production relation
YIIK,-F(AN,IKI) (13)
Thus,
MCr  Ci ( W*, Y,IN„ A„ )
This is then incorporated in the price equation (9). Note that we are assuming here 
that y  . A„ Kj and co, are all known in advance.
It is convenient to present the relevant equations in log-linear form in order to provide 
a foundation for the empirical work and this we may do as follows.
Production function
y r kr i  o+ 't^ni¥* r ki) (5a)
Industry demand
y,-y-G>,-0(p,-p) + a , (3a)
Price-setting equation
PrP«-P3 (o '-T ,)*m c, (9a>
where the marginal cost is
me,- w,*-a,+ P2(y,*-Ar,)t (12a>
The marginal cost term can then be expressed in terms of trend labour productivity 
and demand effects by noting that y,0-y ,-  o*-a") . so
me,- w f-a ,*  p2 (yr k,) + p2 (o f - T , )
Furthermore
7 r * / - Y o + Y i  ( / » / + « / - * / )  ( 1 3 a )
which gives
Thus the marginal cost is re-written as:
me,-b0l + tv,* -  b, (yr n,)-( 1 -6 ,)a ,+p2(o ,*-o ) (12b)
& « r t - P 2 Y < /( 1 -Y i) .  * i - P 2Y i / ( 1 - Y i )
Therefore, the corresponding version of the price setting equation is:
pr w,’ -b 0-b^ (yr n i H l -*i W b ^ a *-°f) (9b)
^o"Po+ o^f» ^2“ p2~p3
This completes the discussion of firms’ behaviour and we must next move on to 
wage determination in the industry.
The Determination of Industry Wages.
We shall devote chapter 4 to study the complexity of the wage determination issue, 
in the following, we limit ourselves to a sketch of the basic features in our wage model 
that is relevant to the current analysis. Our model of wage determination is kept 
deliberately general because, in reality, wages may be determined by a variety of 
different methods even within the same industry. Here we see industry wages as 
being influenced by two sets of factors. The first group we call "insider" factors and 
these reflect productivity within the industry and the well-being of the existing 
workforce. The second group reflect "outsider1' influences which affect the firms’ ability
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to retain and motivate workers, and inciude wages paid elsewhere and the general 
state of the labour market.
In order to make these notions more precise, we begin by deriving the relationship 
between product wages, employment and productivity within the industry. This 
relationship is based on the marginal revenue product condition which is an alternative 
form of the pricing equation (9). It is a well known fact that marginal cost is equal to 
the wage divided by the marginal product of labour, so we have
MCr  WflA'F, W iK , )  <14>
Using this and rearranging (9), we obtain the marginal revenue product condition
w r — * = * - P A F t <A,N,'lK,) (15)
ef (o 7)
which is really an alternative way of writing the pricing rule. Under competition, of 
course, 0 «» and (15) then simply represents the employment decision of the
competitive firm with Pt now being exogenous. The log-linear version of (15) is 
obtained by using the production function (5a) to eliminate expected output y* in (9a) 
and (12a). This yields, after some re-arrangement
p r w  * - p  0 + P 2y  a - P 3(o  r o " / )+ P 2Y i( r t /# - f r / H 1  - P 2Y 1 K  * 1 0 )
In order to specify the "insider1 wage, we first ask the question, what would the wage 
have to be in order to generate a level of employment for all the workers considered
"insiders", /?/, if demand remains at the average level ? The answer is given by
29
(16), replacing n® by nj dropping the a terms. Insider wage setting, in its purest form, 
is concerned with maximising wages while guaranteeing the jobs of the existing 
workforce (see, Blanchard and Summers 1986, for example). Thus ni' would be set 
at av,(1-5) where 6 is the proportion who leave voluntarily. The argument here is that 
unions are the primary force in wage bargaining and their sole concern is with existing 
jobs. There are, however, further possibilities. For example, the union might also 
attach some weight to the recently unemployed workers from the /h industry. We 
would then have
0s<a,s1
where Uj refers to those unemployed who recently worked in industry /. So if L, is the 
labour force "attached" to firm /, defined as
L r N fU ,  
then N /-
where Uj=Uj/L, is the industry unemployment rate. So, In logs, we have
n / (17)
In addition, there are a number of further factors which could be included in the 
"insider" category. Insiders may resist wage adjustments associated with changes in 
the wedge between product wages and consumption wages (post-tax wages deflated 
by retail prices). In other words, if tax changes, for example, raise product wages 
relative to consumption wages, workers may resist the reduction in the consumption 
wage necessary to stabilise employment. Other factors tending to raise the "insider"
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wage may include the power of the union in industry i, for example, and in general we 
simply include all these exogenous forces in a vector z,,.
So we are now in a position to specify the "insiders" wage, w,1, as that which will 
ensure the long run employment of nj workers defined in (17), modified by some 
further exogenous factors z^. So we have, using (16),(17)
It is most unlikely, however, that firms are immune from outside forces and the 
"outsider" wage reflects this fact. This wage, w,°, captures the payment required to 
retain and motivate workers. This clearly depends on the wages that are expected to
rule elsewhere, modified by the chances of obtaining employment and the
financial and other penalties associated with unemployment. We suppose that the 
former depends inversely on the general level of unemployment, u, and the latter on 
a series of factors, such as the level of unemployment benefits, which we label z^. 
The outsider wage may, therefore, be specified as
where, for the moment, we suppose the unemployment term to enter linearly.
Now we assume that the actual wage set in industry i is a weighted sum of the
"insider" and "outsider" wages where the weights are X, 1 -X respectively. Thus we 
have
w/~(P 0+P2Y «+p2Yi* )+PrP2Yi((r,-i*>) 
+(1-P2Yi )a^P2Yi(“ i-6)W j., + z „
(18)
W,°-80,+ tV-C1 U+Zy (19)
WpX w/+(1 -X)wf°+X a
o - M P  o+ P2Y o+ P 2 Y i6  M 1  -X)b01+X (p ^2yA(kr lirl) 




In order to tie this up with our pricing model we shall suppose that L, is proportional 
to the trend level of employment in the industry thus yielding5
This implies
V W ^ r n) _a
„  u  , 1 iT , TT\ Y o  Y 1«1
o r    —
/ 4( 1 - Y i )  1 " Y i  1 - Y
making use of the trend production function (13a).
Substituting this into (20) now gives, after some manipulation, our final wage equation
wr c0+\(ppbi (yr n,)+{ 1 -b ja ,)
+(1 -X)(w -c1u+;rJ+A.pi!ir1(o l -8)uM (22)
c 0 - i  0+ A .(P 0 + P 2Y « + P 2Y ,8  )+ ( 1  - A ) 8 „ - P 2Y i « - * i Y  <?•
We can give some interpretation to (22) by re-arranging it as a relative wage 
equation,
wr w- c0+ k (6 / (yr n)+(1 -8, )a ,-(w -p,))
+(1 - A) (c, u+zw) + A P2y, (u ,-8 )!/(.,
This indicates that wages in industry i rise relative to outside wages for four possible 
reasons. First, if inside "trend" marginal productivity,
5ln order to justify our comparative static results, we need only suppose that this 




rises relative to outside wages normalised on industry product prices, (w-p).
Second, if the general level of unemployment, u, is lower. Third, if the industry 
unemployment rate, u„ has been higher and fourth, if autonomous wage pressure 
inside the industry, z,, increases. The third of these effects may appear somewhat 
strange, at first sight, but it is really quite straightforward. If unemployment inside the 
industry has been rising, this implies that employment is now at quite a low level. The 
"insiders" can now negotiate a higher wage, without fear of job loss, than they would 
have been able to do had employment been previously maintained.
Three parameters are particularly important in understanding wage setting in a
particular industry. The parameter X measures the extent to which wage setting is 
influenced, in the short run, by "inside" forces such as own productivity. This is clearly
related both to the absence of competition in the product market and to the power of
unions in the labour market. The size of the (positive) coefficient on lagged
unemployment reflects the extent to which the existing employees are concerned only
with their own welfare and the extent to which they can impose this concern on
management. In a sense, therefore, a high coefficient on lagged unemployment
reflects both selfishness and power. This forms the basis of the hysteresis effect. The
third parameter is that associated with aggregate unemployment. This captures the
impact of outside labour market on wage setting. The higher it is, the more
"competitive" is wage setting behaviour.
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III. The Industry Model in the Long Run
One of the main purposes of setting up an industry model is to see how the industry 
will adjust in the long run to a variety of exogenous shifts. In particular we are 
interested in how wages, prices, output and employment adjust to technological 
improvements (rises in a,) and demand shifts (to,, a,). In order to undertake such an 
investigation we propose a specific operating context. First, we assume perfect 
foresight since we shall not be concerned here with the impact of surprises. Second, 
we shall not endogenise capital accumulation but simply investigate its consequences, 
while noting the situations in which capital accumulation is likely to occur, for example, 
when more capacity is clearly required. However, we must allow "trend" marginal 
productivity to change because this will influence "insider" wages. Our model allows 
trend productivity to evolve through equations (13) and (10). Recall that
YrIKr F{ANfIK f)
These ensure that when aggregate demand is operating at the full utilization level in 
the economy as a whole, then it will be enough to ensure that industry / will be 
operating at this same level. So, in the long run, the industry will operate at full 
utilization output when o,= 0.
Before looking at some comparative statics, one final point is worth remarking and 
this refers to the determination of employment. Since, in reality, there are employment 
adjustment costs, employment will adjust only slowly to exogenous shocks. The 
production function in (9a) should, therefore, be thought of as holding when 
employment has adjusted fully and when hours of work and capital utilization (shift
work) have reverted to their normal levels. The true, short run, production function 
would, of course, include these other factors but is surplus to our requirements so long 
as we are mainly interested in the full long run employment responses. (Note that 
employment only enters in this equation and is thus completely separable from the rest 
of the model.) Similar arguments relate to the price and wage equations where 
adjustment terms in the model allow short-term rent seeking behaviour.
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IIIA. The Impact of Productivity Gains and Technical Progress.
In order to see how the model operates it is convenient at the outset, to set down its 
key equations. These are
Production:(eq 5a) y r ^ - y  0+y,(n^ar k,) (23)
Demand: (eq3a) yr y -u  r 6(pr p)+a; (24)
Pricing:(eq9b) pr wr b0-b^ (yr n,)-V  - * i )*V A  ( ° r ° / )  (25)
Wages: (eq22)
wr c0+A.(p^^1(yr 77)+(1 -bJa)+( 1 -A.)(»v-clu+zJ+A.p2Y1i/,_1 (26)
Key parameter: V y iPs/(1 " * i)
where p2 measures the rate at which marginal costs increase with output, and Yi is the 
elasticity of output with respect to employment in production.
In the short run, this model determines wages, w„ prices, p„ output, y„ and
employment, n„ given a„ k„ p, w, u, uM a„ ^  /  ln the lon9 run> however,
we may suppose that yr yh n/-nh- Therefore, in the long run, trend productivity is also
determined within the model.
The next step is to determine the impact of technology, a„ kh on wages, prices, 
output and particularly employment. Our main objective is to explain secular changes
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in employment and output. Before that, we begin with a description of short-run 
behaviour which is interesting on its own and also gives some insight into this model.
Improvements in production efficiency benefits the consumers through lower prices. 
This is given in (25) which relates the price mark-up on marginal cost to cyclical 
demand only, and is independent of the level of marginal cost itself. The rationale 
behind this is that in an imperfectly competitive industry setting, profit margins must 
stay within a certain range to deter new entrants. Now equation (25) is in a static 
form. In the short run, prices take time to respond to changes in demand and marginal 
costs. This amounts to the presence of adjustment terms which we include as6
P rwr  * . +p(Pm-“7-i )-(1-p)[6 i (yr " i  M 1-6| (25a)
Initially, only a part, (1-p), of the improvement will show up as lower prices. The 
remainder becomes a source of economic rent to the firm and its workers. The 
sharing of this spoil depends on the power of the "insiders" to seize the new rent that 
has arisen. To see this more clearly, let us look into the structures of the price and 
wage equations. Assume for the moment that 1-^ > 0. Note also that w, is the wage 
which concerns the workers, and w,-a, is the wage paid per unit of efficient labour unit, 
rifta^ which is the important wage for the firm. The firm’s mark-up on marginal cost 
is [p,-(w,-aj-b 1 (yi-nra j]. When there is a technical shock so that da;>0, the wage per 
efficient unit of labour drops and the mark-up rises. This rise is partly offset by 
diminishing marginal productivity of labour as the output to efficient labour ratio is 
raised. The extent of deterioration in the marginal cost, b1t is inversely proportional to 
the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour, a. Hence, the overall initial 
benefit to the firm is (1-b^da,. A portion, (1-p), of this is given up due to competition 
considerations. The firm is then left looking at a rent of p(1-b1)da/.
6There are, of course, a lot of reasons for the presence of adjustment terms in 
price equations. A common explanation is menu costs.
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This supposes that the wage w, stays the same. So we turn to (26) to examine this. 
Here, we note that when there is an increase in economic rent, wages will respond. 
In this case, the rise in w, is ApO-b^da,. In the extreme case that workers have no 
power to capture any gains from technical shocks, ^=0 and w, indeed stays the same. 
At the other extreme, X=1 and w, rises by p(1-b1)da/. Since prices cannot rise, workers 
have captured the entire amount of productivity gain and profit margins are unchanged.
If p is large, demand and output are stimulated by only a small reduction in the price, 
and employment is likely to fall via (23). This state of affairs is temporary. Progress 
in production technology will spread and the firm then faces price competition 
as well as the threat of new entrants.7 Notice that this applies whether the rent was 
accruing to producers or workers. What is more important, foreign producers are also 
competing and could provide an even more substantial levelling effect. In fact, the 
majority of the technical advances of this type are probably innovated by foreign 
competitors and diffuse into domestic industries and so the possibility of enjoying the 
rent does not arise.8
This brings us to considerations of the long run, which is perhaps the more important 
part of this analysis. For it is this that may tell us whether technical progress has 
contributed to any secular decline in British manufacturing employment.
To begin with, we have set out some important long run comparative static results 
in table 1A.
7ln the set-up of our model, we have assumed identical firms. In reality, there may 
well be a sequence in which new technology is diffused through the industry. 
Nonetheless, it is difficult to envisage a prolonged advantage in the production process 
of an existing product.
8Gomulka(1979) presented evidence that the amount of technical innovations in 
Germany and Japan had overtaken that of Britain some time in the early 1960s. The 
U.S. has been and remains the leader in this area.
38
TABLE 1A 
Long Run Comparative Static Results9 
Partial derivatives
w, Pi y. n,
a
Aggregate Wage, dw 1 1/A -e/A -0/Yi a
J_
Aggregate Price, dp 0 epa/A e/A 6/Yi A
a
Capital, dkf 0 -Pa/A ePa/A 1-1/Yi A
_a_
Technical Progress, da, 0 -1/A e/A (0/Yi A)-1
A-1 +0p2
A number of features of these results are of considerable interest. As we have 
stated before, the forces of competition ensure that when productivity gains are made, 
industry prices fall and workers are unable to capture any of these gains once prices 
and output are adjusted fully. In the light of this, it is not surprising that in the long run, 
industry wages are not sensitive to technology. The interesting results concern 
industry employment and here there are three important factors. First, industry 
employment is decreasing in the aggregate real wage, (iv-p), ceteris paribus. The
^h e  derivation of these results is given in the appendix.
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coefficient here is 0/Y1O+P20) which is increasing in the demand elasticity 0. As 
aggregate real wages rise, this drives up real product wages (note
&(wr p)-^2 .6(w -p)) and hence reduces employment. This is, of course, only a
ceteris paribus result and rising aggregate real wages will generally be associated with 
increases in aggregate demand which will offset this effect.
Turning to the role of the capital accumulation, there are, as might be expected, two 
offsetting effects here. A ceteris paribus rise in the capital stock will reduce prices and 
hence raise demand. On the other hand it will cause substitution away from labour. 
In the light of this, it will come as no surprise that the upward impact on employment 
is increasing in the demand elasticity and, one would expect, decreasing in the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. This latter point is confirmed by 
the presence of p2 in this result. The relationship between p2 and the elasticity of 
substitution, o, may be established via the marginal product of labour function we used 
implicitly in equation (12),
log MPL -  -p2 (log V'-log K)
Now, along a profit maximising path d(log W)=6(log MPL), so that
cfloq W _ cflog MPL
c/log YIN (/log YIN
m 6 {/log YIK 
P2 {/log YIN 
-_B rftofl YIK {/log KIN 
’  2 {/log KIN {/log YIN 
q </log YIK 1 
" " P2 - d log M K { 1 -Y1)
-P2(Yi )/(1-Yi)
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Now d{log Y/N)/6{log W) is an alternative expression for the elasticity of 
substitution.10 Hence, we have p2=(“l * Y i ■ Now since the effect of an increase in 
the capital stock on employment is increasing in p2, it is therefore decreasing in cr.
Similar remarks apply to the impact of technical progress in the sense of there being 
two offsetting effects. A rise in labour augmenting technical progress reduces the 
amount of labour required per unit of output but also causes a price reduction which 
raises output. As with capital accumulation, a high demand elasticity obviously helps 
employment but in this case the employment change is increasing in the elasticity of 
substitution as it is decreasing in p2. (This is intuitive since the technical progress 
raises the amount of efficient units of labour, a high degree of substitution will allow 
these extra units to be absorbed.) So the impact of technical progress on industry 
employment is fundamentally an empirical matter. However we can gain some idea 
of the orders of magnitude by noting that
fl 1
9 « , " y i ( 1 + P 20 )
-e [Y ,+ e w i-Yl)]-1- i
recalling that p2-(1-y^/oy! • which implies that — L>q if 6>yJ1— — ]_1-
d8f o
Yi being the share of labour, is around 0.6 and a is about 0.8, so we need 0>1.2.11 
Generally we would expect long run demand elasticities to be somewhat greater than
10see Arrow, K., etal, in Review of Economics and Statistics (1961), pp 228-229.
11This is not strictly correct because in a Cobb-Douglas production function, the 
elasticity of substitution is one. However, our use of a Cobb-Douglas type log-linear 
production function is a simplifying approximation to something more general. In a 
discussion of real world magnitudes, therefore, it is more sensible to compare realistic 
values. In any case, plenty of allowance is given to the magnitude of 6 in subsequent 
explorations.
this, so overall it seems likely that the ceteris paribus impact of technical progress is 
likely to be positive. However this can only be confirmed by empirical analysis, which 
will be the subject in the next chapter.
In the meantime, if our suspicion is correct, then the state of demand in the product 
market must be responsible for the fall in employment that we have discussed. To 
assess sensibly this possibility, we examine the role of demand in our model in the 
next sub-section.
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IIIB. The Impact of Demand.
Recall that from (3),(4) and (10) in the model, demand shifts are captured by a taste
factor, (o,, aggregate potential output, y, and a cyclical demand index, o,. The basic
difference between co, and o, is that co, attempts to capture secular changes in demand 
whereas a, measures demand changes that, while not altogether transient, are 
nonetheless expected to disappear in the long run. Important examples of the former 
include relative income elasticities of demand for British industrial goods.12 Examples 
of the latter type include the business cycle and, say, prolonged deviations of Sterling 
exchange rates from Purchasing Power Parity values.13
The sum of the taste variable, aggregate potential output and the average level of 
a, together determine trend industry output. However, deviations of a, from its average 
level affect pricing and wage behaviour, and hence generate a different outcome. For 
instance, as income increases, some industries will benefit because of a high income 
elasticity of demand. This creates a demand shift in (24) via co,. The ability and 
willingness of firms to supply this extra demand obviously depend on the interactions 
of the price and wage equations. In (25), we see that as this demand rise is a long 
term characteristic of the industry, profit margins are unaffected.14 In the short run, 
when plant and machinery are unprepared, marginal product of labour drops as output 
is increased resulting in a rise in the marginal cost. Output price rises precisely by this
12The relative weakness of world income elasticity of demand for British industrial 
products have been put forward as explaining loss of manufacturing markets by Panic 
(1975), for example.
13See, for instance, OECD studies on purchasing power parities (1985) and (1991).
14For the purposes of clarity, we abstract from the discussions on the adjustment 
process in the price equation as described by (25a) in the last subsection. This will 
add an extra complexity to the discussions about the short run which is easily 
assimilated.
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amount so that profit margins remain the same. As economic rents do not arise, 
wages are not affected. (There may however be some second round effects coming 
through the unemployment terms. Industrial unemployment could be lowered 
signifying a dilution in the membership of the "insider'1 group. This would tend to lower 
wages. On the other hand, aggregate unemployment might be reduced, representing 
a somewhat tighter labour market, thus tending to push up wages. One would suspect 
that because of labour mobility, the relation between industry unemployment and 
employment are somewhat loose. The extent of any fall in aggregate unemployment 
is also likely to be small. Ultimately, this is an empirical matter, and we shall comment 
on it in due course.)
In the long run, producers would adjust their capital stock so that factor utilization is 
once again optimised. Then there is no decrease in the marginal product of labour 
and marginal costs are stable in (25). Hence, prices and wages are unchanged. The 
industry is able to absorb all the extra demand and output and employment increase 
proportionately. This result obviously relies on the availability of spare capacity in the 
economy, otherwise the aggregate level of unemployment might fall to such an extent 
that wages would rise via (26), upsetting some of the earlier assessments.
Another type of demand changes concern the cyclical or transitory factors. Take a 
recession in a business cycle. Though sometimes appearing to last for ever, they are 
nonetheless expected to go away. This we capture in the term a,. In the event of an 
increase in a„ the ability of industry to respond are again dependent on the interplay 
of equations (25) and (26).
As before, short run considerations will have to include the rise in marginal costs of 
production which partly offsets the increase in demand via a deterioration in the 
relative price. An extra complication in this case is that firms’ price mark-up tend to 
react to this type of cyclical demand changes. Take the case where firms use boom
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times to recover profit margins and would absorb adverse cost developments in lean 
times. Then as a, rises, price mark-up on marginal cost is increased by b2da, in (25). 
This creates an economic rent which workers are keen to exploit also, and wages are 
raised by X6p,. Prices are then further increased by this amount to retain the higher 
mark-up. Wages then rise by X(X6p}=X26p, which is again added on to prices. Using 
the usual multiplier arguments, the end result of this catching up is that relative prices 
would need to rise by b^l-X ). Remember that this is in addition to any price rise 
which might have occurred as a result of increasing marginal costs. This implies that 
output and employment would rise by proportionately less than the rise in cyclical 
demand. In the long run, of course factor allocations in production are adjusted so that 
marginal cost stays the same. Employment and output then rise more as the increase 
in price is restricted to b^(1-X).da(.
The formal comparative static results are set out in table 1B below, after which we 
give a description of the actual parameters (we have normalised a, to have zero mean 
in this table).
We present the results concerning trend demand and cyclical demand separately. 
Note also that as we generate the standard comparative static results from our model, 
these will refer to changes holding the capital stock constant. In the long run, 
however, the capital stock will adjust to demand shifts and it is worthwhile also 
examining the results which are generated when this adjustment has occurred. The 
natural adjustment we consider is when the capital stock shifts in proportion to the shift 
in output, that is when dk^dy,.
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Table 1B
Comparative Statics Associated with Demand Shifts15 
Partial Derivatives
the case of fixed capital stock:
do / dy
d/do
-41 -1-X 1-X 1-X
the case of adjusted capital stock: (dk^dy,)
W, Pi y. n,
a a








The impact of long rnn demand factors, y>Q, are more obvious and straightforward. 
When the capital stock is fully adjusted, they have no impact on wages and prices.
15The derivation of these results is given in the appendix.
46
Production and employment, on the other hand, are changed proportionately. When 
the capital stock does not adjust, however, higher demand reduces trend labour 
productivity and this causes the price to rise. However, since the price mark-up is 
unaffected, there is no effect on firms’ rent and hence no effect on wages. Output 
increases are moderated by a combination of rising marginal cost and the demand 
elasticity. Employment increases are further raised because of the reduced output per 
head.
Next, we discuss the impact of the demand index, a,. Consider first the impact on 
prices. If the capital stock is fixed, then prices rise with demand first because of the 
direct demand effect, b2, and second because, when the capital stock is fixed, there 
will be a fall in trend labour productivity and hence a rise in trend unit costs.(note 3)
Note that the weight attached to firm specific factors in wage determination, X, is 
important here. As firm and industry prices rise via the direct demand effect, then
wages will also rise if A>0. This will raise costs and generate further price rises, the
end result being that the direct demand effects, b2, is multiplied up by 1/(1-A,). Turning
to the output and employment effects, there are two offsetting factors. The first is the
direct positive impact of the rise in demand, the second is the offsetting effect due to
the rise in prices which obviously depends on the demand elasticity, 0.
Once we allow the capital stock to adjust, there is no decline in trend productivity as 
output expands and one source of price increases disappears. The output effects are, 
therefore, bigger overall, because some of the price offset no longer occurs. On the 
other hand, the employment effects are reduced because capital is substituted for 
labour. The three key parameters which determine the impact of a demand shift are, 
therefore, the elasticity of demand, 0, the direct impact of demand on prices, b2, and 
the weight attached to firm specific factors in wage determination, X. A rise in any one 
of these will reduce the impact of demand on output and employment.
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IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.
In this chapter, we have presented a complete model of an imperfectly competitive 
industry in the presence of general wage setting behaviour. We then analyzed the
long run effects of exogenous shifts on wages, prices, employment and output.
In particular, this model incorporated "insider" forces in wage setting. Our main 
purpose is to determine whether the change in British manufacturing employment can 
be explained by technical change and demand shifts. The model we built allows us 
to frame these questions in a clear way. We were then able to proceed with a 
theoretical analysis and some conclusions could be drawn. The general idea is that 
as productivity rises, both wages and profits rise in the short run but, over the longer 
term, competitive forces drive down the price of output relative to costs and eventually 
wages are forced back into line. Relative prices of industry output are then at a lower 
rate. In this framework, we find that the employment elasticity of labour augmenting 
technical progress are dependent on three factors, the partial elasticity of output to 
labour, the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital, and the demand 
elasticity. In general, there is some consensus about the magnitudes of the first two 
parameters, these being technical elements of the production function. This gives a 
range for the price elasticity of demand which would be sufficient to maintain 
employment. Thinking in this way, we find it unlikely that technical progress is the 
source of employment decline in British manufacturing. Ultimately, this is an empirical 
matter which we shall have to confirm and explore in the next chapter with actual data.
Some aspects of technical progress are inextricably linked to questions about product 
demand. Here, one would include obvious ideas like international competitiveness, 
both in terms of quality and price. While process innovations affect production
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efficiency and are more easily measurable, innovations in materials, product and 
design are less easily quantifiable. But these innovations will undoubtedly increase 
product or industry demand, for they increase choice in the high street and they 
improve the quality and reliability of products. What about the employment elasticity 
of demand shifts? Analytically, we found these to be positive, and higher in the long 
run than they are in the short run. In the next chapter, we shall investigate the size 
of these elasticities. Note also, that the ultimate impact of these effects depend not 
just on the elasticities, but also on the size of the demand changes themselves. And 
what evidence there is suggests that these could be very big indeed.
Last, we return to the issue of "insider" forces in wage setting. We find that although 
their role is minimal in the long run, they play an integral part in the transmission 
process. Of course, "insider" effects form a very important part of any labour market 
model. Therefore, we shall devote chapter 4 to a full analysis of this subject.
Appendix. The derivation of the comparative static results.
Our long run model may be represented by the following matrix formula:
0 0 1 -Yi
0 0 1 0
-1 1 bi -bi














-1 1 b, -b,
1 -X -X^ Xb,
0 1 -Yi 0 1 -Yi 0 1 -Yi
= - 0 1 0 - 0 1 0 = -d-X) 0 1 0
-X -Xb, Xb, 1 bi bi 1 bi bi
= -(1-X)(T, + b,e - b,ey,)
= -(1 ->->(Yi + (1-Yt)b,e)
= - d - ^ . d  + e(1-Y,)b,/Y,)
=  -(1-X)Y,(1 + ep2)
Results in table 1A
Using Cramer’s rule, we have the following partial derivatives:
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0 0 1 -y. 0 1 -Yi
dWf
I w A' 0 0 1 0
1 -A.
-A' 0 1 0
0 1 b, -b,
^-X -X -A-b, Ab,
1 b, -b.
= -(1-X)(Yi + bt0 -  b.Oy,) /  A'
= "0"^)(Yi + (1*Yi)b10) /  A7 
= -(1-X)Yi(1 + 0(1-Yi)bAi) /  A' 
= -(1-A)Yi(1 h- ©p2) /  A/




0 0 1 0
0 1 b, -b,



























-(1-b,) 1 b, -b,
X(1-b,) -X -Xb, Xb,
= 0. (singular matrix)
dW A'
0 0 1 •Yi
1-A
0 0 1 0
-1 0 b, -b,
1 1-X -Xb, Xb,
0 1 0
-1 b1 -b,
= d-W-Yi)/ A' 










-1 0 b1 -h,
1 0 -Xb, Xb,
= 0(Xb, - b, -y1Xb1 + Yib,) / a 7
= -e(i-Y,)(i-X)b,/ A' = 0(1 *Yi)bi / 7,(1+ep2) 
= ep2/(i+ep2).















= (1 - Yi)(b, - Xb,) / A'




dar A' 0 0 1
■Yi
0
-1 -(1-b,) b, -b,










0 0 0 -y,
O q O O

















■1 1 0 -b, 1 -X Xb1
-X 0 Xb,
= - y, (1 - X)0 / a ' 




0  0  1-y, -y ,
o e o o
-1 1
1 -X
= - (1 - Yi) (1 - X ) b , e / A '
= 0(1-Y,)b,/Y,(1+ep2)
= e f e /  (i+ep 2).
ay,
dSLj A'
= 0 Y, (1 - A.) (-1) /  A7 
= e / ( i+ e p 2).
o -b,
0 Xb,
o o Yi -Yi
0 e o o
-1 1 -(1-b,) -b,













0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0
-1 1 b, 0












0 0 1 0
0 0 0
A' -1 1 0
■1 1 b, 0 1 -X 0
-X -Xb, 0
= -(1 - X) 0 /  a ' 














= -(1 - Yl)( -e(Xbt - b^-ci-X)) / a7
= (1 -Yi)(1 - X)(1- 0b,) /  A'
= -(1 - Yl)(1 - Xjeb, / A7 + (1 ■ Yi)(1 - X) / A7
= T i(1  - X ) / A 7 -(1 -Yi)0 - X)0bt /  A 7 + ( 1 - X ) / A 7 
= 1 / (1+0p2) + p2 / (1+0p2) - 1 / Yl(1+0p2) 
= 1 -(1/Yl(1+0p2)).
0 0 1 Yi
0 0 1 0
-1 1 bi -(1-b,)
1 -X -Xb, M1-b,)
0 6 0 0 e 1
-1 1 -(1-b,)
Yi
A' -1 1 bi
1 -X X(1-b,) 1 -X -Xb,
= ( -6(1-b, - X(1-b,)) - Y,(A.-Xb, - (1 -6b ,))) /  a '
= -<1-X.)(1-b,)e-Y,a-1)(1-eb,)/ A'
= -(1 -X)(6(1 -b ,  + Y , b , ) - Y , ) /  A'
=  -(1 - X) % O d/Y, - b,(1-Y,)/Y,)) + 1) /  A'
= (0/Yi - (1 + 0b,(1-Y,)/Yi)) /  (1+ep2)
= 6/(1+ep2) -1.
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Results in Table 1B.
The case of fixed capital stock




A' 1 0 1 0
0 1 b1 -b,
0 -X -Xb, Xb,





0 1 1 0
-1 0 b, -b,









= -(1 - X)(1 - Y,)b, / A'
= M (i+eiy.
0 0 0 -Yi 0 0 -y,
3 *
da / A' o e 1 o
-±
A' -1 1 -b,
-1 1 0 -b, 1 -X Xb,
1 -X 0 Xb,
= -(1 - X)(Yi) / A'
= 1 /  (1+0p2).
0 0 1 0 0 1
dn, 
do>, A' 0 e 1 A' ■1 1 b,
-1 1 b, 0
1 -X -Xb, 0
1 -X -Xb,









1 0 0 1 0 1
1
A7 b2 1 -b,
+ I l
A7 b2 1 b,
0 "V Xb, 0 -X -Xb,
= -b2(0Xb,) / a 7 - Yi^-OXb, + X) / a 7
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-Xb2(0b,- 7,0b, + 7,) / a '
-*b2Yl(1 + 0(1-Y,)b,/Y,)/ a ' 
Xb2/ (1+0p2).
0 0 1 ■Yi
dp, 1
da i A' 0 1 1 0
-1 b2 bi ■b.
1 0 -Xb, Xb,
0 1 ■Yi 0 0 ■Yi
J_ 1
A' -1 b, ■b. A' -1 b2 ■bi
1 -Xb, Xb, 1 0 Xb,
- -(1 - X)(1 - Yi)bt / A7 - 7ib2 /  a '
- p2 /( i+ e p 2) + b2 / (i-x)(i+ep2)
= + CD "TO ro i
.a+
0 0 0 ■Yi 0 0
dy. 1 _  Yi
da f A' 0 0 1 0 ’  A' -1 1
-1 1 b2 -b1 1 -X
1 -X 0 Xb,
0
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= -y, (1 - X -0b2) / a '
0 0 0 0 0
a/ij
da A' 0 0 A' -1
-1 ■bi b2 -X 0
-X -Xb, 0
= -((1 - A,) + 0b2) / a ;
= (l/d+op,)) (1/Yl - ©b^CI-X)).
The case of adjusted capital stock
Given a constant returns to scale production function, dk,=dy, implies that dy,=dnt, 
i.e. factor usage is always optimal and there is no h, effect. Hence, our long run 
model becomes
0 0 1 -Yi Wi (1-Yi)K+Yia,+...
0 0 1 0 Pi = coj+0p+ci+...
-1 1 0 0 Yi -(1-b1)ai+b2ai+...
1 -X 0 0 ni X((1-b,)a,)+...










= -Yi (1 - X).
Again using Cramer’s rule, we derive the following 




A"1 e 1 o
1 o o
-x o o
= 0. (singular matrix)
0 0 1 -y,
0 1 1 0
- 1 0  0 0





= 0. (singular matrix)
62
0 0 0 -Yt
5// dnf
d(D j dtd f A7/ 0 0 1 0
_Yi_
A/; -1 1 0
- 1 1 0  0 
1 -A, 0 0
1 -A, 0











= Yi (-b2X) / a 7/ 








= Yi (’ b2) / (1-A-) 
= b2 / (1-A,).
0 0 0
dy, dn,
da i da f A/; O 0 1 O
JTi_
A;/ -1 1
- 1 1  b2 0 
1 -X 0 0
1 -X 0
= -Yi ( 1 - X  -0b2) /  a "
= 1 -ebj/o-x).
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CHAPTER 3. THE IMPACT OF TECHNICAL PROGRESS AND DEMAND SHIFTS ON 
INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS.
I. Introduction.
This chapter is concerned with the empirical assessment of the impact of technical 
progress and demand shifts in British manufacturing employment. We have previously 
argued that the employment effects of other factors, such as wage push factors and 
import prices, are likely to act through their impact on industry demand. At the same 
time, technical progress is also intertwined with demand. Thus, the roles that technical 
progress and demand shifts play are crucial. Analytically, we also thought that in the 
long run, Labour augmenting technical progress is probably neutral in its employment 
consequences. In the short run, if prices adjust slowly, there could be some scope for 
rent-seeking activities. We shall confront this with data to see if we are correct.
In the long run, when the capital stock is fully adjusted, employment rises 
proportionally to secular changes in demand. As to the impact of cyclical demand 
factors, it is probably not sensible to adjust the capital stock. Therefore, we must 
consider its short run effects. Here, the employment effects are partly reduced by the 
fact that prices will rise. These reductions obviously depend on the elasticity of 
demand, the deterioration in the marginal costs, and the extent firms will raise their 
profit margins. Ultimately, the overall demand effects depend not only on the 
coefficients and elasticities, but also on the size of the demand shocks themselves. 
And we must look at the likely magnitudes of these variables.
To estimate the underlying parameters, we must first operationalise our theoretical 
model. This we do in section II. In section III, we report a whole host of estimation
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results, plus a summary of the important parameters. We then proceed to discuss 
their significance and implications. In section IV, we summarise our findings and 
provide concluding comments. Appendix 1 contains data definitions and an 
explanation of their sources. As part of the empirical work, we had to reconcile data 
based on the 1968 and 1980 Standard Industrial Classifications. This is a source of 
useful information and we present a note on this matching in appendix 2.
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II. An Empirical Investigation.
In the last chapter, we have developed and discussed the theory regarding the 
impact of technical progress and demand shifts on industry behaviour. In the 
following, we aim to provide an empirical counterpart to allow us to further the 
investigation using actual data on British industries. In this activity, we shall refer back 
to some equations generated in the previous chapter. We were able to use industry 
by industry data to gather a large amount of Information for our estimation. One 
particular problem we faced was that each industry has its peculiar characteristics. 
Therefore, we employ panel data techniques to control for these characteristics.
The empirical model
We have to make operational the basic model we developed in the last chapter. 
First, let us reproduce the four basic equations.
Production: / r ^ / " Y  o +Yi (nf ar k) (1)
Demand: yr y-w /-0(PrP)+o r (2)
Pricing: pr wr b0-b jy r n)+t\ - 6 , ) a ^ 6 2( o  r o ) (3)
Wages:
wr c0*X (p ^ {y r n )+(i -bJa)+( 1 - X ) ( w - c , u + z J + i p 2 Y lu M  ( 4 )
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Key parameter A ,-Y iM 1 ~Yi)
In order to estimate the impact of technical progress on employment, we must obtain 
estimates of three key parameters, the partial elasticity of output to labour, y,, the 
impact of output on marginal cost, p2, and the demand elasticity, 0 (we retain the 
notation from chapter 2). Furthermore, for the investigation of demand shifts, we need 
to capture the direct demand effect on prices, b2, and the weight of insiders in wage 
determination, X. We intend to do this by calibrating a production function, a demand 
equation, and a price equation for each industry. Estimates of X will be taken from 
chapter 4. The data set we shall use is based on the Census of Production, 1974- 
1985, from which we have consistent data on 45 three digit industries which we group 
into 9 two digit industries. For each two digit industry we pool the data.
Production function
Production functions are notoriously difficult to estimate. The problem is that factors 
are often not used to their maximum. Thus, we have to control for capacity utilization. 
If we let / refer to the two digit industry, and j  to the three digit industry and t to time, 
our basic production for industry j  has the form
yji"lol +Y1 injt +(1 - Y i  l)kjt +Y / * / ,  + Y 2 //« /, (5 )
where y, n, k, a are as before and lu refers to labour utilisation. ;, of course, refers 
to all the three digit industries in /. Note that we allow the constant term to be specific 
to the three digit industry which captures its time invariant features. There are a 
number of problems arising from the nature of the data. First, the Census of 
Production does not provide capital stock data at the three digit level. It does,
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however, have investment data, so we utilise the following approximation:
a tr -
* * *  “ /C ~ i< r
o r V iL&kjt ‘ -4JL- 6,
(6)
where l=investment, =exponential rate of decay and y  moving average of
value-added output, v , =output capital ratio. Thus instead of normalising on the 
capital stock, we use a smoothed version of value-added as the scale normalisation.
Second, we must find a proxy for the technical progress term, a. We have a 
measure of a at the two digit level, a based on the standard production function 
residual method (see data appendix), so we use a proxy of the form
a^-Y aa, (7 )
Finally, as a proxy for labour utilisation, we follow Mendis and Muellbauer (1984) and 
make use of overtime hours, OHw to define
lujt-V 4 iOHj t +Y5/C1 +OHjtV '
These variables are substituted into the wage equation (5). The equation is then first
differenced to eliminate the time invariant industry specific effects, yielding
A y ; ,  - ( Y V  - 1 ) 8  J +Y,;A/7/ t +(1 - Y „  )v  +Y 3,  A S ,, (8 )
+Y4/ & O H j, + Y y  A (1  *O H Jt ) _1
which forms the basis for our production function estimates.
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Demand equation
Turning to the demand equation, we require a measure of demand (in terms of 
temporary deviations from potential output), cr„ and a proxy for secular changes in 
demand, co,. Considerations of a, include things like competitiveness as these are 
influenced by exchange rates which will only equilibrate prices in the long run. From 
equation (4) in chapter 2, we use as our demand index,
o/ -o „(p ’ -rt+oz,(p,*-rt+03/y;'+o /
where p‘= price of world manufacturing exports in domestic currency, p=aggregate 
price index, p,*=world price index of output for industry / in domestic currency and 
y/=detrended index of world production for industry /'. Secular changes in demand 
include such things as tastes and fashion, and income elasticities of demand. On the 
whole, we would expect these to be highly trended, and could be proxied by
AM/-A(yr y,') (9)
where y/=industrial production of industry / and y  * =the index of world production for 
industry /. So the demand equation to be estimated has the form
Price equation
The price equation requires a measure of trend productivity ty -fy  and this is
defined by the fitted value of the regression of yy-ty on a cubic polynomial trend. So 
the price equation based on equation (3) has the form
P jt~wjt 'm^ 0 l+ ^ 2 la ~^ 1 /)Y 3 /a /f+ ^ 2 /a 1 /(P f*- P f )  (1 1 )
+by&2i(P*~Pt ) +Py a3 /»  *_^3/^2|15r
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where note that we have also included a term in b2w 'n order to capture nominal 
inertia in price setting.1 Finally, in order to compute the parameter p2, recall that
fc Pgtfir .(see equation 12b in chapter 2)
1 - Y i /
Lagged dependent variables will be added prior to estimation. The extent of the lag 
in this equation is particularly interesting for they create short term economic rents 
when technical progress occurs.
1The idea here is that some prices may be set in advance of wages so that they 
may depend on w 9 as well as w. Then p-a iv+(1-a)wr® can be written as 
p-w —tf-aX w -w *) . If wage inflation follows a random walk, we have 
An^-Aiv^+e which implies iv ^ -^ + A w  1 and hence iv-iv®-A2iy .
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III. Results
Parameter estimates for the production function, demand and price equations for 
each of the nine industries are presented in tables 1 to 3. Note that we have included 
certain additional lags in each of the equations to account for further dynamics.
The least reliable estimates are the demand elasticities which clearly depend on our 
ability to capture secular changes in demand. This we can only do in a very crude 
fashion. So when considering our results we present a range of possible values of 
demand elasticities in order to see how sensitive our results are to variations in this 
parameter.
In general, our equations appear to be reasonably successful with good explanatory 
power. There are only one or two weak results. In particular, the production function 
in the motor and vehicles sector were very difficult to estimate. This is probably due 
to the fact that some companies were making losses through most of the period, and 
hence the observed factor shares do not add up.
In terms of the partial labour elasticity of output, the high ones include textiles, 
clothing, miscellaneous (small) industries. The low ones include electrical engineering, 
and the food sector. p2, which gives the rise in marginal cost when the output-capital 
ratio rises, measures the difficulty of expanding production with existing machinery. 
The only high ones here include the food sector, electrical engineering, and bricks and 
glass.
We find high demand elasticities in metal manufacturing, electrical engineering, food, 
drinks and tobacco, and the clothing sector. As we have already noted, since our 
proxy for secular demand factors is somewhat crude, we shall allow a wide range of 
values in our final assessments. b2, the pro-cyclicality of pricing to demand, are found 
to be highest in food, drinks and tobacco, clothing, and miscellaneous industries.
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These are mainly non-durables. Last, we also include X values from chapter 4 for 
completeness. We next discuss the implied effects of technical progress and demand 
shifts based on the above parameters.
Technical Progress
In table 4, we present our final parameter estimates and the corresponding partial 
derivatives which capture the employment effects. The most important point to be 
made overall is that even given considerable latitude in our estimates of the demand 
elasticity, the impact of technical progress is generally to increase employment, ceteris 
paribus. The only exceptions to this are Bricks and Glass, and Textiles. This is much 
as we expected and emphasises the fact that if we are seeking an explanation as to 
why manufacturing employment has declined so rapidly in the last decade, technical 
progress is not the answer.
Also notable is that, in general, lags are significant in the price equations. This 
means that when there is labour augmenting technical progress, prices do not fall 
instantly. Thus profit margins rise, creating short term rents. Industries which are 
particularly affected include bricks and glass, food, metal manufacturing, and 
miscellaneous industries.
Demand Shifts
In table 5, we present our final parameter estimates and the corresponding partial 
derivatives which capture the demand effects. The key factors which influence the 
impact of demand on output and employment are those which affect the size of the 
wage/price offset. This will be bigger if the direct impact of demand on prices (b2) is 
large and/or the elasticity of demand (0) is large. These will be assisted if the insider 
effects on wage setting {X) are also large, because then wages will also adjust in the
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same direction as prices, causing a further reinforcement of the price effect.
On the basis of this, we see from table 5 that the industries with small demand 
effects are MM, MNES (large 0), and VE, Cl and F (large b2) with the last named 
having a rather dramatic negative effect. That is, in the food sector an inward shift in 
the demand curve for food actually leads to a rise in output and employment! This 
arises because the impact of demand on prices is very large and when this is 
reinforced by insider wage setting the final result is for price reductions to more than 
offset the demand fall. While this result is probably excessive, it may be possible to 
explain the very high pro-cyclicality of prices by inventory costs. Given that food is 
perishable and has a restricted shelf life, it may be economical for firms to lower prices 
in recessions to minimise inventory losses.
Those industries with large demand effects are EE, TX, DT (small b2) and BG (small 
0). In the case of DT and TX, once capital has adjusted there is essentially no price 
offset and the change in demand passes through one for one into a change in output 
and employment. We have investigated the relationship between these effects and 
certain industry characteristics such as concentration and import penetration. We have 
not, however, found any significant correlations. Finally, it should be remembered that 
although certain industries, such as metal manufacture, respond well to demand 
shocks, the ultimate outcome depends additionally on the size of the shocks which in 
this case is rather big. In this context, note that there is a positive relation between 
the demand elasticity and the size of competitiveness shocks, for the simple reason 
that high domestic demand elasticity is directly related to high international demand 




Dependent Variable ay i
Industry MM BG EE VE F DT TX CL MNES
-0.35 0.32 0.018 0.00 0.07 0.44 -0.29 -0.45 -0.15
W i - 1 (0.8) (1.2) (0.3) (0.0) (0.4) (1.1) (1.7) (2.8) (2.3)
0.87 0.67 0.012 0.10 0.84 0.78 1.05 0.38 0.68
A H i (2.1) (2.7) (0.3) (0.1) (3.3) (1.8) (5.7) (1.5) (3.9)
i
-0.008 -0.38 0.22 0.59 -0.42 -0.40 0.01 0.63 0.36
(0.0) (1.3) (0.5) (0.8) (1.5) (0.7) (0.0) (2.3) (1.8)
0.38 0.20 1.17 -0.15 -0.30 0.69 -0.25 0.12 0.043
(0.5) (0.6) (0.9) (0.1) (0.8) (1.4) (0.7) (0.1) (0.1)
a a± 0.23 0.40 -0.64 0.29 0.38 -0.35 0.21 0.14 0.13(1.3) (1.6) (0.6) (0.1) (1.3) (0.7) (0.8) (0.2) (0.4)
1 0 1AOHi
0.20 0.19 1.66 0.20 -0.11 -0.11 0.28 0.11 0.52
(1.3) (1.6) (1.0) (0.4) (0.9) (0.5) (2.8) (0.7) (3.8)
a ( 1  + 0 ^ )  _1
0.53 0.018
(0.5) (2.3)
number of 8 5 4 3 6 5 6 6 4
sub-industries
NT 66 55 44 33 68 60 66 72 48
se 0.104 0.089 0.145 0.271 0.089 0.183 0.089 0.155 0.090
Notes
(i) MM = metal manufacure,BG = bricks and glass,EE = electrical engineering, VE = vehicles,
F = food,DT = drinks and tobacco,TX = textiles,CL = clothing and footwear,MNES =  manufacturing not 
elsewhere specified.
(ii) The equations also include 3 digit industry dummies.
(iii) The equations are estimated by instrumental variables, with ayM being treated as endogenous.
Instruments include further lags on output.
E s i per-{cyr*e<A using A vta r e < j \ * S S 3rtc^  u/cre





Industry MM BG EE VE F DT TX CL MNES
-i
0.91 0.75 0.87 0.58 0.66 0.60 0.78 0.86 0.83
119.) (13.) (21.) (4.1) (9.3) (5.3) (14.6) (23.4) (14.2)
(P i-p )
-1.47 -0.40 -1.21 -1.49 -1.01 -1.34 -0.27 -0.84 -1.58
(4.3) (1.1) (5.1) (3.4) (5.6) (3.4) (1.3) (5.9) (2.5)
(P i“P) -X
1.07 0.391 1.05 1.17 0.54 0.45 0.23 0.57 0.46
(3.2) (1.0) (5.0) (3.8) (2.8) (1.0) (1.1) (3.9) (0.8)
(p * -p )
0.66 0.40 0.50 0.70 0.24 0.62 0.82 0.44 1.00
(3.6) (2.4) (3.8) (2.0) (2.1) (1.7) (7.0) (2.3) (3.7)
0.21 0.90 3.39 0.43 0.058•N1oH
(0.7) (1.6) (1.1) (0.7) (0.1)
a t a i
-0.086 0.65 -0.10 0.76 1.35 1.56 0.27 0.62 0.66
(0.5) (2.1) (0.4) (1.5) (2.9) (2.1) (1.4) (2.0) (1.7)
number of 6 5 4 3 6 5 6 6 4
sub-industries
NT 72 60 48 36 72 60 72 72 48
se 0.10 0.075 0.068 0.141 0.083 0.131 0.077 0.129 0.099
Notes
(i) MM = metal manufacure,BG = bricks and glass,EE = electrical engineering,VE = vehicles, F = food,
DT = drinks and tobacco, TX=textiles,CL = clothing and footwear,MNES = manufacturing not 
elsewhere specified.
(ii) The equations also include 3 digit industry dummies.
(iii) The equations are estimated jointly with the subsequent price equation imposing the cross equation
restrictions implied by the structure of the demand term (cf the demand terms in equations (33) and 
(34)). The term in the industry specific world price was never used because it turned out to be 
unsatisfactory (i.e. generally wrong signed and insignificant).




Dependent Variable (p 1- v i )
Industry MM BG EE VE F DT TX CL MNES
(P i-W j)
0.78 0.88 0.30 0.26 0.08 0.60 0.00 0.39 0.60
(7.7) (15.) (2.1) (2.4) (5.5) (8.1) (0.0) (3.1) (5.0)
-0.13 -.0 8 5 -0.28 -.047 -0.21 -0.14 -0.83 -0.45 -0.25
( y j - n " ) (2.4) (1.4) (2.2) (0.7) (2.0) (3.2) (10.7) (2.4) (2.0)
0 .036 0.07 -0.20 0.79 0.14 0 .34 0.13 -0.11 0.042
a i (1.0) (2.2) (1.4) (4.4) (1.2) (0.7) (1.1) (0.8) (0.4)
0.35 0.053 0.20 0.56 0.22 0 .14 1.13 0.20
( O j - S " ) (2.7) (0.9) (2.0) (1.7) (1.7) (1.5) (1.9) (2.5)
-0.29 -0.24 -0.07 -0.35 -0.34 -0.23 0.052 -0.23 -0.11
A2 (3.3) (2.8) (0.0) (5.2) (1.9) (2.0) (0.9) (1.5) (1.0)
number of sub­
industries
0 5 4 3 6 5 6 6 4
NT 72 60 48 30 72 00 72 72 48
se 0.041 0.032 0.046 0.058 0.074 0.039 0.041 0.104 0.031
Notes
(i) MM = metal manufacure.BG = bricks and glass,EE = electrical engineering , VE = vehicles, F = food.
DT = drinks and tobacco,TX = textiles,CL = clothing and footwear,MNES = manufacturing not
elsewhere specified.
(ii) The equations also include 3 digit industry dummies.
(iii) The equations are estimated jointly with the demand equations, is treated as endogenous.
Instruments are A2w^_1t a2*!',, a2w,, the latter two being aggregate variables.
CiV"> noir Civ) in iM? i
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Table 4
Employment Effects of Technical Progress
Industry MM BG EE VE F
Yi
0.49 0.43 0.28 0.69 0.39
0.63 0.91 1.04 0.028 0.97
0 max. 5 1 2 1 2
0 e s tim a te d 4.48 0.06 1.24 0.75 1.38
6 min. 1
0.05 1 0.7 1
dnf
d{w-p) 9 max. -2.45 -1.22 -2.32 -1.41 -1.51
9 est. -2.37 -0.12 -1.93 -1.07 -1.32
9 min. -1.25 -0.11 -1.75 -1.00 -1.13
dn,
~dk, 9 max. 0.51 -0.22 0.016 -0.41 0.24
9 est. 0.47 -1.21 -0.56 -0.42 0.04
9 min. -0.25 -1.22 -0.75 -0.43 -0.13
dn,
da. 9 max. 1.45 0.22 1.32 0.41 0.51
9 est. 1.37 -0.88 0.93 0.07 0.32
9 min. 0.25 -0.89 0.75 0.00 0.13
Notes
(i) The parameter estimates are based on the appropriate long run coefficients from the individual
equations.
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Table 4  (cont.)
Employment Effects of Technical Progress
Industry DT TX CL MNES
Yi
0.68 0.82 0.70 0.89
0.165 0.18 0.36 0.09
0 max. 3 1 3 7
0 e s tim a te d 2.19 0.21 1.98 0.46
0 m in. 1 0.1 1 1.5
dn.
d(w-p) 0 max. -2.94 -1.03 -2.07 -4.83
0 est. -2.37 -0.25 -1.66 4.59
0 min. -1.26 -0.12 -1.05 -1.49
dn,
~dk, 0 max. 0.02 -0.03 0.31 0.31
0 est. -0.08 -0.17 0.16 0.29
0 min. -0.26 -0.20 -0.05 0.01
dn,
Ba, 0 max. 1.94 0.03 1.07 3.83
0 est. 1.37 -0.75 0.66 3.59
0 min. 0.26 -0.88 0.05 0.49
Notes




Demand Effects on Wages. Prices. Output and Employment
Industry MM BG EE VE F
Yi
0.49 0.43 0.28 0.69 0.39
P2 0.63 0.91 1.04 0.028 0.97
b2
0.14 0.27 0.075 0.32 0.93
X 0.25 0.17 0.16 0.52 0.33
0 max. 5 1 2 1 2
0 e s tim a te 4.48 0.06 1.24 0.75 1.38
0 m in. 1 0.05 1 0.7 1
dW,ldo, d max. 0.20 0.65 0.37 0.67 0.80
d est. 0.21 1.18 0.49 0.68 0.99
d min. 0.50 1.19 0.55 0.68 1.20
dy,ldo, d max. 0.01 0.35 0.27 0.32 -0.61
d kr  0 d est. 0.038 0.93 0.39 0.49 -0.38
d min. 0.50 0.94 0.45 0.52 -0.20
dn,ldaf d max. 0.02 0.81 0.96 0.46 -1.56
d est. 0.078 2.16 1.39 0.71 -0.97
d min. 1.02 2.19 1.61 0.75 -0.51
By d u . d max. 0.49 1.22 1.16 1.41 0.76
d est. 0.53 2.21 1.56 1.42 0.96
d min. 1.25 2.22 1.75 1.43 1.13
dw/do, 0.048 0.056 0.014 0.35 0.46
dp,/da, 0.19 0.33 0.089 0.67 1.45
dkrdy, d y jd o p  dp/Ida d max. 0.045 0.67 0.82 0.33 -1.78
d est. 0.14 0.98 0.89 0.50 -0.92
d min. 0.81 0.98 0.91 0.53 -0.39
Notes







































































































0 max. 1 0.96 0.21 0.069
0 est. 1 0.99 0.48 0.14
__    0 min. __ __ 1__________ L ? £ _  °*7 4 _________ 0-80
notes ■**...................
(i) The parameter estimates are based on the appropriate long run coefficients from the individual 
equations.
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IV. Summary and Conclusion.
We have examined the impact of technical progress and demand shifts on industry 
behaviour.
Beginning with the effects of technical progress on employment, the key results are 
as follows. First, in the long run, the existence of insider wage setting has no 
implications for the employment effects of technical change. The fact that insiders can 
capture the productivity gains in the short run are irrelevant because competitive forces 
in the product market ensure that these gains are eventually spread throughout the 
population via their impact on product prices. Second, the impact of technical progress 
on employment depends on two offsetting forces. A negative effect arises from the 
fact that fewer workers are needed to produce any given output. A positive effect is 
generated by the increased demand arising from the fall in marginal cost and hence 
reduces price. The elasticity of demand is clearly a key parameter here and so long 
as this is greater than about unity, technical progress will not cost jobs. Our parameter 
estimates indicate that for the majority of industries, this is indeed the case.
Next we move onto the impact of demand shifts on output and employment in a 
variety of manufacturing industries. The major results are as follows. First, there are 
two factors which determine the effect on demand shifts on industry output and 
employment. If demand rises, there is a positive direct effect in the product market. 
However, if the demand shock is of a cyclical nature, it will induce changes in the price 
mark-up and hence an offsetting negative effect. The size of this latter effect depends 
on (i) the impact of cyclical demand on prices and (ii) the demand elasticity. If these 
two parameters are large, then the price offset will, itself, be large. Second, the size 
of firm/industry specific effects in wage determination are also important here because 
if industry wages respond directly to industry output prices (via firms’ ’ability to pay’),
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then this will magnify the price changes induced by demand shifts.2 Finally, the 
results indicate a wide range of output and employment responses to demand shifts 
across different industries. We have not, however, found any relationship between the 
sizes of these effects and the structural characteristics of the industries concerned.
In an explanation of the secular changes in industrial employment, it is important to 
note that the actual employment effect of the demand variables depend not only on 
the elasticities but also on the size of the demand shocks themselves. There has 
been some evidence that British industries have indeed suffer large demand shocks. 
First, Layard and Nickell (1986) demonstrated significant declines in price 
competitiveness from the 1950s to the mid-1980s.3 Second, in terms of trend 
demand, Thirwall (1978) presented income elasticities of demand for various British 
industries which he found to be generally lower than those in other industrialised 
countries.4 Third, Gomulka (1979) noted that the number of technical innovations in 
Germany and Japan had overtaken their British counterparts since the early 1960s.5 
While the effects of these innovations are sometimes difficult to quantify, they would 
have increased quality and choice of foreign products relative to British ones. This 
would lead to a serious loss of demand.
These features are captured in our model in the following way. If industry demand, 
aggregate real wages, industry capital and technical progress all move up in 
proportion, our comparative static results suggest that employment is unchanged (see 
tables 1A and 1B, chapter 2). What has happened is that because of the decline in
^The examination of these "insider" effects is the subject of the next chapter.
3See Layard, R. and S. Nickell, 1986, The Rise in Unemployment, pp 128-130.
4See Thirwall A., "The U.K.’s economic problems: A Balance of Payments 
Constraint?" in National Westminster Bank Quarterly Review, Feb. 1978.
5See Gomulka, S. (1979), "Increasing Inefficiency versus Slow Rate of 
Technological Change", p169, in "Slow Growth in Britain" edited by Beckerman (1979).
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competitiveness over this period, industry demand has not kept pace with the other 
variables. It is this which has generated the decline in employment.
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Appendix 1
The data are mainly drawn from the Census of Production. They refer to some 51 
3-digit industries grouped into ten 2-digit headings. This is more complicated than 
might appear at first sight because of the dramatic change in the Standard Industrial 
classification (SIC) which occurred in 1980. The procedure for matching is described 
in appendix 2 and the numbers below refer to this appendix. The industry groups are 
(/) Metal Manufacture (MM) containing 1,2,3,4,5,6, (//) Bricks and Glass (BG) containing 
7,8,9,10,11, (///) Chemicals (CH) containing 12,13,14,15,16,17, (/V) Electrical 
Engineering (EE) containing 18,19,20,21, (v) Vehicles (VE) containing 22,23,24, (w) 
Food (F) containing 25,26,27,28,29,30, (w/) Drink and Tobacco (DT) containing 
31,32,33,34,35, (w//) Textiles (TX) containing 36,37,38,39,40,41, (/x) Clothing and 
Footwear (CL) containing 42,43,44,45,46,47, (x) Manufacturing not elsewhere 
Specified (MNES) containing 51,52,53,54.
The precise definition and sources of all the variables are as follows 
p, : Log output price. British Business various issues, table 4 and
Department of Trade and Industry. 
yt : Log gross value added=log(nominal value added)- p; . The former is
taken from Census of Production. 
nf : Log employment. Census of Production.
lf jY{ ' Nominal net capital expenditure/3 year moving average of nominal
value-added. Census of Production. 
af • Log technical progress. Two digit variable, source as in Nickell and
Kong(1988).
Overtime hours. Average weekly hours - Normal weekly hours. 
Department of Employment Gazette, various issues.
Log potential output. Layard and Nickell (1986).
Log Total Final Expenditure deflator at factor cost. Layard and Nickell 
(1986).
Log world price. (The world price is derived from an average of the
US, German and Japanese industry prices converted to domestic 
currency using the appropriate exchange rate).
Log world output price. This is a unit value index of world manufacturing
exports from UN Monthly Digest of Statistics, converted into domestic 
currency.
Log world production (detrended). The detrending is carried out via a
regression on a quintic in time. The series refers to market economies 
and is taken from UN Monthly Digest of Statistics.
yr y* where y is the variable used to generate y • prior to 
detrending.
Log wage including non-wage labour costs. This is derived from the
wage bill plus employers social security contributions divided by 
employment, taken from the Census of Production.
trend version of y] - nf using the fitted values from a regression on 
a cubic polynomial in time.
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Appendix 2.
Matching of 1980 SIC and 1968 SIC Using Census of Production Data.
We begin with data based on SIC(1980).
Two CSO publications: "Indexes to the Standard Industrial Classification Revised 
1980", and "Standard Industrial Classification Revised 1980-Reconciliation with 
Standard Industrial Classification 1968" are then used to match earlier data based on 
SIC(1968) to their SIC(1980) counterpart.
We then check the match with 1979 Gross Value Added numbers which are 
published in the two different SICs in the Census of Production 1979 and 1980. Given 
that the approach of the two SICs are different, one is based on processes whereas 
the other is based on products, the matching can only be approximate.
In total, we managed 55 reasonably consistent series; the accuracy of the matching 
may be summarised:
Matched to within 1% 29 industries
1% to 2% 9 industries
2% to 3% 6 industries
3% to 4% 6 industries
4% to 5% 5 industries(*)
(*) 3 of these are exact matches according to the CSO information.
We adjust the earlier data by these percentages before we splice them onto the later 
data. The details of the industries matched are listed by industry group:
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Match SIC (1980) SIC (1968) %
Diff
1 221:lron & Steel.

















V.A. 5462.6 5321.5 -2.5
2 222:Steel Tubes 312
V.A. 272.7 278.6 2.1
3 323:Textile Machinery 335
V.A. 142.3 143.7 0.9
4 325:Mining & Earth-Moving Equipment 336,337,339/1
V.A. 1062.0 1057.8 -0.4
5* 330:Office & Electronic Equipment 338,336
V.A. 720.9 687.0 -4.7
6 320:Fabricated Steel Work 
324:Food Processing Machinery 
326:Power Transmission Equipment 
327: Woodwork, Rubber, Paper, 
Laundry Machines 










V.A. 6115.4 6132.3 0.3
note. I...J indicates a small element which is not included in the match.
* indicates CSO matches.
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Match SIC (1980) SIC (1968) %
Diff
7 241 :Structural Clay Products 461/2
V.A. 191.3 190.5 -0.4
8 231 :Slate Quarrying 
242:Cement,Lime Plaster 







V.A. 1377.1 1430.6 3.8
9 246:Abrasives 469/1
V.A. 81.9 81.4 0.0
10 247:Glass 463/1-2
V.A. 548.6 547.6 0.0
11 248:Refractory Goods 461/1,462
V.A. 442.9 445.4 0.6
note. [...] indicates a small element which is not included in the match.
* indicates CSO matches.
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Match SIC (1980) SIC (1968) %
Diff












V.A. 1540.0 1516.3 -1.5
14 257:Pharmaceutical Products 272,279/6,[353/1]
V.A. 1056.9 1077.7 1.9
15 258:Soap and Perfume 273,275
V.A. 439.0 460.0 4.7
16 259:Photographic & Misc. Chemicals 279/1,279/7, [275,364/3]
V.A. 159.7 154.0 -3.5
17 260: Man-made Fibres 411
V.A. 246.2 254.3 3.2
note. [...] indicates a small element which is not included in the match.
This is not used in the estimation.
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Match SIC (1980) SIC (1968) %
Diff
18 341 :lnsulated Wires 362
V.A. 312.2 311.2 -0.3
19 342:Electrical Machinery 361 ,[369/5]
V.A. 961.4 928.3 -3.4
20 343:Batteries/Electrical Equipment 






21 346:Domestic Electric Appliances 368
V.A. 350.2 353.4 0.9
note. [...] indicates a small element which is not included in the match.
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Match SIC (1980) SIC (1968) %
Diff
22 351 :Motor Vehicles 381
352:Vehicle Bodies 381 ,[496]
353:Vehicle Parts 381
V.A. 3663.7 3738.6 2.0
23 363:Motor & Pedal Cycles 382
V.A. 63.8 63.9 0.1
24 364:Aerospace Products 383
V.A. 1355.5 1371.8 1.2
note. [...] indicates a small element which is not included in the match.
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V.A. 692.1 716.2 3.4
26 413:Milk Products 215
421 :lce Cream/Sugar Confectionery 217
V.A. 1084.5 1090.5 0.5
27 414:Vegetarian/Fruit Products 218
416:Grain Milling 211
423(48):Starch,Tea,Coffee 229/2
V.A. 1039.9 1014.6 -2.4
ro 03 * 419:Biscuits & Bread 212,213
V.A. 870.9 908.7 4.3
29 420:Sugar & By-products. 216
V.A. 176.0 176.0 0.0
30 422:Animal Fats 219,[272]
V.A. 391.9 389.0 -0.7
note. [...J indicates a small element which is not included in the match.
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Match SIC (1980) SIC (1968) %
Diff
31 424:Spirits 239/1,[271/2]
V.A. 589.2 589.2 0.0
32 426:Cider, Perry, Wine 239/2
V.A. 49.3 49.3 0.0
33 427:Beer & Malt Products 231
V.A. 913.3 914.6 0.1
34 428:Soft Drinks 232
V.A. 325.7 320.1 -1.7
35 429:tobacco 240
V.A. 555.2 563.5 1.5
note. [...] indicates a small element which is not included in the match.
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Match SIC (1980) SIC (1968) %
Diff
36 431 :Wool 414
V.A. 397.0 405.2 2.0
37* 432:Cotton
433:Throwing,Texturing of Continuous 
Filament Yarn 




V.A. 420.6 441.5 4.9
38 435:Jute 415
V.A. 40.8 40.6 -0.5
39 436:Knitted Fabrics 417
V.A. 516.4 515.9 0.0
40 437:Finishing of Fabrics 423
V.A. 227.4 227.9 0.2
41 438:Carpets
439: Lace, Rope, Elastics.
419,429/2
416,418,421,429/2
V.A. 375.5 367.0 -2.2
note. [...] indicates a small element which is not included in the match.
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Match SIC (1980) SIC (1968) %
Difff
42 441 :Leather & Fellmongering 431
V.A. 103.5 107.5 3.8
43 442:Travelling Goods and 
Leather for Industry
432
V.A. 71.5 70.5 -1.3
44 451: Footwear 450
V.A. 400.3 400.1 0.0
45 453:Clothes 441-6,449
V.A. 1315.9 1323.2 0.5





V.A. 1083.0 1101.1 1.7
47 456:Fur Goods 433
V.A. 36.8 37.9 2.9
note. [...] indicates a small element which is not included in the match.
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Match SIC (1980) SIC (1968) %
Difff
48 46:Timber and Furniture Order XVII
V.A. 1743.7 1742.9 0.0
49 471 Pulp & Printing Paper 481 
472:Wall Covering, Household Paper 482/1 -2,483,484 
and Packaging
V.A. 1713.6 1702.4 -0.6
50 475Printing & Publishing 485(486),489
V.A. 2819.5 2834.0 0.5
note. [...] indicates a small element which is not included in the match.
This is not a homogeneous group and is not used in the estimation.
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Match SIC (1980) SIC (1968) %
Diff
51 481 :Rubber 491
V.A. 782.9 806.6 2.9
52 492:Music Instruments 499/1
V.A. 27.6 27.9 1.0
53 494:Toys & Sports Goods 
365:Baby Carriages & Wheelchairs
494/1,494/3 
494/2,[382],[399/12]
V.A. 259.8 257.2 -1.0
54 495:Stationery & Misc. 495,499/2
V.A. 177.6 169.0 -4.8
note. [...] indicates a small element which is not included in the match.
and,
Match SIC (1980) SIC (1968) %
Diff
55 500:Construction 500
V.A. 8455.5 8455.5 0.0
note. [...] indicates a small element which is not included in the match.
This is not used in the estimation.
98
CHAPTER 4. THE POWER OF INSIDERS IN WAGE SETTING
I. Introduction.
In this chapter, we analyze certain basic characteristics of the model we have been 
using in previous chapters. In particular, we want a more precise justification of 
"insider" effects in wage setting, and an empirically assessment of their magnitudes.
When managers are asked how wage increases are determined, a common 
response is to state that ’productivity plus inflation’ is the basis for negotiation. Thus, 
for example, managers questioned in the British 1984 Workplace Industrial Relations 
Survey put forward profitability/productivity and increases in the cost of living as by far 
the most important influences on pay settlements, with the external pay structure 
coming a poor third [see Blanchflower and Oswald (1988,table 3) for example].
The fact that increases in worker productivity within the firm are thought of as being 
a prime determinant of wage rises, irrespective of what is happening to pay elsewhere, 
suggests that 'insider1 factors must play an important role in wage bargaining. If the 
labour market were competitive, ’outside’ factors, particularly wages paid elsewhere 
and possibly the overall state of the labour market, would be the key determinants of 
pay within the firm.
If insiders are important in pay bargaining this will have profound implications for the 
behaviour of the macroeconomy. In earlier chapters, we have already established that 
any "insider" effects will complicate the short run impact of technological progress and 
demand shifts. Under certain circumstances insider wage setting leads to a high level 
of hysteresis in the economy which implies that the impact of shocks may persist for 
very long periods even under rational expectations [see Blanchard and Summers
(1986) for example]. It may also lead to asymmetric behaviour and ratchetting,
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whereby employment responds less, and wages more, to demand increases than to 
demand falls [see Lindbeck and Snower (1986), for example].
In the light of this, it is our purpose to investigate the importance of insider forces in 
pay determination in the British industrial sector. In order to do this we further develop 
the idea in chapter 2 to set up a model of union pay bargaining where unions and 
firms bargain over wages but firms set employment unilaterally. We utilise this 
framework because this is the predominant form of pay determination in British 
industry [see Oswald and Turnbull (1985)]. The general idea is that unions are 
concerned with the wage and long term employment prospects of a fixed group of 
workers, the insiders, and firms are concerned with longer term profitability. Long term 
here is taken to mean the situation which arises when employment has been fully 
adjusted to the wage bargain. The resulting model of wage determination, a 
generalisation of that presented in Blanchard and Summers (1986), is one where 
wages are a weighted sum of the wage which would, on average, induce the firm to 
employ all the insiders and the wage that would rule if only outside opportunities were 
significant.
This model is then confronted with data from a number of 2 digit industrial sectors 
and several hypotheses are investigated. First, are insider factors important? Second, 
is the importance of insider factors related to union power as our model, in fact, 
predicts? Third, does the state of play in the external labour market influence wages 
and is the importance of this factor inversely related to union power? Finally, if insider 
factors are important, are the insiders a restricted group of workers such as the 
existing employees or do they extend into the unemployed who last worked in the 
industry? Only in the former case does insider wage setting translate into hysteresis. 
Having set out the questions we may now proceed towards the answers.
Our theoretical model is set out in section II. We then discuss the analytical
implications of this model in section III. An empirical counterpart is then developed in 
section IV, followed by a presentation and discussion of the results in section V. 
Because the data requirements in this activity are different from those in earlier 
chapters, we were able to use a longer run of 2-digit industry information in our 
empirical work. After conclusions in section VI, we present in an appendix an 
interesting comparison study in which we exploit an alternative empirical route and the 
3-digit industrial data we used in previous chapters. As well as confirming the 
consistency in the two data sets, the results there are also helpful in checking some 
of our empirical specifications. There are also some differences in the theoretical 
development which we explain in the following section.
II. A Model of Industry Wage Determination.
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In the following, we present an imperfectly competitive industry model which is a 
variant of the one we used in Chapters 2 and 3. There are several reasons for the 
differences. We are principally concerned with an explicit derivation of a union 
bargaining set-up that includes "insider'1 forces. This explains our use of explicit 
functional forms in our technical equations to minimise ambiguities. In particular, our 
main aim is to obtain estimates of the strength of "insider" forces in the wage equation. 
Therefore, we have no need to formulate or estimate any other equation except to help 
in identifying the "insider" parameter. As a result, we need only to incorporate and 
estimate a marginal revenue condition instead of the production function itself. This 
is a major advantage as production functions are notoriously difficult to estimate 
satisfactorily. A consequence of this approach is that we can use 2-digit industry data 
where, because of the availability of capital stock data as well as industrial 
unemployment rates, we can work out the capital-labour ratio as a measure of labour 
intensity.
Suppose that each industry consists of price setting firms. Since we shall assume 
that the firms have a constant returns technology and that prices and wages are 
uniform across the industry, we may take it that factor input/output ratios are also 
uniform. We thus have an industry production function which we assume, for 
expositional simplicity, to have the Cobb-Douglas form1
Y - B N a, ( ! )
where Y- value added, N= employment, B= capital plus technical progress coefficient. 
To avoid clutter, we drop industry subscripts. Note that the term B has the form
1This assumption is not carried over to the empirical work.
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S - ^ 1_aA a, ( 2 )
where K= capital and A= technical progress (written as labour augmenting). 
The industry faces a demand for its product of the form
where co reflects long-run secular movements in demand due to changes in tastes and 
possibly effects of a non-unitary income elasticity of demand, P= price of industry
value added, p*= expected price of aggregate value added and § is a random
variable reflecting short-run demand shifts. Note that we can recover the original
demand equation in chapter 2 if we make e=a, y*. We suppose that decisions are
taken in the following sequence. Wages are determined via bargaining between firms
and unions before © is revealed. Prices, employment and output are then fixed after©
is revealed but before the aggregate price level is known. These precise assumptions 
about timing have no substantive consequences and are not carried over to the 
empirical section.
Although we suppose that there are employment adjustment costs of the standard 
type, it is convenient at this stage to analyze the static equilibrium employment 
behaviour of the industry. In order to do this, we begin with the pricing decision. If the
industry behaved as a single monopoly, the resulting monopoly price, /S, would satisfy
y -© (P /p #p f t . (3)
ae
(4)
where Wis the pre-determined wage and 1/e= q/(Ti-1), the standard monopoly mark­
up on marginal cost. The fundamental question is the relationship between the joint
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monopoly price and that which is actually set. In a Cournot-Nash industry, the actual 
price is a fixed proportion of the monopoly price.2 However, other theories indicate 
that deviations of industry prices from the joint monopoly level are sensitive to short- 
run demand fluctuations [see Stiglitz (1984), Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), or Bils
(1987) for example]. The general view appears to be that industries behave more 
competitively when demand is high, indicating a pricing equation of the form
with fo 1, f'z0- Corresponding to this price-marginal cost relationship is the standard
marginal revenue product condition obtained by using the product function to eliminate 
Y from (5). This may be written as
where r f  is the equilibrium level of employment. Recall that under static expectations, 
convex adjustment costs imply that actual employment follows an approximate partial 
adjustment process of the form
where lower case letters indicate logs. This equation, which along with (6) yields a 
dynamic version of the marginal revenue product condition, forms the basis of our





2ln fact the mark-up is given by r|/(r|-H) where H is the Herfindahl Index. See 
Cowling and Waterson (1976), for example.
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empirical analysis of employment.3
However, our key purpose in this section is to lay down the foundations for the wage 
bargaining model. As we have already noted, we suppose that when firms and unions 
bargain about wages, they concern themselves with the long run consequences of any 
choices. That is, the union is concerned with the employment consequences when the 
firm has fully adjusted to the new wage. Similarly the firm is concerned with the long 
run impact on profitability. Furthermore, since wages are determined prior to the
revelation of the demand index §, unions and firms are interested in the expectations
of the relevant variables.
By making use of (1 ),(3),(5), we can express ex-post employment and profit in terms 
of wages and variables exogenous to the industry. For employment we obtain
N '-b B ,(W IP Y Uy).
where
$ -[0 1"7$)]<1*t>, 1+Y-(1-ae)-1. (8)
Real profit n-(P (P ')Y -(W /P ')N -F , where F are fixed costs, is given by
^h e  use of (6) as a basis for the empirical analysis of employment may be 
questioned in the sense that it is arguably preferable to use an expression for N" which 
contain variables which are either pre-determined or exogenous to the firm [e.g., eqn
(8)] rather than one which contains the endogenous output price of the firm, P. 
However,, alternatives will inevitably contain the variable co which captures secular 
changes in demand. Since these are both unobservable and hard to proxy, we may 
utilise the marginal revenue product condition, (6), which, in effect, makes use of the 
output price in order to capture these long run taste changes. Concerning the dynamic 
structure of (7) we make no attempt here to go beyond this simple dynamic formulation 
by allowing for non-static expectations, for example. Our justification for this is first that 
it will make the empirical analysis overly complex in a direction away from the main 
point at issue and second that given that real wages approximately follow a random 




B2-B?’B ’ b“ (a6)'l''-b B v <9>
As a basis for bargaining ex-ante, therefore, unions and firms are concerned with 
expectations of (8),(9).
2.1 A bargaining model of wage determination
The foundation of wage determination we take to be the Nash bargaining model,4 
the strategic justification for which is given by Binmore et al. (1986). In order to make 
it operational we first consider the union objective. We suppose that unions are 
concerned only with the welfare of a group of members, N1 in number. At this stage 
we make no assumptions as to who they are. They could, for example, range from 
a small subset of existing employees to a wide group including all existing employees 
and recently unemployed union members who are potential employees. We now 
suppose that the union objective is the expected utility of a representative member of 
this group. If we suppose that L is the probability that a member of the group does 
not obtain employment in the industry, U is the member’s utility if he does obtain
employment and Q his expected utility if he does not, then the union’s objective, Z,
4The model developed here is essentially static and therefore misses out on some
potentially interesting phenomenon. For example, agents will recognize that the higher 
the wages that are set today, the lower will be employment and the fewer the number
of insiders for tomorrow’s wage bargain. Unfortunately, there exists no satisfactory 
sequential bargaining model which is rich enough to cover all the basic issues dealt 
with here and yet simple enough to be suitable as a foundation for empirical analysis. 
We would also contend that the static model which we use here is adequate for
analyzing the data in the sense that the interpretations placed on the results would not




Z-(\-L)U + LU. (10)
The status quo point, z> f° r the Nash bargain refers to the utility that the
representative member can obtain while bargaining proceeds if immediate agreement
is not forthcoming. This we suppose to be Q since, for the duration of any conflict,
existing employees can obtain this elsewhere and any other members of the group can 
obtain this in any event. So the union’s contribution to the Nash bargain is
On the firm’s side, the concern is with expected profit E(n) and the status quo point, 
* ,  is simply -F since the firm has to pay out its fixed costs for the duration of the 
conflict. So the firms’ contribution to the Nash bargain is
from (9), where ^  is the mean of BT The generalised Nash objective is, therefore,
where p is a measure of firms’ bargaining power. The wage outcome is obtained 
simply by maximizing Q with respect to W but before this can be analyzed we must 
discuss the precise form of the L and U functions.
The L function measures the probability of a union member not obtaining work within 






So if the random variable $ has a mean 4 and a distribution function G(.)f then 
it may be shown, using (8), that5
11 0
where
|i -  / V' ( (14)
The utility function of the representative worker, U, we specify as
U - V ,(W [\-v)IPm)+V2(WIW-(WlW}_,), V ^ V fO , V \,V "Z<Q, (15>
where x> is the factor which transforms the real product wage into the post-tax real
consumption wage and yy is the average wage in the economy. The term u,
commonly referred to as the wedge, includes taxes on labour and consumption as well 
as the real price of imports. Note that utility is allowed to depend not only on the level 
of real disposable income but also on the gain in wages relative to the economy wide 
average. This latter term allows for the possibility that individual utility is influenced 
not only by the level of real income but also by changes in the individual’s relative 
position. While this is not standard in economics, it is both a commonplace
5we derive this as follows:
wheren- « '( WjP^)^ . So
|l -  \i \i
•* q ^ 0 0
using integration by parts.
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observation that individuals are particularly motivated both by relativities and by 
deviations from the habitual state of affairs, as well as being an aspect of human 
behaviour which is well known to social psychologists [see Argyle (1987), for example]. 
Finally we express expected utility outside the industry as
0 -0  - ^ [ ^ 1  -u)/PV y2(1 -(Wm.y)] (16)
+t/M (p  W[\ -u /P V  W p -W W ).*
where p is the benefit replacement ratio and Jj is the aggregate unemployment rate; Q
is thus the weighted sum of utility in alternative employment and utility while 
unemployed.
We may now maximise the Nash objective £2 with respect to W to obtain the first- 
order conditions6
1 - - - - - - ^ - [ ( 1 + T )  + P T ] - 0 ,  ( 1 7 >
K W a iV )  T/ HTJ
which serves as the basis of our wage equation. Before we log-linearise, there is one 
problem which must be dealt with in preparation for the empirical implementation of 
this model. As we have already noted in footnote 3, it is convenient to exclude the 
long-run taste variable © [see eq.(3)] from our empirical model. Recalling from (14) 
that p is given by
6From (12) we have
aw awx 1 v * a w TH w
and from (14)
W a u d W i-v+ rm ti-L iv i))  
giving us the first-order condition (17) in the text.
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|1 -N '(W IP yu'l>B ,\ (18>
we see from eq.(8) that B1 is a function of a. However, note that (8) implies
V -N 'ilE LN '),
and we can utilise the marginal revenue product condition (6) to generate an 
alternative expression for E(tf), namely
a [N’) - (  «§)■?..)-i/c,-a> (19)
aeP»S
where P* is the price which the firm expects to set and o *s the value of§
corresponding to Thus we can make use of the fact that we observe the industry
output price, P, in order to eliminate the unobserved taste variable a. Noting the 
definition of B in eq.(2), we are now able to write p as
> •  KA"1'*
where
n t a constant (20)
ae
Returning to the first-order condition (17), it is easy to show that, to a high degree of 
approximation, the term (U-U)IW{d(JldW) is homogeneous of degree zero7 in w[P9>WfP9
7This can be shown as follows
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and so it can be written as
— — x i ( w w w w )-i . v , p ,i /)- (21)wpuidW)
Writing (G-L)/(1-L) as x2(M). then (17) reduces to
1 -x,[WIW,(WIW)_„v,p.uW +y)X2(p) + Py]-0 . (22)
d t u- °  ]------- !___ w y  V -Q
a(wfpy w[auidWj w[auidW) 1 w[duidw> p‘
M M , ------
aWW^ei d(vWiP*)2
Omitting second-order terms, and we may approximate (U-U)IW[dUldW) by
(lY-lV)/lV+[i/Wf IV](1 -p). Making use of this and omitting all terms containing tJi/11, 
as second order, we find that
3 _  U.Q  A W ,  (1 . p ). M n , .
3(WfP®) w w a w )  p *  v 1.
Consider next
a  ^ u-u  j  (0  i v + w p ^ ^ )
a(WfP*) w a w )
where V/11W- V^1-, evaluated at W. t/^p  is defined similarly. Using Taylor 
expansions we find that
a-— [— U~Q  1«-------  \$ -U )v(V '.+^^(W -W ))+upvV '.)
n«#v1 \M A t l ia W \X W tA llWI/IA v 7 v 1 V "  r  1a w p y w w a w r  W W )  1 p<
-v t/1 v l/11 —
1 -{1 -u(1 -p)—=— 2-(»V-
w[auidW) ' r ' p v .  
.  iv a . u-ih i
* ’ lV3(W7P*) m q w w 1'
which is the result in the text. Note also that if V1 is a constant elasticity function, this 
approximation is exact.
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with p given by (20). if we log-linearise, we obtain a wage equation of the form8
where it is possible to show that X<1; c1,c2,c3>0. Unfortunately we are unable to 
demonstrate that X is positive for a general distribution G although it is positive for a 
uniform distribution, for example.9 However, it is clear that if X is negative we have 
a potentially unstable situation since the industry wage would respond to the average 
wage level, £,with a greater than unit elasticity, so we shall ignore this possibility in 
what follows.
This type of industry wage model has a very appealing interpretation. If we log- 
linearise our expression for the expectation of equilibrium unemployment [eq.(19)], we 
obtain [using (2)]
so the expression in the first bracket of the wage equation can be interpreted as the
8Note that in our definition of p in eqn.(20) we have supposed the mean of the
short-run demand shift ® to be constant. We are assuming here that the long-run 
employment expectation induced at different wages is independent of any short-run 
fluctuations in the mean of the demand shift term. We, in fact, investigated this 
proposition by including current and/or lagged demand shift variable in the model 
reported in table 2. In not one industry was a demand term positive and significant at 
the 5% level so we did not pursue this any further and remain satisfied with our implicit 
assumption.
9X has the form




(1 n )x a n  , i y x i i  + C W )x 2ii 
1 - a  w x \  + 1 - a
It is easy to show that X u  > 0  but it is not possible to sign x 2 for a general distribution 
function. We can, however, demonstrate that the denominator is positive.
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wage that would be required in order to induce the industry, on average, to employ all 
N1 insiders. To see this, simply replace log E(bt) by n1 in (24) and solve for w. If we 
deem this to be the ’insider’ wage, then it seems natural to call the term in the second 
bracket of the wage equation the ’outsider’ wage since it reflects the alternative 
opportunities available to the worker. The actual wage is thus a weighted sum of the 
insider and outsider wages and is, therefore, a natural generalisation of the Blanchard 
and Summers (1986) model which involves only the insider wage, with V  set equal to 
last period’s employment. Furthermore, it is easy to show that the weight on the 
insider wage, X, is a decreasing function of p, the firm’s bargaining power [see 
eq.(12)].10 So the more powerful is the union in the bargain, the higher is the weight 
on the insider wage. This hypothesis we investigate in due course.
10From footnote 9 we see that X has the form
, (1 n)x'anf w xn (1+y)x'2hh  
1 - a  i v x * + 1 - a
(1-T h a i*,IV  ,« » v2 (W h a t* ,.,
— ( Py+0 +y)x2) +— r ~ r ~ ] 1 - a  w  1 - a
from the definition of x, in (22). This expression is clearly diminishing in p.
III. Industry Wage Behaviour in the Long Run
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It is clear from the above analysis that if insider forces are important in wage 
determination, then wage rises in an industry are influenced by productivity growth 
within the industry. Suppose, then, that we have two industries, one of which has a 
rate of productivity growth which is consistently faster than the other. Does this mean 
that wages in the two industries will continuously diverge? If this were so, it would be 
an extremely worrying implication of the model since it would imply that the 
fundamental force of competition was being permanently overridden. In fact, however, 
this is not an implication of the model because, in the long run, as productivity grows, 
competition exerts a downward pressure on the industry price and hence on the 
industry wage.
To see how this operates, consider the log-linear version of the marginal revenue 
product condition (6), (7) along with the wage equation where we have dropped the 
lagged dependent variables:
n-k-ao+a*\QQ0— — (w-p)+—^ -logA (25)
1-a 1-a
w-q>+A(p+(1 -a)(k-n )+aIogA)+( 1 -A.)(iy-c,t/+2)f (26)
where a,log0— 1/(1-a)logf(0) and z-cfelogv+c l^ogp. the ’wage pressure’ variables.
Now suppose that in equilibrium, the number of insiders, n1, is a fixed proportion of the 
employees. So
n '-n+0. (27)
Then, if we further suppose that short-run demand shifts are set at their average level
reveals that
dw- dw- c. du+ . (28)
^  (1-A)
Thus industry productivity growth, as captured by k  and log A, has no impact on 
wages which are influenced solely by outside opportunities and the proportion of 
employees who are insiders. This result indicates that while insiders can generate a 
wage ’mark-up’ which is higher the lower the proportion of employees who are actually 
insiders (dwfd6<Q)> competitive forces ensure that industry productivity growth is 
transmitted into lower prices in the long run rather than higher wages.
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IV. The Empirical Model
In order to confront this model with the data, we must both generalise it and specify 
some of the unobserved variables such as the number of insiders. We start out from 
the wage equation (23) and the marginal revenue product condition (6), (7) which in 
full dynamic form is
n-*n_, +(1  -< p )[a o+ a , lo f l0 + f r -  l j ( i v - p ) + ^ l o g > 4 ]  ( 2 9 )
Our first problem is that we have no data on value-added prices by industry. If p, is 
the final output price and pm the price of material inputs, then we have the relation 
(ignoring constants)
P - P r^ iP m -P l  <30>
where s is the share of materials in final output. Second, we see no strong reason to 
impose the Cobb-Douglas assumption on the data and thus we simply write
1 /(1  - a ) - % .  ( 3 1 )
In general a2 need not be greater than unity since it is the elasticity of substitution 




* - c 0+ A [p / - y ^ ( p m'- p , v J - ( / r - n  V - ^ l o g / l ]  (33)
+(1 -A)(iv-c,(/+c l^ogv+Cjlogp)+c4(w-w)_1.
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The following terms must now be specified. First, short-run demand shifts are 
captured by aggregate competitiveness, comp, and deviations of industry specific 
world production from trend, wt. Thus we have
ajtogO-a^comp+a^wf+e^ (34)
where e, is a further random error reflecting productivity shocks.
The number of insiders, N1, we capture by
A/,- o 16/_1+ co2A(.1,
where is the exogenous proportion of previous employees who count as insiders, 
oil, is the exogenous proportion of the unemployed who count as insiders and U 
refers to those unemployed who recently worked in the industry. The insiders 
therefore reflect some proportion of the existing employees plus some proportion of 




N ' - o , -U .,)-cdjZ-.j [1 -(1 )U ,],
G>2
where u=U/L, the industry specific unemployment rate. This yields
n ' - / ,  -(1 )u 1+constant. (36)
<•>2
Note that this formulation generates a positive impact of lagged unemployment on 
wages so long as the proportion of unemployed who count as insiders is lower than 
the proportion of existing employees who do so (cof<co2). This is the foundation of the 
hysteresis element in the insider model.
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Finally we deal with the price expectation terms in the wage equation by the standard 
measurement error method [see Wickens (1982) for example] replacing pf*,pm• by the
actual values pppm and incorporating the innovations ^ -p r p,* e4-pm-p m® int0 the
equation error.
Substituting (34),(35),(36) into our basic eqs.(32),(33) yields
80Sn~<tn.y +(1 -<v)[a0+ay,comp+anwt+k-e±(w-p)--~^(pm-p)\ (37)
+(^-1)(4+y0+(1 -<p)[e,+(%-1)e2],
w-c0+\\pr ^ ( p m-p )+± (k - l_ ih !^ (a + y t) l  
I - s  8 2  8 2
+(1 -A)w-(1 -X)c^u+— (1 - — )(/_! +(1 -  A)cfelogv (38)
82 &>2
+(1 -J.)c3loop+c4(w-i^_1+J .[-^^e2 _ (e3
1 -S
For the purpose of estimation we suppose that k, £ are known in advance and hence 
predetermined whereas it is clear that w,p„pm may all be influenced by productivity 
shocks and must, therefore, be treated as endogenous. We also treat comp and wt 
as endogenous as a precautionary measure. In the wage equation, the price 
innovations in the error may be correlated with any current dated variables except for*; £ 
which are known in advance and so ail such variables must be instrumented by lagged 
values.
In the light of these remarks, we therefore investigate the following structural model 
based on (37),(38).
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Marginal revenue product condition
n - k - a  0 -a ^ { \ - a j ( w - p ) - a 2(\ - a 5 )(pm-p i+ a ^ c o m p  (3g)
+a32M^+a4(1 -a5)4+a4(1 - a jy t + a s{n_,-k),
n=employment, w=hourly labour cost*, pm=material Input price*, p#=flnal output price*, 
comp=aggregate competitiveness*, wt=industry world activity*, k=capital stock, £= 
residual based measure of technical progress; ‘variables are treated as endogenous. 
In (37) it has been assumed that the value-added restriction holds. If this is not the 
case, then the coefficient on the materials price, a* can take either sign. Furthermore, 
(37) also contains the restriction that technical progress is labour augmenting(LATP). 
In terms of (39) this restriction has the form
a4-a .,-1 (40)
Wage equation
w -w -y  0+ \[(p r ^ y ^ ( k - l . y ) - y 2{pm- p i+ y 3d+yAt[ ^
+'Ysu+Ye -^1+ +Vs(w-  ^ )-i»
~#= wages expected to rule elsewhere in the economy, u= aggregate unemployment 
rate, u=industry specific unemployment rate, log v=wedge between employers’ real 
wage and the real consumption wage. This is f,+^+^+s(pm-p^ where ^ is the
employer’s labour tax rate, t* is the income tax rate, t3 is the excise tax rate, ~pm-~pf
is the aggregate real price of imports and s is the appropriate share. All current dated 
variables except kt £ are treated as endogenous. The model restrictions implied by
(37),(38) are Y2=oc/at, y^(x/av y4=a4y/«f. The third of these is not required
if the LATP restriction (40) is satisfied and the fourth does not appear if 7^ 0, for then 
the time trend is omitted from the model entirely.
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V. The empirical investigation.
Our aim in this section is to investigate the four hypotheses set out in the introduction 
using 25 years of annual data for 14 two-digit industrial sectors in Britain. The data 
are described in the appendix.
The first stage is to investigate the overall importance of insider factors and we do 
this by fitting a very general unrestricted wage equation for each industry and testing 
for the joint significance of the insider variables. Thus, based on the wage equation
(41), we simply regress w-w  on two lags of itself and all the dependent variables
except the productivity terms (k-I.J, 4 which are so heavily trended that only one lag 
makes much sense. We also include a trend and constant. The F-tests for the joint 
significance of the insider variables (pr  w), {k-l ipm-p), 4, are presented in table
1 and indicate that in 11 of the 14 industries, this group is jointly significant at the 10% 
level (8 at the 5% level). Furthermore two of the remaining three results indicate that 
insider factors are of considerable importance.
While such equations are useful for investigating overall effects, the degree of over­
fitting and the consequent shortage of degrees of freedom arising from a regression 
with 15 variables using 25 data points makes them all but useless for any intensive 
investigation of individual coefficients. However, to avoid charges of data mining and 
the like, we feel that it is worth presenting results from unrestricted estimates of the
wage equation which are identical in form across ail industries. So we regress w-w
on the first lag of all the independent variables in (41) except aggregate unemployment 
where we use the current value in order to preserve the theoretically important 
temporal difference between this variable and the industry unemployment rate. 
Relevant statistics from these regressions are presented in table 2. The first important
point is that for most of the industries X is strongly positive and appears to be larger 
in those industries with strong unions (chemicals, engineering, vehicles, paper and
printing) relative to those with weak unions (textiles, clothing, bricks and glass,
construction). This impression will be confirmed more precisely when we have
considered estimates of our structural model. The second point worth noting is that
the unemployment terms do not give a very clear cut impression. Recall that
aggregate unemployment effects should be negative and since it is an outsider factor
we might expect it to be more important in those industries where X is small and 
unions are weak [see eq.(38)]. Ten out of the fourteen industries have negative
aggregate effects and these are indeed large where unions are weak (textiles, clothing,
bricks and glass, construction). Again we shall firm up this impression in due course.
However, only eight of the fourteen industries have positive industry unemployment
effects and overall these unemployment effects are badly determined. This is,
perhaps, not wholly surprising given the high degree of collinearity between the two
unemployment variables (correlation coefficients are typically in the range 0.91-0.97)
so we should not be too disappointed. However, there are clear instances of overall
positive unemployment effects in some industries and this will make a contribution to
hysteresis in the economy as a whole.
In table 3 we present estimates of the key wage parameters of structural model set
out in eqs. (39),(41). The remaining parameters may be found in table 3’ in the
appendix, our general strategy in estimating this model is as follows. We allow the
equations to differ across industries by dropping material prices (pm-pf), the trend term
and the wedge term (log v) if their coefficients are small and insignificant. We impose 
the labour augmenting technical progress restriction if it is not rejected. Otherwise, the
first equation for each industry is the same throughout, whereas in the second
equation we drop one of the unemployment terms if this seems sensible.
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Overall, the wage equations are fairly satisfactory in the sense that they always have 
considerably lower standard errors than a simple first order autoregression, they exhibit 
stable parameters over the two episodes of greatest ‘structural change’ in the 
economy, 1973-1974,1979-1980 and they generally have serially uncorrelated errors. 
The cross equation restrictions implied by the theoretical structure are never rejected.
The insider effects, X, are well determined and differ quite systematically between 
industries as we might expect. Furthermore, since they are all significantly below unity
and typically below one half, this implies that the outside wage is a very important
factor in wage determination. Other features worth noting include the fact that the
lagged dependent variable, which typically covers a multitude of sins in time series
models, usually has a gratifyingly small coefficient. This is consistent with the
variables in the wage equation being cointegrated, which in all bar a couple of cases
they are. A discussion of the implications of non-stationarity for these equations is
provided in an appendix.
Unfortunately the unemployment terms tend not to be well determined, partly as a 
consequence of their lack of independent variation. If their overall effect seems to be 
negative we drop the lagged industry term and if positive, we drop the aggregate 
unemployment rate. Once we do this, then in most cases we obtain a significant 
effect. This is not, however, a wholly satisfactory procedure.
We are now in a position to present tentative answers to the four questions posed 
in the introduction. First, are insider forces important? The results reported in all three 
tables indicate a resounding yes. Industry wages do not simply track aggregate wages 
modified by the situation in the aggregate labour market but are strongly influenced in 
the short run by industry price and productivity terms. The second and third questions 
refer to the relationship between insider/outsider effects and union power. Recall our 
theoretical framework indicates that the ‘insider weight’, X, should be increasing in
union power (see fn. (10)) and this implies that the coefficient on aggregate
unemployment should also be increasing in union power [see eq.(38)]. Note that an
increase in the unemployment coefficient implies that the unemployment effect on
wages becomes less important, since it is generally negative. To investigate these
issues we analyse the cross industry variation in the X coefficient and that on 
aggregate unemployment in relation to union power. Our measure of union power in
each industry, which we consider to be relatively stable through time, is the mark-up
on union on non-union manual male wages in 1976 as reported in Stewart (1983). As
a measure of union power this is superior to union density in the British context, since,
for a variety of reasons, several heavily unionised industries have rather weak unions.
However this measure does have the drawback that it reflects not only union power
but the rents which are available to be captured. To deal with this, we also control for
the 1976 industry 5-Firm Concentration Ratio, C5, when examining the relationships.
In table 4, we tabulate Union Power, the 5-Firm Concentration Ratio and the value of
X and the aggregate unemployment coefficients from both table 2 and table 3. We 
also present some relevant regressions in order to summarise the overall picture. The
results here indicate that there is a significant positive correlation across industries
between the insider effect, X, and our measure of union power. This is consistent with 
the theoretical framework set out in section 2. Furthermore, there is evidence of a
positive cross industry correlation between the aggregate unemployment effect and
union power. This is the correct sign because larger negative unemployment effects
should be associated with weaker unions. Finally, the positive concentration ratio
effects are of independent interest. There is evidence of some association between
strong insider or weak outsider effects and high levels of concentration within the
industry, holding union power constant. This is consistent with the evidence on
efficiency wag models presented in Katz (1986), for example. However we do not
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wish to speculate further at this stage but simply leave it as an interesting result.
The last question posed in the introduction concerns the extent to which insiders are 
a restricted group of workers such as the existing employees, as opposed to a wider 
group including the recently unemployed. In this case, we should observe positive 
lagged industry unemployment effects generating hysteresis in the economy. The 
evidence here is rather mixed. It is clear from tables 2 and 3 that there are such 
effects in a minority of industries, in particular CH, MM, VE and CL. Overall, however, 
we do not find any strong evidence that hysteresis generated by insiders11 is a 
pervasive phenomenon.
Finally, the functional relationship between the insider effect and union power we 
derived in footnote 10 (and estimated in table 4) suggests an alternative empirical 
route to the estimation of X. We attempt this interesting exercise in appendix 2, where 
we also repeat it with the 3-digit industry data we used in previous chapters. It is 
reassuring that the estimates of X generated by both sets of data are remarkably 
similar.
11Hysteresis can arise for other reasons. For example, if the long-term unemployed 
have only a weak impact on wage determination this will generate hysteresis via the 
dynamics of the relationship between the unemployment rate and the proportion of 
long term unemployed [see Nickell (1987) for example].
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VI. Summary and conclusions.
The purpose of this exercise has been to investigate the importance of insider factors 
in wage determination. Starting with a variant of the general model in chapter 2, we 
have developed a theoretical framework based on union bargaining which indicates 
that the wage outcome is a weighted sum of that wage which will just ensure the 
employment of the ‘insiders’ and the wage which will attract and retain workers in the 
face of outside competition for their services. The weight attached to the former is 
found to be an increasing function of the power of the union.
When confronted with the data, this model in both unrestricted and tightly specified 
form reveals insider factors to be important and indicates that insider forces are 
stronger and outsider forces weaker when unions are powerful. However, the insider 
group does not, in general, appear to be restricted to the current incumbents and, as 
a consequence, hysteresis arising from insider behaviour does not seem to be a 
pervasive phenomenon. These results based on industry data are generally consistent 
with those derived using firm data which are reported in Nickell and Wadhwani (1990).
Table 1
Wage equations (VAR type): F tests for insider variables 
(dependent variable: w-w> 1961-1985)
Industry F-statistic Industry F-statistic
FDT 1.99 ENES 5.25*
CH 2.03 TX 4.98*
MM 4.32* CL 7.36*
ME 3.50* BG 1.20
IE 3.57* TF 2.81“
EE 5.21* PP 2.41“
VE 2.37** CON 4.53*
notes.
i. The equation includes two lags on W- W, pr w> Pm*Pf»
u, u, log u; one lag on £, k-l^ plus c and trend. The F 
tests the joint significance of the insider terms, namely 
two lags on P r w, 
pm-pf> u and one lag on £, k-l.,.
ii. In order to specify the expected outside wage, w> we 
proceed as follows. If wage bargainers are fully 
informed, then the expected outside wage would simply 
be, wa, the aggregate wage. If, as seems more likely, 
they are less than fully informed about aggregate wages 
but have a good knowledge of aggregate prices, they 
would sensibly estimate aggregate wages by wa_^+Ap+g 
where ap  is the change in aggregate prices and g is 
rend real wage growth. So we define w as 
awa+(l-a)(wa_,+Ap)> assuming g is a constant. In the
analyses reported here, we set a -0.5* ,n fact» varying g 
on the unit interval makes very little odds to the results.
iii.FDT=food, drink, tobacco; CH=chemicals; MM=metal 
m anufacture; ME=mechanical engineering; 
IE=instrumental engineering; EE=electrical engineering; 
VE=vehicles; ENES=other engineering; TX=textiles; 
CL=clothing and footwear; BG=bricks and glass; 
TF=timber and furniture; PP=paper and printing; 
CON=construction.
iv. The relevant statistic is F(8,10), 5%=3.07,10%=2.37. 
So * represents a 5% rejection, “  a 10% rejection.
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Table 2
Unrestricted wage equations (single lag) 
(dependent variable: w-w, 1961-1985)
Industry
Parameters
y5M Ye(^-i) se R2
FDT 0.49(3.8) 0.68(1.8) -0.27(0.7) 0.013 0.93
CH 0.34(2.6) 0.11(0.2) 0.06(0.1) 0.017 0.89
MM 0.38(3.0) -0.37(1.0) 0.18(1.2) 0.015 0.70
ME 0.36(4.0) -0.62(2.0) 0.87(2.1) 0.012 0.82
IE 0.26(2.1) -0.63(1.7) 1.04(1.1) 0.016 0.84
EE 0.26(3.7) -0.25(1.1) -0.29(0.6) 0.011 0.72
VE 0.32(1.5) 0.07(0.1) 0.26(0.4) 0.025 0.92
ENES 0.22(3.1) -1.26(5.6) 0.24(1.7) 0.010 0.86
TX 0.13(1.4) -0.65(1.8) -0.27(1.3) 0.012 0.94
CL 0.02(0.2) -1.26(3.1) 0.46(1.8) 0.015 0.92
BG 0.26(2.3) -0.53(1.2) -0.16(0.4) 0.016 0.67
TF 0.39(3.5) -0.73(2.1) 0.44(1.4) 0.013 0.89
PP 0.50(3.7) 0.93(1.7) -1.38(1.5) 0.019 0.90
CON -0.10(0.1) -0.68(2.2) -0.09(0.5) 0.015 0.79
i. The equation includes one lag on W- W, pr w> Pm“
pf, u, log o, £, k-l_1f the current value of h  plus c and 
trend.
ii. Notes ii) and iv) on table 1 also apply.
iii. t-statistics in parentheses.
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Table 3
Wage equation [structural model, eqs (39,40)]
Industry
Parameters FDT CH CH MM MM ME ME
X 0.33(4.4) 0.21(2.8) 0.22(2.8) 0.26(2.8) 0.25(3.1) 0.27(4.6) 0.30(5.3)
Y s W














y^log v) - - - - - - -
_____________
0.59(4.0) 0.29(1.6) 0.39(2.2) 0.14(0.8) 0.14(0.9) 0.21(1.5) 0.18(1.4)
se 0.0157 0.0182 0.0182 0.0201 0.0196 0.0136 0.0138
se(1st-order autoregression) 0.0200 0.0237 0.0237 0.0213 0.0213 0.0204 0.0204
Autocorrelation, LM, x*2 3.30 1.58 3.18 7.11' 7.40' 3.48 2.08
Parameter stability ’73/74 F(12,x)1.27 0.83 1.10 1.17 0.96 0.92 0.97
Parameter stability ’79/80 F(6,x) 1.31 0.82 0.20 0.70 0.79 0.30 0.32
Cross equation restriction %2(df) 1.52(2) 1.36(2) 0.82(2) 3.17(3) 5.06(3) 0.30(2) 0.30(2)
Industry
Parameters IE IE EE EE VE VE


























Y a d rrM -i
0.14(0.9) 0.18(1.2) 0.07(0.4) 0.20(1.1) 0.88(4.3) 0.74(3.9)
se 0.0122 0.0124 0.0123 0.0125 0.0204 0.0204
se(1 st-order autoregression) 0.0192 0.0192 0.0153 0.0153 0.0278 0.0278
Autocorrelation, LM, %2 1.53 1.96 3.34 3.55 0.66 0.75
Parameter stability ’73/74 F(12,x) 1.31 1.25 1.30 1.42 1.04 0.78
Parameter stability ’79/80 F(6,x) 1.01 0.39 1.24 0.84 1.17 0.57
Cross equation restriction %2(df) 6.77(3) 6.50(3) 4.20(2) 3.35(2) 0.43(4) 0.26(4)
Notes.LA I h restrictions: a4= a ,- l.
W-W~y0+X[(pr v^+y^k-l^)-y2{pm-p)+y3a+y4(i
+Vsu+Ybw-i + Y^ OQv + YsC "^ ^ -1 * 




Wage equation [structural model, eqs (39,40)]
Industry
Parameters ENES ENES TX TX CL BG BG




0.23(0.7) -0.33(2.9)-0.49(1.6) -0.79(4.7) -1.40(4.7) -0.76(0.2) -0.14(1.0)
Ye(u-i) -.40(1.8) - -0.23(1.2) - 0.62(3.6) -0.68(0.2) -
y7(log 0) 0.10(1.9) 0.13(2.7) 0.25(4.0) 0.26(4.1) 0.18(2.4) 0.84(1.2) 0.87(1.3)
-0.03(0.2) 0.11(0.7) 0.24(1.4) 0.37(2.7) 0.74(5.4) 0.31(1.5) 0.31(1.6)
se 0.0160 0.0141 0.0114 0.0114 0.0137 0.0163 0.0163
se(1 st-order autoregression) 0.0194 0.0194 0.0199 0.0199 0.0213 0.0190 0.0190
Autocorrelation, LM, %2 0.92 3.44 1.98 0.12 0.24 0.34 3.95
Parameter stability ’73/74 
F(12,x)
1.36 1.23 1.19 1.25 1.58 1.33 1.19
Parameter stability ’79/80 
F(6 ,x)
0.43 0.49 1.87 1.24 3.14 0.37 0.23
Cross equation restriction 
X2(df)
2.84(2) 1.51(2) 0 .02(2) 0.79(2) 3.78(3) 6.58(3) 5.26(3)
Industry
Parameters TF TF PP PP CON CON
X 0.26(1.9)0.24(2.2) 0.29(1.8) 0.42(2.3) 0.12(1.2) 0.12(1.2)





-0.15(0.3) -0.17(0.6) -0.09(0.1) -0.54(1.7)
Ye(u-i) -0.17
(0.4)
- 0.23(0.3) - -0.14
(0.4)





0.82(3.6) 0.81(3.6) -4.2(2.0) -4.0(2.0)
se 0.0145 0.0142 0.0221 0.0229 0.0148 0.0142
se(1 st-order autoregression) 0.0205 0.0205 0.0258 0.0258 0.0278 0.0278
Autocorrelation, LM, 3.17 2.04 0.83 0.63 3.98 4.01
Parameter stability ’73/74 F(12,x) 0.70 0.85 1.17 1.22 0.95 0.99
Parameter stability ’79/80 F(6 ,x) 0.84 0.86 1.16 1.23 0.88 0.52
Cross equation restriction %2(df) 5.10(3) 4.71(3) 2.81(2) 2.08(2) 0.35(3) 0.58(3)
notes. Gross equation restrictions: y^l/a,, Yjsa^ a,, 73=a«/a1, a^o^ya,.
All current terms except £  and k are treated as endogenous - the first lags on all these variables 
are used as instruments. The model was estimated using non-linear 3SLS on TSP4.1A.
‘ indicates rejection of null hypothesis.
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Table 4
The Relation between Insider Power and Industry Characteristics
Union 5 firm
Power Concentrati Coefficients 
on
Industry (U J Ratio(C5) X(table 2) A.(table3) 2/(table2) ~jj(table3)
FDT 0.161 0.618 0.49 0.33 0.68 0.11
CH 0.241 0.602 0.34 0.22 0.11 0
MM 0.116 0.642 0.38 0.25 -0.37 0
ME 0.122 0.351 0.36 0.30 -0.62 -0.21
IE 0.167 0.322 0.26 0.33 -0.63 -0.22
EE 0.108 0.635 0.26 0.16 -0.25 -0.19
VE 0.272 -0.677 0.32 -0.52 -0.07 0
ENES 0.198 0.275 0.22 0.24 -1.26 -0.33
TX 0.111 0.476 0.13 0.12 -0.65 -0.79
CL 0.127 0.254 0.02 0.04 -1.26 -1.40
BG 0.101 0.489 0.26 0.17 -0.53 -0.14
TF 0.269 0.279 0.39 0.24 -0.73 -0.43












Note. The 5 firm concentration ratio is based on net output and refers to the weighted average across 
all the 3-digit industries within each 2-digit industry. Union power is taken directly from Stewart(1983), 
table 3 and corresponding to the raw differential.
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Table 5
Marginal Revenue Product Condition [structural model, eqs (39,40)]
Parameters
Industry
FDT CH ■ CH MM MM ME ME
<*1 1.62(11.9) 1.05(7.5) 0.93(6.5) 3.13(5.3) 2.96(7.4) 2.16(8.7) 2.08(10.1)
<*2 - - - - - - -
<*31 0.14(3.4) 0.20(2.7) 0.24(4.1) 0.53(4.3) 0.55(4.4) 0.25(3.3) 0.30(3.7)
0t32 1.20(3.2) 0.30(1.8) 0.40(2.2) 0.32(1.6) 0.32(1.6) 0.51(2.6) 0.82(3.6)
<*4 0,-1 0,-1 <*i'1 0.69(1.6) 0.55(2.2) a,-1 0,-1
o4y - - - - - - -
as 0.93(20.6) 0.86(8.3) 0.91(9.5) 0.89(14.5) 0.86(16.0) 0.81(13.0) 0.76(11.3)
se 0.0131 0.0203 0.0206 0.0412 0.0426 0.0263 0.0285
Industry
Parameters IE IE EE EE VE VE
<*i 1.13(12.9) 1.12(12.5) 1.29(7.3) 1.24(6.9) 1.92(2.8) 1.66(2.6)
<*2 - - - - - -
“ 31 0.12(1.8) 0.13(1.8) 0.20(3.8) 0.20(3.7) 0.31(5.9) 0.33(6.1)
tX32 0.26(1.2) 0.25(1.2) 0.69(5.2) 0.68(5.1) 0.33(2.6) 0.33(2.5)
a4 <*i-1 a,-1 -0.13(0.4) -0.23(0.8) 2.22(2.7) 1.86(2.6)
a4y -0.023(9.2) -0.023(8.9) - - -0.041(4.0) -0.036(3.7)
as 0.76(9.9) 0.76(9.9) 0.80(15.7) 0.80(15.2) 0.95(29.1) 0.93(21.0)




Marginal Revenue Product Condition [structural model, eqs (39,40)]
Industry
Parameters ENES ENES TX TX CL BG BG
1.57(9.2) 1.55(9.5) 1.46(7.6) 1.41(7.7) 1.16(2.7) 3.58(10.4) 3.57(10.7)
«2 - - 0.94(1.9) 1 .06(2.2) - - -
«31 0.28(3.7) 0.30(3.9) 0.49(6.2) 0.51(6.3) 0.37(7.0) 0.31(4.7) 0.31(4.8)
®32 0.81(2.7) 0.92(3.1) 0.73(3.5) 0.76(3.7) 0.64(2.6) 0.86(6.2) 0.86(6.3)
« 4 0 ,-1 Ol-1 a ,-1 0,-1 0.90(4.2) 0.90(4.3)
<x4y - - - - - - -
«s 0.81(14.1) 0.80(13.9) 0.81(20.8) 0.80(20.5) 0.84(19.9) 0.90(26.3) 0.90(26.3)
se 0.0266 0.0268 0.0198 0.0199 0.0190 0.0187 0.0187
Industry
Parameters TF TF PP PP CON CON
cl, 2.24(5.5) 2.18(5.9) 2.11(5.1) 2.01(11.9) 1.60(0.7) 2.78(0.7)
Otj . . . . . .
otg, 0.23(2.7) 0.24(2.9) - - AD2.03(2.9) AD2.21(3.2)
0(32 0.71(3.6) 0.71(3.7) 0.26(2.0) 0.40(3.0) -
oc4 -0.01(0.0) -0.05(0.1) otj-1 <v1 -1.19(1.3) -1.89(0.7)
oc4y - - - - -0.053(2.1) -0.038(0.8)
ots 0.91(18.7) 0.91(18.2) 0.93(21.4) 0.84(15.9) 0.90(8.3) 0.95(10.6)
se 0.0264 0.0265 0.0178 0.0170 0.0315 0.0318
APPENDIX 1. Non-stationarity in the wage model
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The variables used in the wage model (see table 3) are (w-w)> fog v, and
lpr w+y,(k-l_i-y2{pm-p)+y36+yAll-2, say. The f  coefficients used to define 2 for
the purposes of this analysis are taken from appendix table 3’. J, log v are 
aggregate variables and the rest are industry specific. In table A.1, we present 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests of the null hypotheses that the series are 1(1) 
and l(2). If the ADF statistics are less than around -3.5 (5%) or -3.2 (10%), then we 
may reject the null and suppose that the series are l(0) or 1(1), respectively.
The general impression given by table A.1 is that the variables are 1(1) although in 
some industries (w-fy and z may be l(0). We should, however, be highly sceptical 
about results of this kind based on 25 observations since discriminating between a 
unit root and one which takes the value 0.9, say, is very difficult with so little data.
Were we to have observations for 125 years as opposed to 25 years, it could well 
be a very different story. Just as a simple example, in the case of aggregate 
unemployment we do, in fact, have observations from 1850. Over the period 1859- 
1985, aggregate unemployment fluctuates a great deal, but strictly between the 
bounds 0-14% (on current definitions). Furthermore, the unemployment series 
crosses 3% no less than 22 times and 8% no less than 12 times. The probability 
that such a series is generated by an autoregression with a unit root is more or less 
negligible. Nevertheless,many short stretches of the series look like a random walk.
However, if we proceed in the standard fashion and suppose the variables to be 
1(1), we must next check to see if the wage equation variables are cointegrated. In 
table A.2, we present the appropriate ADF tests and these reveal that aside from 
one or two exceptions, the variables are indeed cointegrated. The coefficients and t 
ratios reported in table 3 are thus generally reliable and although we could,
perhaps, gain some extra efficiency by using the Johansen (1988) multivariate 
procedure, the potential rewards would be minimal given the short length of the 
time series.
These are standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics, using one lag on the 





(w-w) - y ___________ f _________ u_______ i°9v_____
l ( 0 )  1 (1 )  l ( 0 )  1 (1 ) l ( 0 )  1 (1 )  l ( 0 )  1 (1 )  l ( 0 )  1 (1 )
FDT -3.8 -4.8 -1.4 -5.7 -3.5 -4.4
CH -5.0 -7.0 -1.8 -5.0 -3.0 -3.7
MM -2.9 -5.8 -0.9 -3.3 -2.6 -3.7
ME -3.4 -5.0 -1.7 -4.4 -3.3 -3.2
IE -2.3 -4.0 -1.9 -5.0 -2.5 -3.6
EE -3.1 -5.0 -1.9 -4.8 -2.3 -3.4
VE -1.8 -3.8 -1.6 -4.2 -2.9 -3.6
OE -2.9 -4.3 -1.4 -4.0 -2.8 -4.0
TX -1.6 -4.3 -0.9 -4.1 -3.6 -4.9
CL -2.5 -3.3 -0.5 -4.2 -3.3 -4.2
BG -4.1 -5.2 -2.0 -4.5 -2.5 -3.3
TF -3.2 -4.7 -1.7 -5.2 -2.6 -5.6
PP -1.8 -3.7 -2.3 -4.4 -2.3 -3.9
CN -2.9 -6.6 -2.6 -5.0 -2.0 -3.0
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APPENDIX 2. An alternative empirical route to identifying X .
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In footnote 10, we derived a relation which showed that the insider power variable, 
X, is a function of Union Power, Up. In table 4, we showed that empirically, this 
relation is rather strong. This opens up an alternative route for identifying X by the joint 
estimation of:
x-«0 +M i/p-i/p) (A1)
*^c0U [p r ^ ( p m-p,)+J-(Ar-/.1) + - ^ r^(4+Y9J1-5 8^  82
+(1 -A.)w-(1 -  X)Cy~u+— (1 +(1 -A)cfelogv (38)
°2 W2
+(1 -x)^logp+c4(>v-M9.1tX[(a^ 1)e2- e^3
£Lf 1 -S
In (A1), we have mean-deviated Up so that 0^  will give the average level of X. We are 
also ignoring the concentration variable as these are not very significant in Table 4.
Part of the reason for this exercise is to compare results using 3-digit as well as 2- 
digit data. To do that, we now derive a version of (38) that could be operational on 3- 
digit information. First, we have to drop material prices and industry unemployment 
from (38) because these are not available at the 3-digit level for the whole sample 
period. The replacement ratio is also dropped because of statistical insignificance.
There are some further problems which arise because the capital stock is not 
available at the 3-digit level and neither is the industry "labour force", /, for the whole 
sample. To deal with this problem we suppose that / can be approximated by n plus
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a constant, where f i is smoothed employment. We then note that the production 
function has the form
y - ^  (n+a)+('\-£Li ) k
which implies that
y-a, ( / f + a ) + ( 1 - a , ) f c  (A 2 )
y  being smoothed output. Manipulating (A2) yields
k-rr— -— {y-n)— —— a  (A 3 )
(1 -a,) (1-a,)
If we now replace k-l by the above expression for fr-n in (38) we obtain
w -C o -X ip ^ b z iy -n W -b z W + Q -X K w -C i u ^ k ^ v )  (A4)
+cA(w - i i^ + e
This equation plus equation (A1) serve as the foundation for the empirical work at the 
3-digit level. The insider terms in the first bracket capture the industry own price, p, 
smoothed productivity, y -n , and the technical progress factor, a. It is hypothesised 
that the weight, X, depends positively on union power.
Estimation
2-digit level
First, we present the empirical version of (38) which we use to estimate with 2-digit 
level data as
» -^ Y ^ M (P r^ n i(* - /- i) -Y 2 (p m-Pi)+Y34+Y4<] (41)
+Y6u+Yeu- i+ Y7|o0v+Ys(m'-  .
In contrast to the main text, the estimation here is based on a pooling of all the
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industries but allowing certain coefficients to change systematically across the cross 
section. In particular, we always have an industry specific constant and allow the 
insider weight to vary across the industries as a function of Union Power (see eqn A1). 
In order to simplify the estimation,we impose the coefficients on the insider variables, 
taking them from individual industry estimates of the employment wage model set out 
in table 3B. The pooled estimates parameter in (A1) and (41) are then
X = 0.13 + 0.87 (Up-Up)
(7.0) (3.5)
Thus, there is a strong tendency for insider factors to be accorded a higher weight 
when union power is higher.
3-digit level
Turning now to the 3-digit estimation based on equation (A4) and (A1), we found that 
allowing common coefficients aside from the constant across 54 industries was not 
satisfactory, so we divided up the industries into 11 groups and allowed the 
productivity, wedge, and unemployment parameters to vary across these groups. As 
before, we allow an individual industry constant and obtained the following results from 
a pooled regression.
X = 0.15 + 0.71 (Up-Up)
(4.4) (1.5)
Thus we were able to compare the consistency of the two data sets and confirm our 
estimates of the parameters for the insider effects.
APPENDIX 3. Data Definitions and Sources.
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N, Employees in employment in industry /, male and females, G.B., mid-year.
Source: Employment Gazette.
K, Gross capital stock (plant and machinery) in industry /. Between 1963 and
1977, data taken from Panic(1978). Before 1963 and after 1977, annual gross 
capital stock (plant and machinery) from the Blue Book were used.
W, Real labour cost in industry /. First we compute male hourly wage rate, Wm' and
female hourly wage rate, Wf‘ by the expressions 
E j = W j x NH + Wm‘ x 1.3 x (Hm‘ - NH),
E,' = W,' x H,',
where Em', E,' are male and female average weekly earnings In the Industry /.
H J  H,' are male and female average weekly hours in industry /. Then we 
calculate
W , - [ ~  xWm '+ ^T X  W,>] .(1 +t, )N, N,
where N j, N,1 are male and female employment in industry /.
Sources: Earnings and hours are October figures in the Employment Gazette. 
Employment are mid-year figures from Employment Gazette. Employment 
taxes, fy are from Layard and Nlckell (1986).
P, Output price in industry /. Up to 1977, data taken from the Cambridge Growth
Model data bankv\a\he Macroeconomic Modelling Bureau, Warwick University. 
After 1977, these are the wholesale price indices in British Business.
Pm, Price of raw materials purchased by industry /. Source: British Business.
A, Five-year moving averages of technical progress in industry /, (TP,) Using a
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constant returns to scale production function,
Yg1 = f(M„K„N„TP,),
where Ygi = gross output in industry / at constant prices, M, = raw materials 
input of industry / at constant prices; TP, was calculated in the manner 
described by Layard and Nickell (1986). Source; Output and materials at 
current prices from the Census of Production are deflated by the respective 
price indices.
comp Competitiveness series as described in Layard and NickelI (1986).
wt, Index of world production (market economies), detrended by a quintic in time.
Source: UN monthly statistics, 
u Male unemployment rate, mid-year, G.B. Source: Layard and Nickell (1986).
u, Industry unemployment rate, male and female, mid-year, G.B., defined as
UR/(N,+UR|). Source for UR,: Employment Gazette. After 1982, when these are 
no longer published, they are estimated from several proxy indicators; lagged 
UR„ u, deviations of N, from a moving average. The weights used to combine 
these proxy indicators result from a regression with UR, as the dependent 
variable.
Y, Index of industrial production. Source: Blue Book.
Y Potential output of the economy. Source: Layard and Nickell (1986).
W Average aggregate hourly wage, male, October. Source: Layard and Nickell
(1986).
P Output price index (TFE deflator at factor cost) described in Layard and Nickell
(1985). Source: Blue Book.
AD Adjusted Fiscal Stance. Source: Layard and Nickell (1986).
Up Union power. Unadjusted union mark-up. Source: Stewart (1983).
WedgeTaxes plus relative price of imports weighted by the share of imports in final 
expenditure. Source: Layard and Nickell (1986). 
t, ‘Tax’ rate on labour paid by employers. Source: Layard and Nickell (1986).
C5 Five-firm concentration ratio. This is based on net output and is averaged over
the three-digit industries within each two-digit one. Source: Census of 
Production.
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CHAPTER 5. UNEMPLOYMENT AND MORTALITY IN ENGLAND AND WALES.
I. Introduction.
In previous chapters, we have studied the decline in industrial employment and its 
various causes. Obviously, economists are interested in these developments not just 
for esoteric reasons but are really concerned about their human consequences. In this 
chapter, we look at one particular aspect of those consequences, namely the mortality 
impact of unemployment on the working population in England and Wales.
To begin with, let us look at the pattern of male mortality statistics. Figure 11 shows 
that male mortality rates in various age groups have declined steadily in the last one 
hundred years, punctuated only by the two world wars.
In recent years, the main causes of mortality among working age men have been 
circulatory diseases (around 33%), cancers (around 25%), followed by physical injuries 
which are important among younger males (around 25%), but less so for older men 
(around 3%). The main types of physical injuries which lead to deaths are motor 
accidents and suicides, each making up around 40% of fatalities in this category. 
Between 1974 and 1991, the mortality rates in these age groups declined substantially. 
Apart from incidence of suicides, deaths from major causes have come down in step. 
The absolute rise in the suicide rates in the 35-44 age group means that suicide rates 
now decline with age. This is a reversal of the situation in the seventies. (Figure 2)
In terms of the regional picture, the mortality pattern exhibits strong persistence. 
While mortality rates in every region declined in absolute terms over the last three 
decades, the North, Yorkshire and Humberside and the North West suffer higher death
’Figures are presented on pages 164-168.
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rates consistently. East Anglia and the South-east, on the other hand, have far lower 
mortality rates. This is true for all the age groups we studied (35-44, 45-54, 55-64) 
and has persisted over the entire sample period. In figure 3, we compare regional 
mortality rates relative to the average for England and Wales, for males aged 35-44. 
Figures 4 and 5 repeat this exercise for males aged 45-54 and males aged 55-64. It 
is obvious from all three pictures that there is no indication that regional variations in 
the mortality pattern have narrowed or changed in any significant way.
There are many possible reasons why a rise in unemployment could cause mortality. 
The more traditional view that unemployment creates material deprivation leading to 
deaths from malnutrition is probably less secure nowadays with the general provision 
of social security. More and more, the consensus among those who believe in the 
mortality effect of unemployment is that psychological channels are at work. 
Employment is not just a source of income, but contributes to people’s social status, 
whether real or self-perceived. It also generates activity and rhythm in life. Thus job- 
loss can quite easily bring about dis-orientation in sufferers. The resulting mental 
stress could lead to behaviour which may be considered irrational or reckless in normal 
circumstances.
A less discussed topic is that a general rise in unemployment can also create 
uncertainty in the minds of the employed through loss of job security. The implication 
of this for some people could be just as severe as if they were actually unemployed. 
In this respect, the rise in unemployment above a certain critical level (when a sense 
of doom pervades) could have very wide implications indeed.
From the employers’ side, times of high unemployment are also times when business 
volume and profits are low. That could lead to them giving less consideration to costly 
environmental or safety concerns. This could also have mortality consequences 
although strictly speaking, it would not be an unemployment effect. We shall return
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to these issues in the next section as we review the literature on this subject.
In terms of methodology, we note that there has always been problems in this area
of research, particularly in the effort to separate cause from effect. A major problem
is simultaneous equation bias, i.e. the presence of reverse causation. That health
status affects employment prospects is well known (for example, see Nickell, 1979 ).
An associated problem is that unemployment and illness are both related to chronic
poverty. Indeed unemployment tends to be concentrated at the unskilled end of the
labour market, at the bottom of the income scale (see Layard et al, 1991). In this
poverty trap situation, people suffer economic deprivation in or out of work. It is not
clear how unemployment as such is bad for health.
the use oi s
To overcome this, aggregate time series methods seem, more promising. Even here A A
problems persist. First, the causes of ill-health and mortality are many and varied. In 
a particular year, severe weather conditions could cause more accidents and physical 
injuries, for example. Where these factors are un-correlated with unemployment rates, 
their presence creates statistical noise, lowering observed correlations. Where they 
are correlated with unemployment rates, then we have a serious problem in omitted 
variables bias. Second, in the modelling of mortality, we have to separate the effects 
of the cyclical factors like unemployment from the secular changes brought about by, 
say increased medical and social provision. However, the secular decline in mortality 
may not be smooth or predictable. Improvements in healthcare and social 
infrastructures may not happen with sufficient regularity. It is thus difficult to 
differentiate the secular factors from the cyclical. If we observe that mortality rates rise 
or fall in a certain period, we cannot tell with confidence whether such changes are 
part of a long term trend or due to cyclical factors like unemployment. Third, data on 
unemployment can mean different things over time. For example, the natural rate of 
unemployment changes over time. To the extent that this reflects labour supply
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decisions, it will have minimal impact on health. Thus, if people choose not to work 
because generous unemployment benefits are easily available, then they are actually 
better off in an unemployed state. Furthermore, the definition of unemployment was 
substantially revised in the early eighties. And in recent times, there have been 
reports that employment agencies are more severe in testing benefit entitlements. With 
more people rejected as unemployed, this obviously lowers the jobless count.
To control for these difficulties, we develop our model in the context of a pooled time 
series-cross section technique in section ill. Section IV describes the data, the 
estimation equations and the results. We conclude with a summary in section V. 
Before that, we give a brief survey of the literature on this subject.
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II. Background Literature.
The literature in this area may be chronologically separated into two groups, those 
done in the inter-war years, and those done since the late 1970s.
The inter-war studies are of a cross-section nature, generally associating 
unemployment with destitution and hence, ill-health such as tooth-decay and maternal 
mortality (Pilgrim Trust, 1938; Rowntree,1941). Some also describe the mental strain 
of being unemployed (Pilgrim Trust, 1938; Halliday,1935). There is, however, great 
difficulty in separating out the effects of unemployment from the effects of chronic 
poverty. Many workers earned wages at or below the recommended minimum for 
subsistence (Rowntree,1941). To overcome this problem, Titmuss & Morris(1944) 
used a short time series (1930-1934) of a cross section containing 77 county 
boroughs, and correlated the change of sickness rates with the change of 
unemployment rates across the boroughs. They found that the correlations between 
changes in maternal mortality and diphtheria mortality with changes in unemployment 
were statistically established; and the corresponding correlations of infant mortality, 
tuberculosis, diarrhoea and enteritis with unemployment were positive but, each 
statistic on its own, insignificant. This is by far the best study of the period, and 
provides the most promising method of research. The shortness of the time series did 
not allow the dynamics to work through. And the data were not adjusted for changes 
in demography and inter-regional migration. On this latter point, it is interesting to note 
that sometimes there are less problems with demographic changes or migration if we 
compare larger areas. While there may be a lot of migration from rural villages to town 
centres, say, a large region can contain both types of conurbations so that most of the 
migration will happen within the region.
Next we turn to the post-war literature. This debate was rekindled with a series of
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influential papers by Harvey fcramev- (J979, i98g). Using time series techniques, 
Brenner regressed various indices of sickness on measures of economic activity and 
health care. In the Lancet paper of 1979, he conducted this study using aggregate 
data for England and Wales, 1936-1976, arriving at the conclusion that while 
increasing healthcare accounted for the secular decline in mortality, changes in 
unemployment explain the variations of mortality. His work stirred up some 
controversy. In addition to the general weakness of aggregate time series studies 
discussed above, the paper was also attacked in several respects. A criticism of the 
use of mortality rates as a measure of sickness was that only extreme cases of 
ill-health are included in the analysis. In Brenner’s formulation, unemployment leads 
to loss of material welfare causing more sickness, eventually resulting in deaths. Each 
of these mechanisms involves some lag. Thus, he was able to use up to eleven years 
in lagged unemployment to explain mortality. Of course unemployment may cause 
illness or death in a much shorter time frame. In his paper in the International Journal 
of Health Services, Eyre (1977) looked at the impact of job loss on psychology and 
life-style. He found that induced stress caused mortality rates to peak around 
economic recessions. Here, the shock of becoming unemployed was associated with 
increased probability of physical injuries. Another way unemployment could have an 
immediate impact on mortality was by striking down the already weak. Thus, in the 
life studies Eyre carried out, he concluded that the latent lag of cause to effect could 
be of the order of weeks or months.
The alternative to using mortality rates is to study the incidence of particular diseases 
in relation to unemployment. Unfortunately, this suffers from the problem of imprecise 
reporting of sickness either because of difficulties in diagnosis or because of differing 
reporting methods. An extreme example of this was observed in the 1930s when 
some of the poorest areas were reporting the lowest malnutrition figures, presumably
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because doctors were so used to seeing malnutrition that they did not report it 
(Webster, 1982). Another data problem in this method is the low rate of incidence, 
making reliable statistically analysis very difficult. Thus our feeling is that this is 
probably not a sensible way to proceed.
With the increasing availability of panel or survey type information, we also have
more recent longitudinal studies. The results are mixed. Cook, et al (1982) found
among the unemployed more heavy smokers and a higher incidence of ischaemic
SoMblatfc
heart disease. Fox and (1982) had the surprising result that unemployed men 
seeking work had a greater mortality rate than others, for all causes but especially in 
accidents and violence, including suicide. Thus, Fox, et al concluded "unemployment 
may have contributed to an excess of deaths from suicide and related cases but it is 
not likely to explain the excess of cancers. Other factors should therefore be sought 
to explain the latter excess." In a study using panel data on individuals from OPCS 
surveys, Narendranathan, etal(1985) found that long spells of unemployment increase 
the probability of further spells of unemployment; and that past history of sickness 
raise the probability of future occurrence of sickness. However, they found little 
evidence that unemployment spells raise the probability of future sickness.
There is a problem with longitudinal studies of mortality. Say we have individuals 
drawn from two populations. The first population contains very healthy individuals 
who, therefore have low probabilities of unemployment and mortality. The second 
group all have terminal illnesses and are as a consequence in very poor health. They 
therefore have high probabilities of unemployment although their eventual demise has 
nothing to do with their employment history. But in a comparison of the two 
populations over time, we will observe a strong positive relation between mortality and 
unemployment. Here, we once again discover an advantage in using a large unit of 
aggregation because there is no reason to suspect that each large area has a
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significantly different health structure in the population.
This brings us to a study using data on standard regions. Junankar (1991), using 
data on working age men (16-64) in the standard regions over three two-year periods, 
was able to demonstrate a significant association between unemployment and mortality 
after controlling for social class and region of residence. This exercise was conducted 
using standard mortality rate for all causes and for ischaemic heart disease only. In 
both cases the results were positive. Lower social class was found to be positively 
associated with mortality rate for all causes but not correlated with death rate due to 
ischaemic heart disease.
In recent years, there have also been many studies conducted by the medical 
profession, epidemiologists and sociologists. They have increasingly concentrated on 
the mental stress that comes from unemployment. Compared to the pre-war period, 
we do nowadays have wider availability of social benefits. It is perhaps to be expected 
that the ill-effects of unemployment may come from the psychological shock more than 
through physical or nutritional deprivation. The effect of this stress is to lead to 
increased incidence of mental or physical illness. Sometimes this leads to mortality 
as a result of suicides and serious accidents. Examples in this area of research 
include the papers by Kelvin and Jarrett (1984), and Moser e t ; (1984, 1986).
However, we may have presented a false picture of overwhelming consensus on this 
issue. As another example of a statistical study which did not find any mortality effects 
of unemployment, we have the paper by Forbes and McGregor (1984) who used the 
Brenner methodology on Scottish postwar data. Even in papers which have found 
mortality effects, the significance, magnitudes and timing of the effects are often not 
in agreement.
The following analysis attempts to build on these developments and clarify some of
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the controversial aspects. Our approach is close to that in Junankar. However, we 
shall use much longer time series (26 years) on the standard regions. We shall also 
make use of duration data on unemployment to help explain mortality. This is done 
because among the unemployed, there are significant differences between the long 
term unemployed and the others both in terms of their chances of getting back to work, 
and also in their mental state. Further, we shall improve on the use of standard 
mortality rates by focusing on tighter age groups.
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III. The Theory.
We start with a model of the form
M lt ~  C M jm +p, i/tM +P2 A t/{ M+ ^  (i ,+e„ (1)
£=1,N are regional indices,
&  ,T are annual indices.
M is the age specific mortality rate, for the whole of the current period. U is the age 
specific unemployment rate, measured at the end of the previous period, p, captures 
stable regional characteristics such as geography, industrial and occupational patterns 
and social mix. ^  captures general factors overtime, common to all regions, including 
the secular decline in mortality rates brought about by steady improvements in 
healthcare. The Jagged dependent variable allows us to capture the dynamics in this 
relation.
We control for the demographic structure by looking at age specific mortality and 
unemployment rates. Further, since we concentrate on working age men, we hope to 
isolate a more direct relationship between unemployment and ill-health.
The unemployment term in equation (1) is obviously used to capture the 
unemployment effects on mortality. Together with the lagged dependent variable, we 
hope to capture its impact and the long run effect. The presence of the difference in 
unemployment is used to capture a kind of shock effect experienced by those people 
becoming unemployed. Hence, this term will allow us to assess the argument that 
unemployment influences health and mortality via psychological channels.
While equation (1) gives us a simple model to frame our analysis, it is perhaps not
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complete. First, changes in unemployment could be due to changes in unemployment 
duration, without more people entering unemployment. In that case, the same number 
of people are getting unemployed but for a longer period of time. Therefore, the effect 
due to changes in unemployment we measure in (1) is a mixture of the shock effect 
we referred to earlier, plus a duration effect. Second, much previous literature 
highlighted the material deprivation brought about by unemployment which led to ill- 
health. In this context, it would be useful for us to incorporate a long-term 
unemployment effect, as this group could be expected to suffer most from economic 
hardship. Once again, including an unemployment duration variable alongside our 
unemployment variables seem sensible. Equation (2) is a general way we propose 
to do this.
H r " C ^ < M  + P l^ /,M  + P 2 ^ ^ /,M  + a 1 P*f-1+ a 2P *f-2+ P A+P f+eA,f ®
where p is the proportion of long-term unemployment in the overall unemployment rate. 
In (2), the a’s assess a duration effect controlling for overall unemployment and 
changes in unemployment. Furthermore, now the parameter on the change in 
unemployment can be more clearly interpreted as a psychological shock kind of 
influence.
Perhaps the biggest problem in the estimation of equations (1) and (2) is the 
simultaneous equation bias due to reverse causation. Of course, mortality cannot 
cause unemployment, but the precursor illness can. We can minimize this problem 
by looking at aggregate data. While at the individual level, probability of job loss is 
significantly increased by a history of ill-health, it is less clear that similar effects hold 
at the regional level. At the individual level, there is more choice for employers to 
substitute one worker for another. At the regional level, if the whole workforce is less 
healthy, there is less scope to replace them. Certainly, no one has claimed that the
153
North South divide in economic prosperity and unemployment is caused by unhealthy 
workers. Nor is it easy to argue that incidence of illness drives unemployment or 
business cycles to any extent. While we have made a case for how aggregate 
unemployment, its change and its duration may affect aggregate mortality rates, it is 
difficult to argue that the incidence of illness can explain innovations in all these 
unemployment variables.
In (1) and (2), note also the use of lagged unemployment and duration data to reduce 
simultaneous equation bias.
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IV. The Empirical Investigation.
To control for demograhic differences in the regions, we focused on three 10-year 
age groups of working age men. These are men aged 35-44, 45-54 and 55-64 in the 
nine standard regions of England and Wales, over the period 1966-1991. The 
watershed we use to distinguish between short and long-term unemployment is 52 
weeks duration. Furthermore, we allow for time-invariant regional characteristics and 
eliminate general macro-factors in the following way.
Estimation.
Both equations are transformed before estimation. Take equation (1),
M ^ t -  p /lf/M  + p1 + p2 A + |x |x e f t
We study regional differences by looking at deviations from the national average, so
Since u .-—T 'u .-O . we have eliminated secular or time effects in (3). We first 1*1 wZ ,r*(
estimate (3) using the Least Squares Estimator (GLS) in TSP. With the use of highly 
aggregated regional data, we hope to alleviate the problem that unemployment and 
mortality rates are jointly determined. Hence, we feel reasonably confident of these
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estimates. To make sure of the absence of endogenous biases, we repeat these 
estimations by instrumenting for the unemployment rates and the lagged dependent 
variable. The instruments we use are regional unemployment rates in other age 
groups. The drawback here involves the loss of efficiency and the small sample 
properties of the Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimator. In terms of the former, if our 
explanatory power diminishes, the lagged dependent variable effect tends to increase. 
This gives the impression of a longer lag structure than is true. As far as the small 
sample properties of the IV estimator is concerned, it is difficult to counter them 
systematically. It is thus dangerous to place too much confidence in them. Hence, 
we prefer to interpret from our GLS estimates below. We shall also present the 
corresponding IV estimates, in which we hope to find comparable long-run effects from 




Log-linear versions of equations (1) and (2) are transformed as in (3) prior to 
estimation. Estimation results for equation (1) are shown below:




3 5 -4 4
Male
4 5 -5 4
Male
5 5 -6 4
0 .1 7 4 0 .0 7 5 0 .1 7 6
Lagged MR (2 .5 ) (1 .1 ) (2 .6 )
Lagged Unemployment Rate 0 .0 1 0 0 .0 2 4 0 .0 6 0
(UR) (0 .3 ) (2 .2 ) (4 .4 )
0 .0 3 8 0 .0 2 1 0 .0 1 8
Change in UR (lagged) (1 .2 ) (1 .4 ) (1 .2 )
Long run U effect 0 .0 1 3 0 .0 2 6 0 .0 5 1
AveSE 0.055 0.030 0.023
AveDW 1.60 1.70 1.30
NT 207 207 207
t-statistics in parentheses. 
Regional dummies not shown.
Three features stand out. First, overall unemployment effects rise with age. This is
reasonable in the sense that older people are, in general, less able to sustain a period
there are ^cations that 
of physical hardship. Second,^ the unemployment shock effect — ^ - decreases
with age. This is consistent with the view that job loss can represent a shock in
psychology and life-style that leads to higher mortality in things like accidents and
suicide. As we observed before, the number of fatalities caused by these events have
been volatile and increasing in younger men. Third, the coefficients on the lagged
dependent variables are small, implying fairly short lags for the unemployment effects
to work through. These results give a preliminary picture of significant associations
between unemployment rates and mortality rates.
For a more complete assessment, we continue with an estimation of equation (2), 
reported below.




3 5 -4 4 preferred
Male
4 5 -5 4 preferred
Male
5 5 -6 4
lagged MR
0 .1 9 9
(3 .0 )
0 .2 2 8
(3 .5 )
0 .1 0 3
(1 .6 )
0 .1 0 4
(1 .6 )




-0 .0 4 7
(1 .5 )
-0 .0 3 3
(1 .1 )
0 .0 0 0
(0 .0 )
0 .0 0 0
(0 .0 )
0 .0 3 6
(4 .1 )
Change in UR 
(lagged)
0 .0 6 0
(1 .8 )
0 .0 3 5
(1 .3 )
0 .0 3 6
(2 .2 )
0 .0 3 6
(2 .3 )
0 .0 5 1
(3 .8 )
P m 0 .0 4 7
(1 .6 )
0 .0 0 0
(0 .0 )




0 .1 4 1
(7 .1 )
0 .0 4 7
(2 .6 )
0 .0 4 7
(2 .9 )
-0 .0 7 1
(6 .2 )
Ave SE 0.051 0.045 0.030 0.029 0.022
AveDW 1.78 1.80 1.78 1.79 1.75
N 207 207 207 207 207
t-statistics in parentheses. 
Regional dummies not shown.
In this more correct formulation, we find that the unemployment shock variable is 
uniformly significant for all the age groups we cover. This is so after we have 
controlled for the variations in unemployment duration. Further, these shock effects 
appear more potent than the level effect of the unemployment rate which is only 
significant for the 55-64 age group.
The unemployment duration terms are also significant, though the pattern of their 
influence is more complex. The strongest effect appears on the equation for the 35-44
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age group. This is halved in the 45-54 equation. What is more intriguing is the 
negative impact the duration variable seems to have on the mortality of older men 
aged 55-64. One possible explanation could be that over 55, people can move from 
long term unemployment into retirement. Obviously, it is then less of a stigma to have 
left employment. Also at that age, many people would have had time to save up 
sufficient resources. Hence, they are more prepared psychologically and materially.
The coefficients on the lagged dependent variable are in general small, ranging from
0.1 to 0.4, indicating a fairly short time lag for the various unemployment effects to 
work through. This is consistent with the overwhelming importance of the shock 
variable which is expected to have a more direct and immediate impact on mortality 
through events such as suicide or accidents. Although the duration variables are 
significant, their overall impact is perhaps limited because the change in 
unemployment duration over the sample period is small relative to the change in the 
unemployment rate.
After controlling for duration and unemployment shock, the unemployment rate itself 
is only important in the equation for the age group 55-64. Correspondingly, the lag in 
this equation is longer. This is consistent with the view that the ‘pure’ unemployment 
rate affects mortality in a longer time frame.
Finally, we repeat the estimation of our preferred equation with Instrumental Variables 
method (see appendix 1). The instruments used are the second lags of unemployment 
and duration for all the regions but at other age groups than those being estimated. 
Therefore, we are confident of their independence from the error processes in the 
estimation. On the whole, we find that these estimates are remarkably similar to our 
GLS results. The only differences relate to a lengthening of the lags and that now, the 
duration effects in the over-55 equation are consistent with a shock impact with no 
perverse level influence.
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On the whole, then, our estimation seems to have been reasonably robust. The 
impression we get (short lags, unemployment shocks or duration shocks) 
support the idea of a psychological channel at work. Also significant is that there is 
virtually no mortality effect coming from the level of unemployment. There are, 
however, substantial effects associated with the duration of unemployment. Given that 
we have discounted the material deprivation story, how do we explain this? One 
possibility is that at times of high unemployment, many people go through short spells 
of unemployment. It is only when they cannot find work for some time that the stress 
becomes important. This would also be consistent with the result that, having 
controlled for duration, the unemployment shock became quite significant for the over 
55 group. It is easy to see that, for these people, once they have become unemployed 
their chances of finding another job is very slim. Thus, stress can set in very early on. 
On the other hand, after the initial shock, the duration of unemployment has minimal 
impact on them, presumably because they can easily assimilate into retirement.
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V. Summary and Conclusion.
to
Recent macro-economic studies have often referre4Athe lingering effects of demand 
or supply shocks to the real economy. The cyclical, and indeed, secular rises in 
unemployment carries a big cost not only in numbers, but also in human terms.
In this paper, we have estimated models of the mortality effects of unemployment, 
having controlled for various macro-economic, regional and demographic influences.
We find that unemployment affects mortality in a variety of different ways depending 
on the age group. For those men 35-44, unemployment shock and duration seem to 
be most important. This is also true for men 45-54, but in their case, both effects are 
smaller. For men 55-64, both unemployment rate and unemployment shock have 
equal impact, though they seem to endure increases in unemployment duration well, 
possibly turning a state of long term unemployment into permanent retirement.
Overall, the lags involved in these mechanisms appear to be fairly short, typically with 
over half of it happening after the first year. This is consistent with the hypothesis that 
unemployment affects health and mortality via psychological shocks, and hence 
changes in social status and habits.
In terms of its long run effect, we find that the unemployment effect on mortality 
increases with age in the male working-age population. Although we found no 
mortality effects coming from the level of unemployment, we cannot conclude that 
unemployment have no adverse implication for health. First, we found that 
unemployment duration or its rise are significantly associated with mortality. Second, 
whether it is the level or the change in unemployment that matters, the end result is 
that more people die or they die prematurely.
Finally, the somewhat complex pattern in which unemployment affects mortality may 
explain why previous investigators have found different results on this subject.
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Obviously, if we just correlate mortality with the level of unemployment, and the true 
model is as we discussed, then the observed correlation will very much depend on the 
sample correlation of unemployment with the change in unemployment and durations. 
As an interesting exercise, we can re-interpret table 1 in this way and this gives us the 
following sample values:









Elasticities 0.013 0.026 0.051
Ave. change in UR 3.36X 3.96X 2.03X
Ave. Mortality Rates 1.99 6.8 19.2
Implied increase/000 0.087 0.700 1.988
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APPENDIX 1.










lagged MR (6.9) (5.4) (10.7)
lagged Unemployment -0.070 0.000 0.012
Rate(UR) (2.0) (0.0) (0.9)
Change in UR 0.122 0.059 0.074
(lagged) (2.9) (4.1) (3.8)
P.t-i - - 0.040
(2.2)
Pt-2 0.160 0.056 -0.033
(2.6) (3.8) (2.1)
N 207 207 207
Instruments are second lags of unemployment and durations 




Age specific mortality rates were collected for men aged 35-44, 45-54, 55-64 in the 
nine standard regions of England and Wales. Numbers of Male unemployment by 
duration in these groups were also collected. From time to tiine, the Employment 
Gazette changed the age groups for which they reported these unemployment 
numbers. Hence, we have to use ttesfeoctad national distribution to allocate to the 
precise age brackets.
The watershed we use to distinguish between short or long-term unemployment is 
52 weeks duration. To calculate unemployment rates, we normalize these jobless 
numbers by the mid-year population in each age group. It may appear that we have 
implicitly assumed 100% participation rates. However, as we are comparing regions, 
we are in fact supposing the same participation rates across regions which is a fairly 
reasonable assumption. The same argument could be applied to the assumption of 
changes in the natural rates of unemployment.
Finally, because of a substantial change in the definition of some standard regions 
in January 1974, we allow them a different regional characteristic before and after this 
point. These regions are the North, Yorkshire and Humberside, East Midlands and the 
North West. In effect, we treat data from these regions before and after 1974 as if 
they represent different regions.
Data Sources
Age specific mortality rates and population, male: OPCS Mortality Statistics, 1974- 
1991. Annual Report of the Registrar General of England and Wales, 1966-1973.
Age specific unemployment by duration: Employment Gazette, 1966-1991. Where 
the age groups are not exact, the data have been computed as described above.
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Figure 1.
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We have attempted to shed light on the causes of employment changes in British 
industries and to investigate their health consequences.
The particular causes we have focused on are technical progress and shifts in the 
demand function. Of particular concern to us is the decline of British industrial 
employment relative to both the domestic economy and other industrialised countries. 
Clearly, this decline cannot be explained by a global substitution away from 
manufacturing products.
Examinations of various possible causes suggest that demand in manufacturing, a 
traded sector, is particularly sensitive to competitive forces; and this may have been 
seriously affected by certain characteristics of Britain’s industrial structure, her labour 
market conditions, and her pace of innovations.1 To fully assess these forces, it is 
thus important to study the employment consequences of changes in demand.
Now there is a view that technical progress in production efficiency can cost jobs, 
and this has sometimes led to resistance in the implementation of new technologies. 
While this has detrimental effects on industrial demand in the long term, the concern 
of workers and trade unions are likely to have shorter horizons. It is therefore 
interesting to see what are the employment implications of technical progress in 
production, at a given level of industrial demand. And this is the second question we 
address.
In chapter 2, we set out an industry model with imperfect competition which
1lt may be possible for the exchange rates to adjust to eliminate divergence in 
competitiveness. Unfortunately, exchange rates are mainly driven by financial and 
speculative forces rather than trade flows, and can deviate from purchasing power 
parity for prolonged periods.
170
determines wages, prices, employment and output. In particular, we distinguish 
between secular demand changes and cyclical demand considerations. The model 
allows for the price mark-up to respond to cyclical demand, and insider effects to 
influence wage setting behaviour. These factors generate rent-seeking activities 
inducing increases in industrial prices and potentially offsetting the initial increase in 
demand. Also, in the short term, plant and machinery are not flexible and therefore 
creating another source of price rise due to rising marginal cost of production. (This 
factor also brings about a beneficial effect on employment since more labour is 
required to produce additional products at fixed capital stock levels than if the capital 
stocks had adjusted).
The total impact of these effects means that the industry cannot benefit fully from an 
increase in cyclical demand, although conversely, it also means that the industry need 
not suffer the full impact of adverse demand changes. However, this advantage is 
probably illusory. In an international context, increases in industry demand could also 
be satisfied by foreign producers. Therefore, any short term rent creation may damage 
competitiveness and final demand in the first place.
The employment effects of secular demand changes arising from changes in taste 
or differential income elasticities are not expected to lead to increases in pricing mark­
ups or abnormal profits, essentially because such changes are considered part and 
parcel of the industry which firms, workers and potential entrants to the industry can 
and do plan for. In the long run, therefore, such demand changes are met one for one 
by industry output. In the short run, once again trailing levels of plant and machinery 
may mean that marginal cost of production will rise. The total impact on employment 
then depends on the balance between the consequent offset in output and the 
increased need for labour due to their less efficient employment. The output offset 
which will be caused by any upward movement of prices obviously depends on the
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demand elasticities, which we estimated in chapter 3.
Improvements in product design and quality will obviously increase industry demand. 
Technical progress which improves labour productivity will tend to do the same. This 
is, however, only true if the resultant benefits are passed along in lower prices.2 This 
in turn depends on the behaviour of firms and workers when they face increased 
productivity. Given adjustment lags, prices only respond partially to productivity gains. 
The abnormal profit which accrues will be subjected to exploitation by workers as well. 
The slice of their share depending on their "insider" power. Hence, consumer benefit 
is restricted by this rent-seeking behaviour plus rising marginal cost of production due 
to the fact that workers are no longer efficiently employed. Once again, the overall 
output effect, though undoubtedly positive, is of a magnitude that is determined by the 
demand elasticities.
In the long run, abnormal profit margins cannot be maintained due to the threat of 
new entrants, as well as international competitiveness considerations, and mark-ups 
will return to their average level giving the full benefit of any productivity gain in the 
form of lower prices. (Consumers can benefit further if factor allocation efficiency is 
restored, lowering marginal costs to their former level). Demand and output 
undoubtedly rise, but the effect on employment is still ambiguous.
The overall assessment is that high demand elasticities are good, since that will 
generate larger output demand and labour demand for a given level of technical 
progress. In the case where capital stock is unchanged, the employment effect is also 
increasing in the elasticity of substitution. This second argument is intuitive because 
labour augmenting technical progress increases the amount of efficient units of labour,
^here is, of course, also the question of where such technical progress originated 
from. If these technologies have been discovered abroad and diffused into domestic 
industries, then demand will recover when prices have been fully lowered. This is 
analogous to the technological catching-up argument in development.
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and a high degree of substitution will increase the ability of industry to absorb these 
extra labour units. Ultimately the employment consequences are an empirical matter 
although given reasonable values for elasticities of substitution, and partial elasticities 
of output to employment, demand elasticities around unity will ensure neutrality of this 
type of technical progress.
We then set about the empirical estimation of these parameters using three-digit level 
industry data and pooled time series-cross section techniques. This allowed us to 
achieve reasonable estimation results which would otherwise have been difficult. We 
found that demand elasticities are generally high enough to ensure employment. 
Indeed, the elasticities are often high enough to create extra employment. The only 
disappointing values are in Bricks and Glass, and the Textiles industry. However, the 
amount of employment decline in the Bricks and Glass industry is no bigger than 
average. And although the textile industry has seen one of the biggest employment 
falls, it is also one of the most competitive and traditional industries. Considerations 
of competition will therefore, suggest that technical progress is unlikely to have been 
responsible for its decline.
In terms of the employment effects of cyclical demand shifts, we found that Metal 
Manufacture and Miscellaneous Manufacturing have small demand effects because 
of high demand elasticities in the product market. We also found that Motors, 
Clothing, and the Food industries have small demand effects because of large pro­
cyclicality pricing responses.3 In the end, the impact of demand shocks on industry 
employment depend on the size of the shocks themselves. This is particularly true of 
secular demand changes which have a one to one employment impact.
There has been some evidence that British industries have indeed suffered large
3We find that Pricing mark-up are pro-cyclical in all our industries. This conforms 
with those found in Layard and Nickell(1986).
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demand shocks. First, Layard and Nickell (1986) demonstrated significant declines in 
price competitiveness from the 1950s to the mid-1980s.4 Second, in terms of trend 
demand, Thirwall (1978) presented income elasticities of demand for various British 
industries which he found to be generally lower than those in other industrialised 
countries.5 Third, Gomulka (1979) noted that the number of technical innovations in 
Germany and Japan has overtaken their British counterparts since the early 1960s.6 
While the effects of these innovations are sometimes difficult to quantify, they would 
have increased quality and choice of foreign products relative to British ones. This 
would lead to a serious loss of demand. Thus, the size of these demand shocks are 
more likely to explain the fall in employment, especially in traditional sectors like metal 
manufacturing.
In the course of our theoretical development, we have used the concept of "insider" 
power in wage setting. This captures short run rent-seeking activities, for example. 
In chapter 4, we provided a rigorous derivation of these "insider" effects and asked 
what determines their magnitude. The "insiders" strive for a wage that, on average, 
will keep this group of workers employed, and within this context to maximise wages. 
Thus, when abnormal rents are available through productivity increases, wage 
demands are set so as to exploit these rents rather than allow higher employment. 
The actual size of these effects reflect how successful workers are in achieving this 
end. Noting that overall inter-industry wages do not significantly diverge despite 
secular differences in productivity, we suggest that such behaviour has mainly short­
term implications. Empirically, we did find that "insider" effects are significant in the
4See Layard, R. and S. Nickell, 1986, The Rise in Unemployment, pp 128-130.
5See Thirwall A., "The U.K.’s economic problems: A Balance of Payments 
Constraint?" in National Westminster Bank Quarterly Review, Feb. 1978.
6See Gomulka, S. (1979), "Increasing Inefficiency versus Slow Rate of 
Technological Change", p169, in "Slow Growth in Britain" edited by Beckerman (1979).
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industries we studied, and that the magnitudes of such effects are correlated with 
Union power. That is, stronger unions ensure that workers are more successful in 
attaining their insider wage. "Insider1’ effects can sometimes produce unemployment 
hysteresis, because unemployment reduces the number of "insiders", thus allowing 
them to push for higher wages at the expense of lower employment. We did not find 
wide support for this in the data.
(Among the appendices in these chapters, we have included in chapter 3 an 
appendix on the matching of the 1968 and 1980 Standard Industrial Classifications. 
This facilitates the use of 3-digit level industry data covering the years before 1979 and 
after 1980.)
Having completed the analysis into the causes of employment decline in British 
industries, we turn to an investigation of the mortality impact of the consequent rise in 
unemployment.
Given how important this topic is, there is remarkably little consensus over whether 
there exist mortality effects of unemployment. Among the sources of contention is the 
difficulty in controlling for various factors. How do we separate out the secular 
developments in mortality from cyclical movements, for example? And how do we 
distinguish between the unemployment effect on sickness and mortality, and the fact 
that illness causes unemployment? Another area of disagreement is that even among 
those who believe in such effects, there is a debate over whether unemployment 
causes illness through material deprivation or psychological channels.
In chapter 5, we built an empirical model which controlled for age, sex, duration of 
unemployment, regional characteristics, macro-economic and secular factors. Using 
male unemployment and mortality data for the standard regions of England and Wales 
over the last thirty years, we found that unemployment does impact on mortality. 
However, the pattern of such impacts is rather complex. First, we found that in the
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determination of mortality, it is changes in unemployment (shocks) and unemployment 
duration that matter, and that the level of unemployment rate itself has negligible 
effects. Second, the pattern of these effects varies according to age group. Mortality 
in younger age groups (35-44) reacts strongly to unemployment shocks and a 
lengthening of unemployment durations. The durations effect decreases with age so 
that in the 55-64 age group, unemployment duration affects mortality only through its 
changes, but not its level.
Compared to the interwar years when unemployment was at a comparable level, the 
general provision of social welfare has made it more difficult to argue that mortality 
among the unemployed is caused by material deprivation. Work is, nonetheless, a 
source of self-esteem and provides rhythm and meaning to life. Hence, a more 
popular view is that the dis-orientation of job-loss is responsible for higher mortality, 
through such things as drastic changes in dietary and living habits. Our results tend 
to confirm this view. In our empirical work, as well as finding that unemployment 
shocks are more important than unemployment levels, we also found relatively short 
lags in our mortality equations so that over half of the unemployment effects impact 
in the first year or so.
Accepting the view that psychological channels lead to mortality, we can interpret the 
duration effect by pointing out that in times of high unemployment, there is less stigma 
attached to short spells of unemployment. It is only when unemployment becomes 
prolonged that people become stressed. This would also explain why there is no level 
duration effect on the over 55s- because once the shock of unemployment wears off, 
they are more easily assimilated into retirement.
Although we found no mortality effects coming from the level of unemployment, we 
cannot conclude that unemployment has no adverse implication for health. First, we 
found that unemployment duration or its rise is significantly associated with mortality.
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Second, whether it is the level or the change in unemployment that matters, the end 
result is that more people die or they die prematurely.
Finally, the somewhat complex pattern by which unemployment affects mortality may 
explain why previous investigators have found conflicting results on this subject. 
Obviously, if we just correlate mortality with the level of unemployment, and the true 
model is as we discussed, then the observed correlation will very much depend on the 
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This paper is concerned with the role o f insider forces in wage determination. Various union and 
non-union models of wage behaviour are considered and they imply that wages are a convex 
combination of internal and external factors. Certain union models also imply a degree of 
hysteresis. D ata on fourteen British production industries reveal that: (i) insider forces are 
important; (ii) their importance is directly related to both union power and the degree of 
m onopoly in the product market; (iii) the state o f the aggregate labour market is also important; 
and (iv) hysteresis effects arising from insider power are only significant in a small minority of 
sectors.
1. Introduction
W hen m anagers are asked how wage increases are determ ined, a  com m on 
response is to state th a t ‘productivity plus inflation’ is the basis for 
negotiation. Thus, for example, m anagers questioned in the British 1984 
W orkplace Industrial Relations Survey pu t forw ard profitability/productivity 
and increases in the cost of living as by far the m ost im portan t influences on 
pay settlements, with the external pay structure coming a poor third [see 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1988, table 3) for example].
The fact tha t increases in w orker productivity within the f i rm  are thought 
of as being a prime determ inant of wage rises, irrespective of w hat is 
happening to pay elsewhere, suggests th a t ‘insider’ factors m ust play an  
im portant role in wage bargaining. If the labour m arket were competitive, 
‘outside’ factors, particularly wages paid elsewhere and  possibly the overall 
state of the labour m arket, would be the key determ inants of pay within the 
firm.
If insiders are im portant in pay bargaining this m ay have profound 
im plications for the behaviour of the macroeconom y. U nder certain circum-
Correspondence to: Professor S. Nickell, Institute o f Econom ics and Statistics, University o f  
Oxford, St. Cross Building, Manor Road, Oxford 0 X 1  3UL, U K .
*We are m ost grateful to the Department of Employment for research funding and to referees 
for helpful comments on an eari^r draft.
0014-2921/92/S05.00 ©  1992— Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. All rights reserved
1574 S. Nickell and P. Kong, The power o f insiders in wage determination
stances insider wage setting leads to a high level of hysteresis in the economy 
which implies th a t the im pact of shocks m ay persist for very long periods 
even under rational expectations [see B lanchard and Summers (1986) for 
example]. I t may also lead to  asym m etric behaviour and ratchetting, 
whereby em ploym ent responds less, and  wages more, to  dem and increases 
than  to  dem and falls [see Lindbeck and Snower (1986), for example].
In  the light of this, it is our purpose to  investigate the im portance of 
insider forces in pay determ ination in the British industrial sector. In  order 
to do this we set up a m odel of union pay bargaining where unions and 
firms bargain over wages bu t firms set em ploym ent unilaterally. We utilise 
this framework because this is the predom inant form  of pay determ ination in 
British industry [see Oswald and Turnbull (1985)]. The general idea is tha t 
unions are concerned with the wage and long term  em ploym ent prospects of 
a fixed group of workers, the insiders, and firms are concerned with longer 
term  profitability. Long term  here is taken to  m ean the situation which arises 
when em ployment has been fully adjusted to the wage bargain. The resulting 
model of wage determ ination, a generalisation of tha t presented in B lanchard 
and Summers (1986), is one where wages are a weighted sum of the wage 
which would, on average, induce the firm to employ all the insiders and the 
wage tha t w ould rule if only outside opportunities were significant.
This m odel is then confronted with data  from a num ber of 2 digit 
industrial sectors and several hypotheses are investigated. First, are insider 
factors im portant? Second, is the im portance of insider factors related to 
union power as our model, in fact, predicts? Third, does the state of play in 
the external labour m arket influence wages and is the im portance of this 
factor inversely related to  union power? Finally, if insider factors are 
im portant, are the insiders a restricted group of workers such as the existing 
employees or do they extend into the unem ployed who last w orked in the 
industry? Only in the former case does insider wage setting translate into 
hysteresis. H aving set out the questions we m ay now proceed tow ards the 
answers.
2. A model of industry wage determination
Suppose that each industry consists of price setting firms. Since we shall 
assume that the firms have a constant returns technology and  th a t prices and 
wages are uniform across the industry, we may take it tha t factor inpu t/ 
ou tpu t ratios are also uniform. We thus have an  industry production 
function which we assume, for expositional simplicity, to  have the C o b b - 
D ouglas form 1
'This assumption is not carried over to the empirical work.
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Y  =  B N a, (1)
where 7  =  value added, N  =  employment, B =  capital plus technical progress 
coefficient. To avoid clutter, we drop  industry subscripts. N ote th a t the term  
B has the form
B =  K 1~aA a, (2)
where K  =  capital and A =  technical progress (written as labour augmenting). 
The industry faces a dem and for its product of the form
Y = ( d{PIP*)-"Q , 77 > 1 , (3)
where a> reflects long-run secular movements in dem and due to changes in 
tastes, P =  price of industry value added, P e =  expected price of aggregate 
value added and 8 is a random  variable reflecting short-run dem and shifts. 
We suppose th a t decisions are taken in the following sequence. Wages are 
determ ined via bargaining between firms and unions before 8 is revealed. 
Prices, em ploym ent and ou tpu t are then fixed after 8 is revealed bu t before 
the aggregate price level is known. These precise assum ptions about tim ing 
have no substantive consequences and are no t carried over to  the empirical 
section.
Although we suppose th a t there are em ploym ent adjustm ent costs of the 
standard type, it is convenient a t this stage to  analyse the static equilibrium  
employment behaviour of the industry. In  order to  do this, we begin with the 
pricing decision. If the industry behaved as a single m onopoly, the resulting 
m onopoly price, P M, would satisfy
WP M=_ ^ y (1 -« )/«£-i/a,
ae
where W  is the pre-determ ined wage and l/e =  rj/(r] — l),  the standard  
m onopoly m ark-up on m arginal cost. The fundam ental question is the 
relationship between the jo in t m onopoly price and th a t which is actually set. 
In a C ourno t-N ash  industry, the actual price is a fixed p roportion  of the 
m onopoly price . 2 However, o ther theories indicate th a t deviations of 
industry prices from the jo in t m onopoly level are sensitive to  short-run 
dem and fluctuations [see Stiglitz (1984), Rotem berg and Saloner (1986), or 
Bils (1987) for example]. The general view appears to  be th a t industries
2In fact the mark-up is given by rjl(r\—H )  where H  is the Herfindahl Index, See
Cowling and Waterson (1976), for example.
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behave m ore competitively when dem and is high, indicating a pricing 
equation of the form
with 1, / ' ^ 0 .  Corresponding to  this price-m arginal cost relationship is 
the standard  m arginal revenue product condition obtained by using the 
product function to eliminate Y  from (5). This may be w ritten as
where N *  is the equilibrium  level of employment. Recall th a t under static 
expectations, convex adjustm ent costs imply th a t actual em ploym ent follows 
an approxim ate partial adjustm ent process of the form
where lower case letters indicate logs. This equation, which along with (6 ) 
yields a dynam ic version of the m arginal revenue product condition, forms 
the basis of our empirical analysis of em ploym ent . 3
However, our key purpose in this section is to  lay the foundations for the 
wage bargaining model. As we have already noted, we suppose tha t when 
firms and unions bargain about wages, they concern themselves with the long 
run  consequences of any choices. T hat is, the union is concerned with the 
em ploym ent consequences when the firm has fully adjusted to  the new wage. 
Similarly the firm is concerned w ith the long run im pact on profitability. 
Furtherm ore, since wages are determ ined prior to  the revelation of the 
dem and index B, unions and firms are interested in the expectations of the 
relevant variables.
By m aking use of (1), (3), (5), we can express ex-post em ploym ent and
3The use of (6) as a basis for the empirical analysis of employment may be questioned in the 
sense that it is arguably preferable to use an expression for N *  which contains variables which 
are either pre-determined or exogenous to the firm [e.g., (8) on the following page] rather than 
one which contains the endogenous output price of the firm, P. However, alternatives will 
inevitably contain the variable to which captures long run changes in tastes. Since these are both  
unobservable and hard to proxy, we may utilise the marginal revenue product condition, (6), 
which, in effect, makes use of the output price in order to capture these long run taste changes. 
Concerning the dynamic structure of (7) we make no attempt here to go beyond this simple 
dynamic formulation by allowing for non-static expectations, for example. Our justification for 
this is first that it will make the empirical analysis overly complex in a direction away from the 
main point at issue and second that given that real wages approximately follow a random walk 
with drift, the assumption of static expectations is unlikely seriously to violate the data.
(5)
(6)
n =  (pn _! +  ( 1  — (p)n*, (7)
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profit in terms of wages and variables exogenous to  the industry. F or 
em ploym ent we obtain
N *  — $ B l (W /F e)~ {l+y\
where
^  =  [0ri/V / (0 ) ] (1 + ,), B 1=(ae)1+W 1+y)/"Be(1+v), 1+ y = ( l - a e ) -1 . (8) 
Real profit n =  (P /Fe) Y —(W /P e)N  — F, where F  are fixed costs, is given by
n =  B2(W /F e) - y- F ,
where
B 2 =  BaiEBE$ ae(a)9)llT' -  $ B 1. (9)
As a basis for bargaining ex-ante, therefore, unions and firms are concerned 
with expectations of (8 ), (9).
2.1. A bargaining model o f  wage determination
The foundation of wage determ ination we take to  be the N ash bargaining 
m odel, 4  the strategic justification for which is given by Binmore et al. 
(1986). In  order to m ake it operational we first consider the union objective. 
We suppose tha t unions are concerned only with the welfare of a group of 
members, N l in num ber. At this stage we m ake no assum ptions as to  who 
they are. They could, for example, range from a small subset of existing 
employees to  a wide group including all existing employees and recently 
unemployed union members who are potential employees. We now suppose 
that the union objective is the expected utility of a representative m em ber of 
this group. If we suppose that L is the probability tha t a m em ber of the 
group does no t obtain  em ploym ent in the industry, U  is the m em ber’s utility 
if he does obtain em ployment and U his expected utility if he does not, then 
the union’s objective, Z, is
Z  =  ( 1 - L ) U  +  LU .  (10)
4The model developed here is essentially static and therefore misses out on som e potentially 
interesting phenomena. For example, agents will recognize that the higher the wages that are set 
today, the lower will be employment and the fewer the number of insiders for tomorrow’s wage 
bargain. Unfortunately, there exists no satisfactory sequential bargaining model which is rich 
enough to cover all the basic issues dealt with here and yet simple enough to be suitable as a 
foundation for empirical analysis. We would also contend that the static model which we use 
here is adequate for analysing the data in the sense that the interpretations placed on the results 
would not be very different were a sequential bargaining model to be used to provide the 
underlying theoretical framework.
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The status quo point, Z, for the N ash bargain refers to  the utility th a t the 
representative m em ber can obtain  while bargaining proceeds if im m ediate 
agreem ent is no t forthcoming. This we suppose to  be U  since, for the 
duration  of any conflict, existing employees can obtain this elsewhere and 
any other m embers of the group can obtain  this in any event. So the union’s 
contribution  to the N ash bargain is
O n the firm’s side, the concern is with expected profit E(7r) and the status 
quo point, 7r, is simply given by — F  since the firm has to  pay out its fixed 
costs for the duration  of the conflict. So the firms’ contribution to  the N ash 
bargain is
from (9), where B 2 is the m ean of B 2. The generalised N ash objective is, 
therefore,
where /? is a m easure of firms’ bargaining power. The wage outcom e is 
obtained simply by maximizing Q w ith respect to  W  bu t before this can be 
analysed we m ust discuss the precise form of the L and U functions.
The L function measures the probability  of a union m em ber no t obtaining 
work w ithin the industry and  is given by
So if the random  variable $  has a m ean (f> and  a d istribution function G(-), 
then it may be shown, using (8 ), th a t5
Z  —Z = ( l  — L)(U  — U). (11)
E ( n ) - n  =  B 2{ W / P T y,
Q =  (1 -  L) (U  -  U )B 2( W /Pe) ~vP, (12)
(13)
5P { N * ^ N l) =  P ($ B 1{ W /P e) - (1- y)-£ N ]) =  G{p), where p =  N \ W / P ' ) il + y)B i l . So
L=G{p)-^]Bv{WIPra + y^ m $ )  = G{p)--]$&G{$)=^G$)d$ 
i v  o M o  M o
using integration by parts.
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where
p =  N \ W / P e)(1 + y)B f 1. (14)
The utility function of the representative worker, U, we specify as
U =  Vl ( W ( l - v ) / P e) +  V2( W / W - ( W / W ) „ l l  V \ ,V '2> 0 , V”u V”2< 0 ,  (15)
where v is the factor which transform s the real product wage into the 
post-tax real consum ption wage and W  is the average wage in the economy. 
The term  v, commonly referred to as the wedge, includes taxes on labour and 
consum ption as well as the real price of im ports. N ote  th a t utility is allowed 
to depend no t only on the level of real disposable income bu t also on the 
gain in wages relative to  the economy wide average. This latter term  allows 
for the possibility tha t individual utility is influenced not only by the level of 
real income but also by changes in the individual’s relative position. W hile 
this is no t standard in economics, it is bo th  a com m onplace observation that 
individuals are particularly m otivated bo th  by relativities and by deviations 
from the habitual state of affairs, as well as being an aspect of hum an 
behaviour which is well know n to social psychologists [see Argyle (1987), for 
example]. Finally we express expected utility outside the industry as
where p is the benefit replacement ratio  and u is the aggregate unem ploy­
m ent rate; U  is thus the weighted sum of utility in alternative em ploym ent 
and utility while unemployed.
We may now maximise the N ash objective Q w ith respect to  W  to obtain 
the first-order conditions6
6From (12) we have
N oting from (14) that W(8L/dW) =  { l  +  y){G(p) — L{fi)) then yields the first-order condition (17) 
in the text.
t7 = ( l- t i ) [F 1[ lF ( l- v ) /P e)+ F 2( l- ( lT / fF )_ 1)]
+  Q W ip W i  1 -  v)/Pe) +  V2(p —(W /W )  _ ,)] , (16)
{U  — U) +  ( \ —L)
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1 u ~ °  fn , ffrl - n
W(dU/dW)  |_ y) l - L ( / i )  ^ yJ  ’ ( )
which serves as the basis of our wage equation. Before we log-linearise, there 
is one problem  which m ust be dealt with in preparation  for the empirical 
im plem entation of this model. As we have already noted in footnote 3, it is 
convenient to exclude the long-run taste variable co [see eq. (3)] from our 
empirical model. Recalling from (14) th a t pi is given by
pi =  N \ W / P e)(1+y)B f 1, (18)
we see from eq. (8 ) th a t B t is a function of co. However, note th a t (8 ) implies
pi =  N l$ /E (N *),
and we can utilise the m arginal revenue product condition (6 ) to  generate an 
alternative expression for E (N*),  namely
E(A,*)= ( S ^ ) I,<1" ”’ (19)
where P e is the price which the firm expects to  set and 9 is the value of 8 
corresponding to  Thus we can m ake use of the fact tha t we observe the 
industry ou tpu t price, P, in order to  eliminate the unobserved taste variable 
co. N oting the definition of B in eq. (2), we are now able to write pi as
where
N l D 
^ ~ \  p e l  K A a/1~a 3’
B$ =  $  ( ) , a  constant (2 0 )
\  as J
R eturning to  the first-order condition (17), it is easy to  show that, to  a
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high degree of approxim ation, the term  (U  — U)/W (dU/8W )  is hom ogeneous 
of degree zero 7 in W /F e, W /P e and so it can be written as
V  U = X i ( W /W , ( W /W ) .u v,p,u). (21)
W(8U/SW)
W riting (G —F )/(l — L) as x 2 (jtf), then (17) reduces to
1 -  Zi (W /W ,(W /W )  _ l 5  v, p, u] [(1 +  t)x 2Gu) +  /?y] =  0, (22)
with n given by (20). If we log-linearise, we obtain  a wage equation of the 
form 8
8 r U - U
8 l W / P e)\_W{dU/8W) 1 WtATT/AUAt 1 DC If’W (d U /8 W ) ) 1 W { 8 U /8 W ) \  1 P
where
n _ 8Vt_ , 82Vl
d [y W /P ') ’ 1 d(vW /Pe)
Omitting second-order terms, we may approximate ( U — U)/W (d U /dW )  by {W  — W ) /W  +  
[u W /W ^ ] .  — p). M aking use of this and omitting all terms containing uV ’[ as second order, we 
find that
a r U-U 1 . nw-mv
8 (W /P e)\_W(8U/dW)  J W 2{ 8 U / 8 W ) \  H P e
Consider next
8 [  U - U
8 (W /P e) \W (8 U I8 W )
((1 — ujvVJV+upvVj^p) 
W (8U /8W )
where V IW =  V\ evaluated at W. V \p  is defined similarly. Using Taylor expansions we find that
8{W /P e)
U - U
W (8U /8W )
1 ' ( l - t i ) v (  V \  +  ]Q ^ { W - W ) )  +  upvV'1
W (d U /8 W ) V  M  1 P
W { 8 U /8 W ) \^  U(1 P eV '^ W
_ W  8 I" U - U  
W  S iW IP ')  \_ W 8 U I8 W  ’
which is the result in the text. N ote also that if K, is a constant elasticity function, this 
approximation is exact.
8N ote that in our definition of p in eq. (20) we have supposed the mean of the short-run 
demand shift $  to be constant. We are assuming here that the long-run employment expectation 
induced at different wages is independent o f any short-run fluctuations in the mean of the 
demand shift term. We, in fact, investigated this proposition by including current and/or lagged 
demand shift variable in the model reported in table 2. In not one industry was a demand term 
positive and significant at the 5% level so we did not pursue this any further and remain 
satisfied with our implicit assumption.
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w =  c0  +  A(pe +  (l — a)(k—n1) +  a  log v4)
+  (1 —A)(w — c 1m + c 2 log v +  c 3 log p) +  c4(w — w)_ l 5  (23)
where it is possible to  show th a t X< 1;  c l 5  c2, c 3 > 0 . U nfortunately we are 
unable to  dem onstrate th a t X is positive for a general d istribution G although 
it is positive for a  uniform distribution, for exam ple . 9  However, it is clear 
tha t if X is negative we have a potentially unstable situation since the 
industry wage w ould respond to  the average wage level, w, w ith a greater 
than  unit elasticity, so we shall ignore this possibility in w hat follows.
This type of industry wage m odel has a very appealing interpretation. If 
we log-linearise our expression for the expectation of equilibrium  unem ploy­
m ent [eq. (19)], we obtain  [using (2 )]
logE(JV*) = -------— ( w - p e) +  k - 1— —  log A  +  constant, (24)
1 — a I  —a
so the expression in the first bracket of the wage equation can be interpreted 
as the wage th a t would be required in order to induce the industry, on 
average, to  employ all N l insiders. T o see this, simply replace logE(iV*) by n1 
in (24) and solve for w. If we deem this to  be the ‘insider’ wage, then it seems 
natural to  call the term  in the second bracket of the wage equation the 
‘outsider’ wage since it reflects the alternative opportunities available to  the 
workers. The actual wage is thus a weighted sum of the insider and outsider 
wages and is, therefore, a  natural generalisation of the B lanchard and 
Summers (1986) m odel which involves only the insider wage, with N 1 set 
equal to  last period’s employment. Furtherm ore, it is easy to  show th a t the 
weight on the insider wage, X, is a  decreasing function of /I, the firm’s 
bargaining power [see eq. (12) ] . 1 0  So the m ore powerful is the union in the 
bargain, the higher is the weight on the insider wage. This hypothesis we 
investigate in due course.
9 A has the form
( i + r k ^ p f  Xu . (i+r)x'2/*1 1 1 —a x\ 1 — a J
It is easy to show that X n > 0  but it is not possible to sign for a general distribution function.
We can, however, demonstrate that the denominator is positive.
10From footnote 9 we see that A has the form
from the definition of Xi in (22). This expression is clearly diminishing in /?.
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2.2. Industry wage behaviour in the long run
It is clear from the above analysis th a t if insider forces are im portan t in 
wage determ ination, then wage rises in an  industry are influenced by 
productivity grow th within the industry. Suppose, then, th a t we have two 
industries, one of which has a ra te  of productivity grow th which is 
consistently faster than  the other. Does this m ean tha t wages in the two 
industries will continuously diverge? If this were so, it would be an  extremely 
w orrying im plication of the m odel since it would imply th a t the fundam ental 
force of com petition was being perm anently overridden. In  fact, however, this 
is no t an  im plication of the m odel because, in the long run, as productivity 
grows, com petition exerts a  dow nw ard pressure on the industry price and 
hence on the industry wage.
To see how this operates, consider the log-linear version of the m arginal 
revenue product condition (6 ), (7) along with the wage equation where we 
have dropped the lagged dependent variables:
* j d
n - k  =  a o +  a 1 lo g 0  — ----- (w —p )+ -  logyl, (25)
1 —a I —a
w =  c0 +  X(p +  ( l  — a)(k—nl) +  a \ o g A ) + ( \ —X)(w—c1u +  z), (26)
where at \o gS =  — 1 / ( 1 — a) log f (B )  and z =  c2 log v +  c 3 log p, the ‘wage pres­
sure’ variables. N ow  suppose tha t in equilibrium, the num ber of insiders, n\  
is a fixed p roportion  of the employees. So
n ^ n  +  S. (27)
Then, if we further suppose th a t short-run dem and shifts are set a t their 
average level (since we are focussing on the long-run equilibrium), totally 
differentiating this system reveals th a t
dw =  dw—cl du +  dz — ^Y— r^d<5. (28)
( 1  —/)
Thus industry productivity growth, as captured by k and log A, has no 
im pact on wages which are influenced solely by outside opportunities and 
the proportion  of employees who are insiders. This result indicates th a t while 
insiders can generate a  wage ‘m ark-up’ which is higher the lower the 
proportion  of employees who are actually insiders (dw/d<5<0), com petitive 
forces ensure tha t industry productivity grow th is transm itted in to  lower 
prices in the long run  ra ther than higher wages.
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3. The empirical model
In  order to  confront this m odel w ith the data, we m ust bo th  generalise it 
and specify some of the unobserved variables such as the num ber of insiders. 
We start out from the wage equation (23) and the m arginal revenue product 
condition (6 ), (7) which in full dynam ic form is
O ur first problem  is th a t we have no data  on value-added prices by industry. 
If pf is the final ou tpu t price and pm the price of m aterial inputs, then we 
have the relation (ignoring constants)
where s is the share of m aterials in final output. Second, we see no strong 
reason to  impose the C obb-D ouglas assum ption on the da ta  and  thus we 
simply write
In general a2 need not be greater than  unity since it is the elasticity of 
substitution divided by the share of capital. Inserting these into the basic 
m odel yields
n =  <pn_ ! + ( !  — (p)\ a 0  +  a i \o g S + k
1 —a 1 — a
(30)
1 / ( 1  - a )  =  a2. (31)
n =  <pn_ 1 + ( 1  — (p)l a0 +  a1 log 8 + k  — a2(w —pf)
(Pm-Pf) + («2-l)lo g ^ (32)
where
(«2 - l ) log A
+  (1 — 2)(w — CiM +  c2 log V +  c3 log p) +  C4(w — w) . (33)
The following terms m ust now be specified. First, short-run dem and shifts
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are captured by aggregate competitiveness, comp, and deviations of industry 
specific world production from trend, wt. Thus we have
fli log 8 = a l l comp +  al2wt +  e1, (34)
where is some random  error. Second, technical progress is captured by a 
residual based measure a described in the data  appendix com bined with a 
time trend. This yields
log A =  a +  y t  +  E2 , (35)
where e2 is a further random  error reflecting productivity shocks.
The num ber of insiders, N 1, we capture by
N 1 =  od1 U  _! +  co2N  _ i ,
where co2 is the exogenous p roportion  of previous employees who count as
insiders, cox is the exogenous p roportion  of the unem ployed who count as
insiders and  U refers to  those unemployed who recently worked in the 
industry. The insiders therefore reflect some p roportion  of the existing 
employees plus some p roportion  of the relevant group of unemployed 
workers. If we define the labour force ‘attached’ to the industry as
L = U  +  N,
then
JV'=a>1C/.1+cu2(L_1- U - J = c o 2L _1( l - f l - ^ u  A
where u = U /L ,  the industry specific unem ploym ent rate. This yields
nl =  l _ t — ( 1 — — ) « _ ! +  constant. (36)
V
N ote tha t this form ulation generates of a positive im pact of lagged unem ­
ploym ent on wages so long as the proportion  of unem ployed who count as 
insiders is lower than  the proportion of existing employees who do so 
(col <co2). This, is the foundation of the hysteresis element in the insider 
model.
Finally we deal with the price expectation term s in the wage equation by 
the standard  m easurem ent error m ethod [see W ickens (1982) for example]
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replacing p},pem by the actual values pf,p m and incorporating the innovations 
6 3 =  Pf — Pf 5 ^  =  pm—Pm in to  the equation error.
Substituting (34), (35), (36) in to  our basic eqs. (32), (33) yields
a0 +  a 1 t comp +  a l2wt +  k - a 2(w - p{) -  (pm- p{)
1 —s
n =  (pn_1+ ( l  — (p)
+  (a2- \ ) ( a  +  yt) +  { \ - ( p ) [ e 1+ ( a 2- l ) £ 2],  (37)
w =  c0  +  2( pf - T^ - ( p m- P f ) + — ( / c - / _ i ) + ^ 2 X\ a +  yt) 
1 —s a2 a2
+  ( 1  — X)w — ( 1  —X)ci u + — (  1 — —  ) m_ A + ( 1  — 2)c2 logv
a2 V " 2,
+  (1 — X)c2 log p +  C4(w  — w )_ !  +A (a2 — 1) „ (£3- 5^4)'--------- t  ^  — -----------
fli 1 — s
(38)
F o r the purpose of estim ation we suppose th a t k,a  are know n in advance 
and hence predeterm ined whereas it is clear th a t w,pf,pm m ay all be 
influenced by productivity shocks and  m ust, therefore, be treated as 
endogenous. W e also treat comp and wf as endogenous as a  precautionary 
measure. In  the wage equation, the price innovations in the error m ay be 
correlated with any current dated variables except for k,a  which are know n 
in advance and so all such variables m ust be instrum ented by lagged values.
In  the light of these rem arks, we therefore investigate the following 
structural m odel based on (37), (38).
Marginal revenue product condition
n -  k =  a0 -  a t ( 1 -  a 5)(w -  pf) -  a 2( 1 -  a 5)(pm -  pf) +  a 31comp
+  a 32wt +  a4( l — a 5)a +  a4(l — a 5)yt +  a 5(n _ 1 — k), (39)
n =  employment, w =  hourly labour cost*, pm =  m aterial input price*, pf =  final 
ou tpu t price*, comp =  aggregate competitiveness*, w t= industry world 
activity*, k =  capital stock, a =  residual based measure of technical progress; 
*variables are treated as endogenous. In  (37) it has been assum ed th a t the 
value-added restriction holds. If this is not the case, then the coefficient on 
the m aterials price, a 2, can take either sign. Furtherm ore, (37) also contains
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the restriction th a t technical progress is labour augmenting. In  term s of (39) 
this restriction has the form
labour augm enting technical progress (LATP) restriction: a4 =  a x — 1. (40) 
Wage equation
w - w  =  y0 +  X[ip f - w )  +  y1{ k - l - i) - y 2{pm-P t )  +  y3a +  y4.t]
+  y 5u +  y6u _ i  +  y7 log v +  y8(w -  w) _ l , (41)
w =  wages expected to rule elsewhere in the economy, u =  aggregate unem ­
ploym ent rate, u =  industry specific unem ploym ent rate, log v =  wedge 
between employers’ real wage and the real consum ption wage. This is 
t i  +  t 2 +  t 3 +  s(pm—p[) where t x is the em ployer’s labour tax rate, t2 is the 
income tax rate, t 3 is the excise tax rate, pm—pt is the aggregate real price of 
inports and s is the appropriate share. All current dated variables except a,k 
are treated as endogenous. The m odel restrictions implied by (37), (38) are 
yx =  l/otx, y2 =  a 2 / a i> 73 =  a 4 / a i> 7 4  =  a4y/ai- The th ird  of these is no t required 
if the LA TP restriction (40) is satisfied and the fourth does no t appear if 
y =  0, for then the time trend is om itted from the m odel entirely.
4. The empirical investigation
O ur aim  in this section is to investigate the four hypotheses set out in the 
in troduction using 25 years of annual da ta  for 14 two-digit industrial sectors 
in Britain. The data  are described in the appendix.
The first stage is to investigate the overall im portance of insider factors 
and we do this by fitting a very general unrestricted wage equation for each 
industry and testing for the jo in t significance of the insider variables. Thus, 
based on the wage equation (41), we simply regress w — w on two lags of 
itself and all the dependent variables except the productivity terms (k — l-x ) ,  
a which are so heavily trended that only one lag makes m uch sense. We also 
include a trend and constant. The F-tests for the jo in t significance of the 
insider variables (pf —w), (/c — /_ A), (pm — pt), a, u _ x are presented in table 1 
and indicate tha t in 11 of the 14 industries, this group is jointly  significant a t 
the 10% level (8 a t the 5% level). Furtherm ore two of the rem aining three 
industries have an F  which rejects the null a t the 15% level so overall these 
results indicate tha t insider factors are of considerable im portance.
While such equations are useful for investigating overall effects, the degree 
of overfitting and the consequent shortage of degrees of freedom arising from 
a regression with 15 variables using 25 da ta  points m akes them  all but 
useless for any intensive investigation of individual coefficients. However, to
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Table 1
W age equations® (VAR type): F tests for insider variables 
(dependent variable: w —w, 1961—1985).b
Industry' F  statistic*1 Industry' F  statistic*1
FD T 1.99 OE 5.25*
CH 2.03 TX 4.98*
M M 4.32* CL 7.36*
ME 3.50* BG 1.20
IE 3.57* TF 2.81**
EE 5.21* PP 2.41**
VE 2.37** CN 4.53*
“The equation includes two lags on w — w, p{ — w, pm — 
pt, u, u, logv; one lag on a, k — l _ j  plus c and trend. The 
F tests the joint significance o f the insider terms, namely 
two lags on pf —w, pm—pt, u and one lag on a, k — l _ t .
bIn order to specify the expected outside wage, w, we 
proceed as follows. If wage bargainers are fully informed, 
then the expected outside wage would simply be, wa, the 
aggregate wage. If, as seems more likely, they are less than 
fully informed about aggregate wages but have a good  
knowledge of aggregate prices, they would sensibly esti­
mate aggregate wages by wa_, +  A p + g  where dp is the 
change in aggregate prices and g  is trend real wage 
growth. So we define w as awa+ ( l —<x)(wa_l +A p) ,  assum­
ing g is a constant. In the analyses reported here, we set 
a =  0.5. In fact, varying a on the unit interval makes very 
little odds to the results.
'F D T  =  food, drink, tobacco; CH =  chemicals; M M  =  
metal manufacture; M E =  mechanical engineering; IE =  in­
strument engineering; EE =  electrical engineering; VE =  
vehicles; OE =  other engineering; TX =  textiles; CL =  
clothing and footwear; BG =  bricks and glass; T F  =  timber 
and furniture; P P  =  paper and printing; CN  =  construction.
dThe relevant statistic is F (8 ,10), 5% =  3.07, 10% =  2.37.
So * represents a 5% rejection, ** a 10% rejection.
avoid charges of da ta  m ining and the like, we feel th a t it is w orth presenting 
results from unrestricted estim ates of the wage equation which are identical 
in form across all industries. So we regress w — w on the first lag of all the 
independent variables in (41) except aggregate unem ploym ent where we use 
the current value in order to preserve the theoretically im portan t tem poral 
difference between this variable and  the industry unem ploym ent rate. Rele­
vant statistics from these regressions are presented in table 2. The first 
im portan t point is th a t for m ost of the industries X is strongly positive and 
appears to  be larger in those industries with strong unions (chemicals, 
engineering, vehicles, paper and printing) relative to those with weak unions 
(textiles, clothing, bricks and glass, construction). This im pression will be 
confirmed m ore precisely when we have considered estimates of our struc­
tural model. The second point w orth noting is th a t the unem ploym ent term s 
do not give a very clear cut impression. Recall th a t aggregate unem ploym ent
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Table 2




y*(“) 1) se R 2
FD T 0.49(3.8) 0.68(1.8) -0 .2 7 (0 .7 ) 0.013 0.93
CH 0.34(2.6) 0.11(0.2) 0.06(0.1) 0.017 0.89
M M 0.38(3.0) -0 .3 7 (1 .0 ) 0.18(1.2) 0.015 0.70
ME 0.36(4.0) -0 .6 2 (2 .0 ) 0.87(2.1) 0.012 0.82
IE 0.26(2.1) -0 .6 3 (1 .7 ) 1.04(1.1) 0.016 0.84
EE 0.26(3.7) -0 .2 5 (1 .1 ) -0 .2 9 (0 .6 ) 0.011 0.72
VE 0.32(1.5) 0.07(0.1) 0.26(0.4) 0.025 0.92
OE 0.22(3.1) -1 .2 6 (5 .6 ) 0.24(1.7) 0.010 0.86
TX 0.13(1.4) -0 .6 5 (1 .8 ) -0 .2 7 (1 .3 ) 0.012 0.94
CL 0.02(0.2) -1 .2 6 (3 .1 ) 0.46(1.8) 0.015 0.92
BG 0.26(2.3) -0 .5 3 (1 .2 ) -0 .1 6 (0 .4 ) 0.016 0.67
TF 0.39(3.5) -0 .7 3 (2 .1 ) 0.44(1.4) 0.013 0.89
PP 0.50(3.7) 0.93(1.7) -1 .3 8 (1 .5 ) 0.019 0.90
CN -0 .1 0 (0 .1 ) -0 .6 8 (2 .2 ) -0 .0 9 (0 .5 ) 0.015 0.79
H statistics in parentheses.
bThe equation includes one lag on w — w, p{—w, pm—pf, u, logv, a, 
k — l _ n  the current value of u plus c and trend. N otes b and c on 
table 1 also apply.
should be negative and since it is an outside factor we m ight expect it to be 
m ore im portan t in those industries where X is small and unions are weak 
[see eq. (38)]. Ten out of the fourteen industries have negative aggregate 
effects and these are indeed large where unions are weak (textiles, clothing, 
bricks and glass, construction). Again we shall firm up this im pression in due 
course. However, only eight of the fourteen industries have positive industry 
unem ploym ent effects and overall these unem ploym ent effects are badly 
determined. This is, perhaps, no t wholly surprising given the high degree of 
collinearity between the two unem ploym ent variables (correlation coefficients 
are typically in the range 0.91-0.97) so we should no t be too disappointed. 
However, there are clear instances of overall positive unem ploym ent effects in 
some industries and this will m ake a contribution to hysteresis in the 
economy as a whole.
In table 3 we present estimates of the key wage param eters of the 
structural model set out in eqs. (39), (41). The rem aining param eters m ay be 
found in table 3' in the appendix. O ur general strategy in estim ating this 
model is as follows. We allow the equations to differ across industries by 
dropping m aterial prices (pm—pf), the trend term  and  the wedge term  (logv) 
if their coefficients are small and insignificant. We impose the labour 
augm enting technical progress restriction if it is no t rejected. Otherwise, the 
first equation for each industry is the same throughout, whereas in the
Table 3
W age equations [structural model, eqs. (39, 40)].a'b
Industry
Parameters F D T CH CH M M MM M E ME
A 0.33(4.4) 0.21 (2.8) 0.22(2.8) 0.26(2.8) 0.25(3.1) 0.27(4.6) 0.30(5.3)
y5(«) 0.11(0.4) 0.50(1.5) - 0.18(0.5) - -0 .2 0 (1 .2 ) -0 .2 1 (2 .7 )
ye(M-i) -0 .0 6 8 (0 .2 ) -0 .3 5 (0 .8 ) 0.19(0.9) 0.025(0.2) 0.094(2.6) 0.036(0.2) -
y70ogv) - - - - - - -
1100 0.59(4.0) 0.29(1.6) 0.39(2.2) 0.14(0.8) 0.14(0.9) 0.21(1.5) 0.18(1.4)
se 0.0157 0.0182 0.0182 0.0201 0.0196 0.0136 0.0138
se (lst-order autoregression) 0.0200 0.0237 0.0237 0.0213 0.0213 0.0204 0.0204
Autocorrelation, LM, xl 3.30 1.58 3.18 7.1 l c 7.40c 3.48 2.08
Parameter stability ’73/4 F(12,x) 1.27 0.83 1.10 1.17 0.96 0.92 0.97
Parameter stability ’79/80 F(6, x) 1.31 0.82 0.20 0.70 0.79 0.30 0.32
(x =  19, 20 or 21)
Cross equation restriction 1.52 (xl) 1-36 (xi) 0.82 (xl) 3.17(x!) 5.06 (xl) 0-30 (xl) 0.30(x!)
Industry
Parameters IE IE EE EE VE VE
A 0.35(5.1) 0.33(5.3) 0.21 (3.3) 0.16(2.7) 0.64(3.7) 0.52(3.2)
y5(«) -0 .0 7 (0 .3 ) -0 .2 2 (2 .0 ) 0.27(1.1) -0 .1 9 (1 .9 ) 0.96(1.9) -
y6(M-i) -0 .3 2 (0 .6 ) - -0 .8 2 (2 .0 ) - 0.35(0.7) 0.86(2.0)
y?(i°gv) - - 0.054(1.1) 0.069(1.4) - -
y8(w -w )_ ! 0.14(0.9) 0.18(1.2) 0.071 (0.4) 0.20(1.1) 0.88(4.3) 0.74(3.9)
se 0.0122 0.0124 0.0123 0.0125 0.0204 0.0204
se (lst-order autoregression) 0.0192 0.0192 0.0153 0.0153 0.0278 0.0278
Autocorrelation, LM, xl 1.53 1.96 3.34 3.55 0.66 0.75
Parameter stability ’73/4 F(12,x) 1.31 1.25 1.30 1.42 1.04 0.78
Parameter stability ’79/80 F(6,x) 1.01 0.39 1.24 0.84 1.17 0.57
(x =  19, 20 or 21)
Cross equation restriction 6.77 (x!) 6.50(*32) 4-20 (x i) 3.35 (x l) 0-43 (x l) 0.26 (x l)
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Parameters OE OE TX TX CL BG BG
X 0.27(4.2) 0.24(3.9) 0.14(2.0) 0.12(1.9) 0.037(0.6) 0.17(1.8) 0.17(1.9)
y5(“) 0.23(0.7) -0 .3 3 (2 .9 ) -0 .4 9 (1 .6 ) -0 .7 9 (4 .7 ) -1 .4 0 (4 .7 ) -0 .7 6 (0 .2 ) -0 .1 4 (1 .0 )
-0 .4 0 (1 .8 ) - -0 .2 3 (1 .2 ) - 0.62(3.6) -0 .6 8 (0 .2 ) -
y7( wedge) 0.10(1.9) 0.13(2.7) 0.25(4.0) 0.26(4.1) 0.18(2.4) 0.84(1.2) 0.087(1.3)
y8(w -w )_ j -0 .0 3 0 (0 .2 ) 0.11(0.7) 0.24(1.4) 0.37(2.7) 0.75(5.4) 0.31(1.5) 0.31(1.6)
se 0.0160 0.0141 0.0114 0.0114 0.0137 0.0163 0.0163
se (lst-order autoregression) 0.0194 0.0194 0.0199 0.0199 0.0213 0.0190 0.0190
Autocorrelation, LM, xl 0.92 3.44 1.98 0.12 0.24 0.34 3.95
Parameter stability ’73/4 F(12, x) 1.36 1.23 1.19 1.25 1.58 1.33 1.19
Parameter stability ’79/80 F(6,x) 0.43 0.49 1.87 1.24 3.14“ 0.37 0.23
( x =  19, 20 or 21)
Cross equation restriction 2-84 (x l) 1.51 (Xl) 0-02 (Zi) 0.79 (x l) 3-78 (xi) 6.58 (xl) 5-26 (^3)
Industry
Parameters TF TF PP PP C N C N
2 0.26(1.9) 0.24(2.2) 0.29(1.8) 0.42(2.3) 0.12(1.2) 0.12(1.2)
Vs(«) -0 .2 8 (0 .7 ) -0 .4 3 (2 .5 ) -0 .1 5 (0 .3 ) -0 .1 7 (0 .6 ) -0 .0 9 (0 .1 ) -0 .5 4 (1 .7 )
V6(«-i) -0 .1 7 (0 .4 ) - 0.23(0.3) - -0 .1 4 (0 .4 ) -
y7( wedge) - - - - 0.02(0.2) 0.05(0.6)
y8(w —w)_j 0.046(0.2) 0.075(0.3) 0.82(3.6) 0.81(3.6) -0 .4 2 (2 .0 ) -0 .4 0 (2 .0 )
se 0.0145 0.0142 0.0221 0.0229 0.0148 0.0142
se (lst-order autoregression) 0.0205 0.0205 0.0258 0.0258 0.0278 0.0278
Autocorrelation, LM, x l 3.17 2.04 0.83 0.63 3.98 4.01
Parameter stability ’73/4 F(12,x) 0.70 0.85 1.17 1.22 0.95 0.99
Parameter stability ’79/80 F(6,x) 0.84 0.86 1.16 1.23 0.88 0.52
(x =  19, 20 or 21)
Cross equation restriction 5-10(zI) 4.71 (x l) 2.81 (x l) 2-08 (xl) 0.35(Z|) 0.58 (x \)
“For reference purposes the model estimated is
Wage: w - w  =  y0 +  A[pf - w  +  y1( f c - l _ 1) - y 2(pm- p f) +  y3a +  y4t] +  y5u-|-y6ii_ 1-|-y7 logv-|-y8( w - w ) - i .
Marginal revenue product condition: 
n —fe =  a0 —a i ( l —a5)(w —pf) —a2( l  —a 5)(pm—pf) +  a 3 iComp +  a32Wt +  a4( l —a 5)a +  a4( l —a5)yt +  a5(n _ 1 —fc).
LATP restrictions: aA =  ix1 — 1.
Cross equation restrictions: y1 =  l / a 1, y2 =  «2 / a i> 7 3  =  a4 / a i> 7 4  =  a4 V/a i-
The third of these is omitted if LATP is satisfied and the fourth if y =  0. In table 3 we report the key parameters o f the wage equation. 
The values o f yl5 y2, y3, y4 may be found by consulting the estimates o f the marginal revenue product condition in the appendix and 
using the cross equations restrictions. Table 1 notes b and c, table 2 note a also apply.
bFor reasons explained in the text, all the current terms except a and k are treated as endogenous -  the first lags on all these 
variables are used as instruments. The equation was estimated by non-linear 3SLS on TSP (4.1 A).
“Rejection of the null hypothesis.
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second equation we d rop  one of the unem ploym ent terms if this seems 
sensible.
Overall, the wage equations are fairly satisfactory in the sense tha t they 
always have considerably lower standard  errors than  a simple first order 
autoregression, they exhibit stable param eters over the two episodes of 
greatest ‘structural change’ in the economy, 1973-1974, 1979-1980 and they 
generally have serially uncorrelated errors. The cross equation restrictions 
implied by the theoretical structure are never rejected.
The insider effects, X, are well determ ined and differ quite systematically 
between industries as we m ight expect. Furtherm ore, since they are all 
significantly below unity and typically below one half, this implies tha t the 
outside wage is a very im portan t factor in wage determ ination. O ther 
features w orth noting include the fact th a t the lagged dependent variable, 
which typically covers a m ultitude of sins in time series models, usually has a 
gratifyingly small coefficient. This is consistent with the variables in the wage 
equation being cointegrated, which in all bar a couple of cases they are. A 
discussion of the im plications of non-stationarity  for these equations is 
provided in an  appendix.
U nfortunately the unem ploym ent terms, tend not to be well determined, 
partly  as a consequence of their lack of independent variation. If their overall 
effect seems to be negative we drop  the lagged industry term  and if positive, 
we drop  the aggregate unem ploym ent rate. Once we do this, then in m ost 
cases we obtain  a significant effect. This is not, however, a wholly satisfactory 
procedure.
We are now in a position to  present tentative answers to  the four 
questions posed in the introduction. First, are insider forces im portant? The 
results reported in all three tables indicate a resounding yes. Industry wages 
do not simply track aggregate wages modified by the situation in the 
aggregate labour m arket bu t are strongly influenced in the short run  by 
industry price and productivity terms. The second and th ird  questions refer 
to the relationship between insider/outsider effects and union power. Recall 
our theoretical fram ework indicates tha t the ‘insider weight’, X, should be 
increasing in union power (see fn. 10) and this implies th a t the coefficient on 
aggregate unem ploym ent should also be increasing in union power [see eq. 
(38)]. N ote th a t an  increase in the unem ploym ent coefficient implies th a t the 
unem ploym ent effect on wages becomes less im portant, since it is generally 
negative. To investigate these issues we analyze the cross industry variation 
in the X coefficient and tha t on aggregate unem ploym ent in relation to  union 
power. O ur m easure of union power in each industry, which we consider to 
be relatively stable through time, is the m ark-up of union on non-union 
m anual male wages in 1976 as reported in Stewart (1983). As a m easure of 
union pow er this is superior to  union density in the British context, since, for 
a variety of reasons, several heavily unionised industries have ra ther weak
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Table 4
The relationship between union power, insider and unemployment effects.







k (table 2)b k (table 3)b u (table 2)b u (table 3)b
FDT 0.161 0.618 0.49 0.33 0.68 0.11
CH 0.241 0.602 0.34 0.22 0.11 0
MM 0.116 0.642 0.38 0.25 -0 .3 7 0
ME 0.122 0.351 0.36 0.30 - 0 .6 2 -0 .2 1
IE 0.167 0.322 0.26 0.33 -0 .6 3 -0 .2 2
EE 0.108 0.635 0.26 0.16 -0 .2 5 -0 .1 9
VE 0.272 0.677 0.32 0.52 0.07 0
OE 0.198 0.275 0.22 0.24 -1 .2 6 -0 .3 3
TX 0.111 0.476 0.13 0.12 -0 .6 5 -0 .7 9
CL 0.127 0.254 0.02 0.04 - 1 .2 6 - 1 .4 0
BG 0.101 0.489 0.26 0.17 -0 .5 3 - 0 .1 4
TF 0.269 0.279 0.39 0.24 -0 .7 3 -0 .4 3
PP 0.312 0.323 0.50 0.42 0.93 -0 .1 7
OLS regressions
k2 = -  0.0038 +  0.98Up +  0.29C5 R2 =  0.36 u 2 =  - 2 .3  +  4.8 Up  +  2.3C5 R 2 =  0.53
(2.1) (1.4) (2.4) (2.6)
-0 .0 6 4  +  1.17Up +  0.25C5 R2=0.51 «3 =  — 1.3 +  1.9Up-t-1.6C5 R 2 =  0.45
(3.0) (1.4) (1.5) (2.7)
“The 5 firm concentration ratio is based on net output and refers to the weighted average 
across all the 3-digit industries within each 2-digit industry. Union power is taken directly from 
Stewart (1983), table 3 and corresponding to the raw differential.
hk (table 2), k (table 3) are the k coefficients taken from tables 2 and 3. u (table 2), u (table 3) 
are the coefficients on aggregate unemployment taken from the same tables. In the regressions, 
these coefficients are written as k2, k3, u2, u3, respectively.
unions. However this m easure does have the draw back tha t it reflects not 
only union power bu t the rents which are available to be captured.11 To 
deal w ith this, we also control for the 1976 industry 5-Firm C oncentration 
Ratio, C 5, when examining the relationships. In  table 4, we tabulate U nion 
Power, the 5-Firm C oncentration Ratio and the values of k and the 
aggregate unem ploym ent coefficients from both  table 2 and table 3. We also 
present some relevant regressions in order to  sum m arise the overall picture. 
The results here indicate that there is a significant positive correlation across 
industries between the insider effect, k, and our m easure of union power. This 
is consistent with the theoretical framework set out in section 2. F u rther­
more, there is evidence of a positive cross industry correlation between the 
aggregate unem ploym ent effect and union power. This is the correct sign 
because larger negative unem ploym ent effects should be associated with 
weaker unions. Finally, the positive concentration ratio  effects are of
111 am grateful to Mark Stewart for pointing this out.
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independent interest. There is evidence of some association between strong 
insider or weak outsider effects and high levels of concentration within the 
industry, holding union power constant. This is consistent with the evidence 
on efficiency wage m odels presented in K atz (1986), for example. However 
we do not wish to  speculate further a t this stage bu t simply leave it as an 
interesting result.
The last question posed in the introduction concerns the extent to  which 
insiders are a restricted group of w orkers such as the existing employees, as 
opposed to  a wider group including the recently unemployed. In  this case, we 
should observe positive lagged industry unem ploym ent effects generating 
hysteresis in the economy. The evidence here is ra ther mixed. It is clear from 
tables 2 and 3 tha t there are such effects in a m inority of industries, in 
particular CH, M M , VE and CL. Overall, however, we do no t find any 
strong evidence th a t hysteresis generated by insiders12 is a pervasive 
phenom enon.
5. Summary and conclusions
The purpose of this exercise has been to  investigate the im portance of 
insider factors in wage determ ination. We have developed a theoretical 
fram ework based on union bargaining which indicates tha t the wage 
outcom e is a weighted sum of th a t wage which will ju st ensure the 
em ploym ent of the ‘insiders’ and the wage which will a ttrac t and retain 
w orkers in the face of outside com petition for their services. The weight 
attached to the former is found to  be an increasing function of the power of 
the union.
W hen confronted with the data, this m odel in bo th  unrestricted and  tightly 
specified form reveals insider factors to be im portan t and indicates that 
insider forces are stronger and outsider forces weaker when unions are 
powerful. However, the insider group does not, in general, appear to  be 
restricted to the current encum bents and, as a consequence, hysteresis arising 
from insider behaviour does no t seem to be a pervasive phenom enon. These 
results based on industry da ta  are generally consistent with those derived 
using firm da ta  which are reported in Nickell and W adhw ani (1990).
12Hysteresis can arise for other reasons. For example, if the long-term unemployed have only 
a weak impact on wage determination this will generate hysteresis via the dynamics o f the 
relationship between the unemployment rate and the proportion of long term unemployed [see 
Nickell (1987) for exam ple].
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Appendix A. Non-stationarity in the wage model
The variables used in the wage m odel (see table 3) are (w — w), u, u, logv 
and \j>[ — w +  y l (k — l - 1) — y2(pm—P{) +  y3a +  y4Q = z ,  say. The y coefficients 
used to  define z for the purposes of this analysis are taken from appendix 
table 3'. u, logv are aggregate variables and the rest are industry specific. In 
table A .l, we present Augmented D ickey-Fuller (ADF) tests of the null 
hypotheses th a t the series are 1(1) and 1(2). If the A D F statistics are less than  
around —3.5 (5%) or —3.2 (10%), then we m ay reject the null and  suppose 
th a t the series are 1(0) or 1(1), respectively.
The general impression given by table A .l is th a t the variables are 1(1) 
although in some industries (w — w) and  z m ay be 1(0). We should, however, 
be highly sceptical about results of this kind based on 25 observations since 
discriminating between a unit roo t and one which takes the value 0.9, say, is 
very difficult with so little data.
W ere we to have observations for 125 years as opposed to  25 years, it 
could well be a very different story. Just as a simple example, in the case of 
aggregate unem ploym ent we do, in fact, have observations from 1850. Over 
the period 1859-1985, aggregate unem ploym ent fluctuates a  great deal, but 
strictly between the bounds 0-14%  (on current definitions). Furtherm ore, the 
unem ploym ent series crosses 3% no less than  22 times and 8% no less than  
12 times. The probability  th a t such a series is generated by an autoregression 
with a unit roo t is m ore or less negligible. Nevertheless, m any short stretches 
of the series look like a random  walk.
However, if we proceed in the standard  fashion and suppose the variables 
to  be 1(1), we m ust next check to see if the wage equation variables are 
cointegrated. In  table A.2, we present the appropriate A D F tests and these 
reveal that aside from one or two exceptions, the variables are indeed 
cointegrated. The coefficients and t ratios reported in table 3 are thus 
generally reliable and although we could, perhaps, gain some extra efficiency 
by using the Johansen (1988) m ultivariate procedure, the potential rewards 
would be minimal given the short length of the time series.
These are standard Augmented D ickey-Fuller statistics, using one lag on 
the differenced residual in the equation generating the statistic.
E.E.R. D
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Table A.1
A D F  statistics (1961-1985).
(w — w) u z u logv
1(0) I(D 1(0) 1(1) 1(0) 1(1) 1(0) 1(1) 1(0) 1(1)
FD T - 3 .8 - 4 .8 - 1 .4 - 5 .7 - 3 .5 - 4 .4 - 0 .2 - 4 .5 - 3 .0 - 3 .2
CH - 5 .0 - 7 .0 - 1 .8 - 5 .0 - 3 .0 - 3 .7
MM - 2 .9 - 5 .8 - 0 .9 - 3 .3 - 2 .6 - 3 .7
ME - 3 .4 - 5 .0 - 1 .7 - 4 .4 - 3 .3 - 3 .2
IE - 2 .3 - 4 .0 - 1 .9 - 5 .0 - 2 .5 - 3 .6
EE - 3 .1 - 5 .0 - 1 .9 - 4 .8 - 2 .3 - 3 .4
VE - 1 .8 - 3 .8 - 1 .6 - 4 .2 - 2 .9 - 3 .6
OE - 2 .9 - 4 .3 - 1 .4 - 4 .0 - 2 .8 - 4 .0
TX - 1 .6 - 4 .3 - 0 .9 - 4 .1 - 3 .6 - 4 .9
CL - 2 .5 - 3 .3 - 0 .5 - 4 .2 - 3 .3 - 4 .2
BG - 4 .1 - 5 .2 - 2 .0 - 4 .5 - 2 .5 - 3 .3
TF - 3 .2 - 4 .7 - 1 .7 - 5 .2 - 2 .6 - 5 .6
PP - 1 .8 - 3 .7 - 2 .3 - 4 .4 - 2 .3 - 3 .9
CN - 2 .9 - 6 .6 - 2 .6 - 5 .0 - 2 .0 - 3 .0
Table A.2
A D F  tests o f cointegration for the wage 
equations o f table 3.
FD T - 3 .5 EE - 5 .8 BG - 3 .9
CH - 5 .0 EE - 6 .0 BG - 3 .9
CH - 5 .2 VE - 2 .4 TF - 3 .9
M M - 4 .3 VE - 2 .5 TF - 4 .0
M M - 4 .4 OE - 4 .1 PP - 4 .1
M E - 5 .5 OE - 4 .1 PP - 4 .1
ME - 5 .4 TX - 4 .9 CN - 5 .1
IE - 3 .0 TX - 5 .1 CN - 6 .7
IE - 3 .0 CL - 1 .5
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Table 3'
Marginal revenue product condition [table 3, eq. (39)].
Industry
Parameters FD T CH CH M M M M  ME ME
“ i 1.62(11.9) 1.05(7.5) 0.93(6.5) 3.13(5.3) 2.96(7.4) 2.16(8.7) 2.08(10.1)
oc2
*31 0.14(3.4) 0.20(2.7) 0.24(4.1) 0.53(4.3) 0.55(4.4) 0.25(3.3) 0.30(3.7)
*32 1.20(3.2) 0.30(1.8) 0.40(2.2) 0.32(1.6) 0.32(1.6) 0.51(2.6) 0.82(3.6)
*4 * i - l <*! — 1 *1“ 1 0.69(1.6) 0.55(2.2) oli- 1 * i - l
oc4y - - - -
*5 0.93(20.6) 0.86(8.3) 0.91(9.5) 0.89 (14.5) 0.86(16.0) 0.81(13.0) 0.76(11.3)
se 0.0131 0.0203 0.0206 0.0412 0.0426 0.0263 0.0285
Industry
Parameters IE IE EE EE VE VE
*i 1.13(12.9)1 1.12(12.5) 1.29(7.3) 1.24(6.9) 1.92(2.80) 1.66(2.6)
*2
*31 0.12(1.8) 0.13(1.8) 0.20(3.8) 0.20(3.7) 0.31(5.9) 0.33(6.1)
*32 0.26(1.2) 0.25(1.2) 0.69(5.2) 0.68(5.1) 0.33(2.6) 0.33(2.5)
*4 * i - l a i - l  -0 .1 3 (0 .4 ) -0 .2 3 (0 .8 )  2.22(2.7) 1.86(2.6)
*4y -0 .023(9 .2 )1 -0 .0 2 3 (8 .9 )  - - -0 .0 4 1 (4 .0 )  - -0.036(3.7)
*5 0.76(9.9) 0.76(9.9) 0.80(15.7) 0.80(15.2) 0.95(29.1) 0.93(21.0)
se 0.0258 0.0257 0.0174 0.0174 0.0193 0.0192
Industry
Parameters OE OE TX TX CL BG BG
*i 1.57(9.2) 1.55(9.5) 1.46(7.6) 1.41 (7.7) 1.16(2.7) 3.58(10.4) 3.57(10.7)
*2 - 0.94(1.9) 1.06(2.2) - -
*31 0.28(3.7) 0.30(3.9) 0.49(6.2) 0.51(6.3) 0.37(7.0) 0.31(4.7) 0.31(4.8)
*32 0.81(2.7) 0.92(3.1) 0.73(3.5) 0.76(3.7) 0.64(2.6) 0.86(6.2) 0.86(6.3)
*4 * i - l OC] — 1 *i — l « i ~ 1 a , - l  0.90(4.2) 0.90(4.3)
*4? - - -
*5 0.81(14.1) 0.80(13.9) 0.81(20.8) 0.80(20.5) 0.84(19.9) 0.90(26.3) 0.90(26.3)
se 0.0266 0.0268 0.0198 0.0199 0.0190 0.0187 0.187
Industry
Parameters TF TF PP PP CN C N
“ i 2.24(5.5) 2.18(5.9) 2.11(5.1) 2.01(11.9) 1.60(0.7) 2.78(0.7)
*2
*31 0.23(2.7) 0.24(2.9) - -A D 2.03(2.9) 2.21 (3.2)
*32 0.71(3.6) 0.71(3.7) 0.26(2.0) 0.40(3.0) -
a4 -0 .0 1 (0 .0 ) -0 .0 5 (0 .1 )  a ! - l (Xi — 1 -1 .1 9 (1 .3 )  - -1.89(0.7)
*47 - - - -0 .0 5 3 (2 .1 )  - -0.038(0.8)
*5 0.91(18.7) 0.91(18.2) 0.93(21.4) 0.84(15.9) 0.90(8.3) 0.95(10.6)
se 0.0264 0.0265 0.0178 0.0170i 0.0315 0.0318
aN otes as in table 3 of main text. For industry C N  we use the adjusted budget deficit (AD) as 
the demand variable since it is more relevant for this industry than the international variables 
used elsewhere.
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Appendix B
Table B .l 
Data.
1. N t Employees in employment in industry i, male and females, G.B., mid-year. Source:
Employment Gazette.
2. K j  Gross capital stock (plant and machinery) in industry i. Between 1963 and 1977,
data taken from Panic (1978). Before 1963 and after 1977, annual gross capital 
stock (plant and machinery) from the Blue Book were used.
3. Wi Real labour cost in industry i. First we compute male hourly wage rate, W'm and
female hourly wage rate, W ‘{ by the expressions
Ej„ =  W*n x N H  +  W l  x 1.3 x { H lm- N H ) ,
where EJn, Ef are male and female average weekly earnings in industry i. H'm, H \  
are male and female average weekly hours in industry i. Then we calculate
Wi = ^ k xWim+^ xWi^x{l + t l l
where N ‘m, N £ are male and female employment in industry i.
Sources: Earnings and hours are October figures in the Employment Gazette. 
Employment are mid-year figures from the Employment Gazette. Employment Tax 
(tx). See Layard and Nickell (1986).
4. Pj Output price in industry i. U p to 1977, data taken from the Cambridge Growth
M odel data bank via the M acroeconomic M odelling Bureau, Warwick University. 
After 1977, these are the wholesale price indices in British Business.
5. Pmi Price of raw materials purchased by industry i. Source: British Business.
6. A/ Five-year moving averages o f technical progress in industry i. (T P t). Using a
constant returns to scale production function,
=  K h N h T P  J,
where YG =  gross output in industry i at constant prices, M' =  raw materials input 
of industry i at constant prices; TP, was calculated with the technique described in 
Layard and Nickell (1986). Source: Y‘G, M ; at current prices from the Census of  
Production are deflated by the respective price indices.
7. comp Competitiveness series described in Layard and Nickell (1986).
8. wt, Index of world production (market economies), detrended by a quintic in time.
Source: U N  monthly statistics.
9. u Male unemployment rate, mid-year, G.B. Source: Layard and Nickell (1986).
10. u; Industry unemployment rate, male and female, mid-year, G.B., defined as
U R i / iN i+ U R j ) .  Source for U R t: Employment Gazette. After 1982, when these are 
no longer published, they are estimated from several proxy indicators; lagged U R if 
UR,  deviation of iVf from a m oving average. The weights used to combine these 
proxy indicators result from a regression with U R t as the dependent variable.
11. Yi Index of industrial production. Source: Blue Book.
12. Y Potential output o f the econom y. Source: Layard and Nickell (1986).
13. W  Average aggregate hourly wages, male, October. Source: Layard and Nickell
(1986).
14. P  Output price index (TFE deflator at factor cost) described in Layard and Nickell,
N IER  (1985). Sources: Blue Book.
15. AD  Adjusted fiscal stance. Source: Layard and Nickell (1986).
16. Up  U nion power. Unadjusted union mark-up. Source: Stewart (1983).
17. Wedge Taxes plus relative price o f imports weighted by the share o f imports in final
expenditure. See: Layard and Nickell (1986).
18. tj ‘Tax’ rate on labour paid by employers. Source: Layard and Nickell (1986).
19. CJ Five-firm concentration ratio. This is based on net output and is averaged over the
three-digit industries within each two-digit one. Source: Census of Production.
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